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2Abstract
This thesis repositions racial population issues as central to an understanding 
of the final decades of settler rule in Rhodesia. At the time of the disintegration of the 
Central African Federation, the small and transient white population of Rhodesia 
rested precariously atop a massive and fast-growing African population; and with 
high rates of white emigration and the spectre of being handed over to African 
majority rule, the Rhodesian regime declared their illegal independence from Britain 
in 1965. As several factors ripened together in the 1970s, including white 
Rhodesians’ heightened population anxieties, the economic strains of the white ‘brain 
drain,’ and the African population ‘explosion,’ the demographically fragile settler 
state was gradually stretched to the breaking point. It was in this context that the 
escalation of the guerrilla war added new pressures and exacerbated pre-existing 
demographic strains that forced Rhodesia’s final collapse in 1979. Despite their 
important role in the collapse of the settler regime, population matters have not been 
sufficiently addressed, periodised, or properly contextualised in Rhodesian history.
As little scholarship as there has been on the significance of population matters 
generally, there has been even less on the ubiquity of white population anxieties, how 
these pressures shaped white society, or on the efforts of both the settler state and 
African nationalists to engineer these demographics. These demographic strains have 
typically been cast as a byproduct of the military conflict, and efforts to re-configure 
population numbers as merely an adjunct to the shooting war. In contrast to the 
prevailing orthodoxies on the subject, this thesis argues that this demographic struggle 
long pre-dated the escalation of the war, and that it was the Rhodesian state’s defeat in 
the demographic ‘war of numbers,’ and the consequences which flowed from this 
failure, that were directly responsible for the settler state’s collapse.
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5Chapter I
Introduction: The Hidden War of Numbers in Rhodesia1
Two wars were fought alongside each other in the final decades of white rule 
in Rhodesia that in combination brought about the collapse of the settler state. One 
war was always more voluble and violent, as it had far-reaching diplomatic and 
international political significance, and would from late 1972 escalate into a deadly 
civil war with guerrillas and counter-insurgency forces clashing inside and outside 
Rhodesia. This was the better known of the two wars, and the one to attract the 
attention of most historians studying the last years of settler rule. This war was also 
the only one retrospectively acknowledged by the political actors on both sides of the 
conflict in Rhodesia, and the only one that has seeped into the shared memories of 
Rhodesians and Zimbabweans alike. Yet there was another war in Rhodesia, a war of 
numbers. In some respects this was a disguised war, and instead of hills and villages, 
sanctions and electoral rolls, this was a contest over racial birth rates and death rates, 
immigration and emigration patterns, racial boundaries, and head counting. But this 
war of numbers was perhaps more important, and certainly no less political, than the 
louder and more violent war, even as its political nature was somewhat obscured by 
an apolitical, coded language of economic development, modernisation,
1 The phrase used in the title o f this thesis, ‘War o f Numbers,’ has acquired two different meanings 
over the years. The first instance o f it being used as a unified phrase was by Lord Beveridge in an 
article that featured in the New York Times in 1946, entitled, ‘The War Hitler Won—The War o f  
Numbers.’ Beveridge’s usage refers to the demographic competition between Nazi Germany and 
neighbouring countries over population size. It was again to describe demographic competitions, 
primarily those that occurred in the Balkans, which Milica Bookman also refers to as a war o f numbers. 
The most popular instance o f the phrase, however, was in a memoir by a former CIA analyst, Samuel 
Adams, entitled, The War o f  Numbers: An Intelligence Memoir, published in 1994. Adams’ usage 
described the bureaucratic controversy within the United States government over North Vietnamese 
troop numbers prior to the Tet Offensive. Similarly, Judith Tucker’s article from 1982 again focuses 
on a controversy over statistics, this time regarding the casualties from the Lebanon War. Both 
meanings have since generated their own separate lineages. In a sense, this thesis refers to both a 
demographic war o f  racial population numbers, and a war over the significance of these numbers in 
Rhodesian history. But this thesis’ title is primarily intended to convey the meaning of Beveridge’s 
and Bookman’s usage o f the phrase, as a demographic competition between ethnic groups. See: L. 
Beveridge, ‘The War Hitler Won—The War o f Numbers; It increased Germany’s Population relatively 
to that o f her victims, raising a world issue,’ New York Times, 18 August 1946; M. Bookman, The 
Demographic Struggle fo r  Power: The Political Economy o f  Demographic Engineering in the modern 
World (London, Cass Publishing, 1997); S. Adams, The War o f  Numbers: An Intelligence Memoir 
(South Royalton, Steerforth Press, 1994); J. Tucker, ‘The War o f Numbers’, The Lebanon War, Middle 
East Research and Information Project Report No. 108/109 (September-October 1982).
2 Over the period o f my research, this same political entity was known sequentially as Southern 
Rhodesia (then a part o f the Central African Federation), Rhodesia, and Zimbabwe-Rhodesia.
6humanitarianism, feminism, and environmentalism. Because of this coded language, 
historians have looked past this other war to the more conspicuous images beyond as 
though those more violent dramas represented the entire story of Rhodesia’s collapse. 
The relative imperceptibility of the war of numbers to subsequent observers did not at 
all mean it was vaporous or insubstantial at the time. It was the defeat in this war of 
numbers that sapped the morale of, and had profound psychological effects on white 
society; heaved unbearable economic and ecological pressures on the state; further 
undermined the white regime’s international and domestic legitimacy; and rendered 
the military conflict unwinnable. In contrast to the prevailing orthodoxies on the 
subject of the fall of white Rhodesia, this thesis argues that it was the Rhodesian 
state’s defeat in the war of numbers, and the numerous and surprisingly varied 
consequences which flowed from this failure, that were directly responsible for the 
settler state’s political downfall. Nonetheless, it would be misleading to regard these 
two wars as being wholly distinct from one another, as they were inseparably 
commingled. These two complementary wars permeated, interacted, and influenced 
each other in complex ways, and neither the more conspicuous war of liberation nor 
the more clouded war of population numbers can be understood in isolation of the 
other.
The racial composition of Rhodesia was always of existential importance to 
the white-ruled settler state, both in regards to its de facto viability and its de jure 
legal status under both British imperial law and international law. Rhodesia was a 
British possession, which from 1923 to 1965 awkwardly straddled the imperial 
classifications of colony and dominion —classifications that were not simply 
constitutional and conceptual, but were was also self-regarding for the white 
inhabitants of these imperial territories. In a sense, Rhodesia was always an inchoate 
dominion: a settler colony with too few white settlers, and a tropical colony with too 
many. Settlers in Rhodesia viewed themselves as out of the same mould as 
Australians, New Zealanders, Canadians and South Africans, and in fact many of 
these settlers were the very same people drifting from one end of the former British
3 Highlighting this inchoate status, Rhodesia was a colony, but was not the responsibility o f the former 
Colonial Office as were other colonies, but of the Dominions Office (later the Commonwealth 
Relations Office), and it was the only colony to have a High Commission in London, a mission status 
normally reserved for independent members of the Commonwealth. Rhodesian Prime Ministers were 
also invited to attend the periodic Commonwealth Prime Ministers’ Meetings, another manifestation of 
its quasi-independent status.
7Empire to the other, but despite a self-conscious grasping on the part of Rhodesian 
settlers for recognition of their commonality and equivalence with other settler 
communities, Rhodesia as a political entity was always a special case, a species of its 
own.
Rhodesia may have superficially resembled these former dominions in their 
political institutions, social manners, sporting culture, and in their general settler 
ethos, but unlike these other societies, the political power of Rhodesia’s settler state 
was compromised by an ambiguous metropolitan tether, and rested precariously atop 
a massive and growing indigenous population. Among these settler societies, 
Rhodesia was most comparable to South Africa, which was also a minority regime in 
southern Africa presiding over an expanding African population. But even in this 
comparison, important distinctions existed. South Africa’s white settlers were far 
more numerous than were Rhodesia’s, both relative to their country’s respective 
African populations and in absolute numbers, and were more rooted to the country 
than were Rhodesian settlers.4 Most importantly, South African settlers had been 
granted irrevocable political independence by the British, whereas Rhodesia’s 
application for dominion status was postmarked several decades too late, after the 
irrepressible political momentum in Britain and the wider international community 
turned away from the concepts of colonial trusteeship and inherent racial superiority 
upon which the principle of minority settler rule rested. There is little doubt that had 
whites in Rhodesia been able to establish themselves as a majority of the Rhodesian 
population, that Britain and the rest of the international community would have 
granted de jure recognition to the settler government, and even barring that unrealistic 
counterfactual, had whites in Rhodesia formed a more sizable percentage of the 
population than what existed there is little doubt that the state’s de facto viability 
would have been greatly enhanced.5 Yet far from expanding the percentage of whites 
in Rhodesia, the settler regime witnessed a continuous shrinking of the ratio of whites 
to Africans. And so while white Australians could effectively ignore the presence of 
their small Aboriginal population, Canadians could cordon-off and condescend to
4 Rhodesia’s settler population was notably smaller and more transient than any other significant 
settler population in Africa. The pied  noirs o f French Algeria, for instance, numbered 984,000 in 1954, 
four fifths o f whom were bom in Algeria. R. Aldrich, Greater France: A History o f  French Overseas 
Expansion (Houndsmills, Palgrave, 1996).
5 It was indeed the hope of the post-UDI Rhodesian regime that increased international connections 
and assertions of the state’s viability would wear down and outlast Western hostility, and that a de 
facto  recognition o f the settler state would evolve by stages into de jure  recognition.
their shrinking Native American population, New Zealanders could afford to 
gradually assimilate their Maori population, and white South Africans had the 
political freedom to construct an elaborate racial system to compartmentalise and 
mitigate the threats posed by their African population, none of these options were 
available to settlers in Rhodesia. Adding to this unique situation, from the early 
1960s Africans in Rhodesia were one of the fastest growing populations in the world, 
and the white settlers, who were notoriously transient, were simultaneously 
experiencing a drop in birth rates that was steeper than any comparable population 
around the world. These historical trends were all on a collision course with the futile 
hopes of white settlers that Rhodesia be recognised by Britain as an independent 
member of the Commonwealth, free and fully equal with other nation-states.
For the combined reasons set out above, the settler state of Rhodesia was 
never granted de jure independence by the British, and so in a dramatic coup de 
theatre the small settler community took it for themselves. Tire settler state’s 
Unilateral Declaration of Independence (UDI) from Britain in 1965 occurred within 
the context of a growing insecurity among whites in Rhodesia following Britain’s 
decision to dismantle the Central African Federation, of which Rhodesia was the 
principal member, and was the larger entity through which many whites hoped to 
finally achieve dominion status. In 1964, Rhodesia’s two former Federation partners 
quickly gained their independence as the African-ruled states of Zambia and Malawi, 
leaving the fate of white-ruled Rhodesia undecided. Britain’s decision to dismantle 
the Federation, and grant majority rule to the Federation’s two northern colonies, was 
consistent with their policy of wholesale African decolonisation following the famous 
‘Winds of Change’ speech in January 1960. By 1965, only Rhodesia and the former 
High Commission territories of Botswana, Lesotho, and Swaziland remained under 
British control in sub-Saharan Africa, with the latter three all gaining independence 
within three years. Whites in Rhodesia were all too aware of their anomalous and 
precarious status in post-colonial Africa, and with a rapidly emigrating population and 
the looming fear of being handed over to majority African rule by Britain, Prime 
Minister Ian Smith’s government declared independence from Britain on 11 
November, 1965. The Rhodesian state that was then created was an autonomous, if 
ostensibly illegal, entity politically dominated by white settlers until its collapse in 
1980. A white-ruled state dominated by a shrinking settler minority, bom into an
9overwhelmingly African-ruled continent hostile to the regime’s survival, and 
welcomed into an international state system that proclaimed its very existence a threat 
to world peace—that racial population numbers mattered in this political environment 
would seem to be, despite the historical silence on the matter, self-evident.
From before the time of UDI and continuing until independence, the white 
state and African nationalists battled for control of Rhodesia with varying levels of 
intensity on the political, military, and demographic fronts. The struggle over 
demographic engineering was itself contested on many levels. The political decisions 
determining these demographic policies came from as far afield as Salisbury, Lusaka, 
London, the United Nations Headquarters in New York City, and from scattered 
guerrilla camps in Mozambique and Zambia. The sites of conflict were also diverse, 
and included: the border ports of entry and departure in Rhodesia and abroad, the 
farms and roads of Rhodesia, in family planning and reproductive clinics, in 
newspapers and on the radio and television sets in Rhodesia, on the parliament floors 
in London and Salisbury, in the criminal courts of Britain and elsewhere, and perhaps 
most importantly, within both white and African families in Rhodesia. The variety of 
these sites of conflict and the geographical diversity of the decision centers reflect the 
geographical and conceptual breadth of this parallel struggle. The specific contours 
of this struggle were primarily dictated by two demographic realities: the rapid growth 
of the African population, and the small size and transience of the white population. 
By the late 1960s, the state had formulated an overall population strategy to increase 
white numbers and decrease African numbers, a strategy that was comprehensive in 
scale, but only desultorily applied and unevenly effective. Defensively, African 
nationalists also engaged in this demographic struggle, though mostly in reaction to 
state initiatives. Despite the asymmetry of interest and initiative in demographic 
engineering, these population trends of decreasing white birth rates, a growing 
African population, and continued white transience, intensified over the course of the 
1970s, and all were moving in a direction that aided the nationalist cause and 
weakened the Rhodesian state. More than any battle, bombing, election result, coup, 
or diplomatic maneuver, these two trends, and the failure of the Rhodesian state to 
effectively alter them or mitigate their effects, and to a lesser extent the nationalists 
and guerrillas’ successes in reinforcing these trends, determined the eventual outcome 
of the wider conflict in Rhodesia.
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White Rhodesia eventually lost the war of numbers, even as the state’s 
definition of victory evolved over time. The settler state could never achieve a sizable 
or stable white population in its 90-year history as a white possession, despite active 
efforts to do so. Before independence in 1980, the demographic frailty of white 
society in the overwhelmingly African territory was realised to be of great 
significance by both international and domestic policy-makers and analysts, and was a 
pervasive part of everyday life in Rhodesia, especially for the small white population.6 
As it was, whites in the territory never accounted for more than five percent of the 
total population, and hovered over five percent for only the nine years from 1955 to 
1964, peaking in 1961 at 5.67 percent, and falling thereafter until the end of white rule 
in 1980, when their actual numbers were most likely less than only three percent of
n
the total population. Moreover, consistently high levels of population turnover 
through immigration and emigration throughout its short history reveal a white
o
Rhodesia that always relied upon a perilous demographic juggling act, and exposes a 
transient white population with only shallow national loyalties. In this context, the 
political, economic, psychological, and military effects of the rapidly expanding 
African population were doubly compounded. In waging the population war of 
numbers to reverse these widening ratios, the state was faced with irreconcilable 
conflicts and contradictions within their short-term and long-term policy goals, and 
these conflicts were never reconciled. Most broadly, the state had to solve or mitigate 
the problem of widening racial ratios or else the settler state would collapse, yet the 
solutions to these problems were also fatal to the state. And so the population 
problems in Rhodesia were like a patient with an inoperable terminal condition, in 
which the underlying problem and any solution to that problem would both kill the 
patient.9
6 Several works describe white anxieties at the time regarding their minority status in an 
overwhelmingly African country. See D. Kennedy, Islands o f  White: Settler Society and Culture in 
Kenya and Southern Rhodesia, 1890-1939 (Durham, Duke University, 1987); F. Clements, Rhodesia:
A Study o f  the Deterioration o f  a White Society (New York, Praeger, 1969); and R. Blake, A History o f  
Rhodesia (London, Eyre Methuen, 1977).
7 Statistics were calculated using the Monthly Digest o f Statistics issued by the Rhodesian 
government’s Central Statistical Office.
8 Alois Mlambo discusses this high rate of population turnover as always being a characteristic of 
white Rhodesia. A. Mlambo, White Immigration into Rhodesia: From Occupation to Federation 
(Harare, University of Zimbabwe, 2002).
9 To take this analogy further, it is quite possibly true that some state officials realised the terminal 
nature of Rhodesia’s condition at the time, and sought merely to prolong the lifespan for as long as 
possible. In a 1983 interview, Ian Smith answered a question about UDI by saying, “We gave
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With the escalation of the war and the continuation of these demographic 
trends, the small and transient white population was gradually stretched to the 
breaking point. Rhodesia’s white population after UDI was one of the most 
demographically fragile ruling ethnic castes in any polity anywhere in the world, and 
when the weakened settler regime finally surrendered in 1979, it was not so much the 
result of any decisive clashes in the civil war, as it was an exhausted acknowledgment 
on behalf of the settler state that it lost the war of numbers and could no longer resist 
the expanding demographic forces moving against it. The creation of Zimbabwe in 
1980 marked the final end of white rule and with it the conclusion of the seven-year 
civil war, the fifteen years of fruitless settlement negotiations, and the final end to the 
war of numbers that had been waged with escalating intensity for a decade and a half.
Thesis Overview
Even while population numbers were abstractly and conceptually recognised 
by white settlers to be linked to Rhodesia’s long term viability as a settler state since 
at least the late 1950s, prior to the 1962 census exact population figures were 
unknown, and the knowledge of these numbers once revealed had profound effects on 
white society. The census corresponded with the dissolution of the Central African 
Federation and the rapid independence of Rhodesia’s two former Federation partners. 
As will be discussed in chapter two, the findings of this census, and the one that 
followed it in 1969, concretised popular anxieties among whites about the widening 
population ratios in Rhodesia, and provided the impetus for a variety of state efforts to 
reconfigure these racial populations as a means of maintaining settler control.
The most shocking revelation to emerge from the 1962 census concerned the 
size of Rhodesia’s African population. The census revealed an African population of 
3,616,600, 20 percent higher than previous estimates of that population,10 and roughly 
17 times the total white population. As chapter three outlines, this African 
population ‘explosion’ fed into whites’ longstanding fears regarding African sexual 
practices and their more recent insecurities concerning their political future in 
postcolonial Africa, and meshed with the increasingly widespread neo-Malthusianism
Rhodesia 15 wonderful years extra...We gave the country 15 exhilarating years...We held the line 
back.” ‘Ian Douglas Smith, Ex-Leader of Rhodesia, Dies’, New York Times, 20 November 2007.
10 ‘3,610,000 Africans— 20% Above Estimate’, RH, 22 June 1962.
theory o f  an impending population apocalypse. These fears prompted more active 
efforts on the part o f the state to slow African population growth so as to maintain 
political stability, economic growth, and secure white privilege. In the late 1960s, the 
Rhodesian state formulated a comprehensive population policy which was 
economically grounded in a government report created by a South African economist 
and demographer, Dr. Jan Sadie. The Sadie Report outlined the need to both increase 
white immigration and slow the African growth rate to maintain favourable racial 
ratios in order to stave o ff economic disaster. This Report, published in 1968, 
provided the theoretical blueprint for the state’s population war, but it was the 1969 
census a year later that provided the state its casus belli for the population war.
Simultaneous with this new knowledge o f Rhodesia's growing African 
population, the Rhodesian public became increasingly aware o f the extent o f white 
emigration. High rates o f white emigration were a longstanding phenomenon in 
Rhodesia, but normally white immigration numbers masked the outflow such that an 
illusion o f continuity remained. However, with the precipitous drop in immigration . 
numbers in the early 1960s, these emigration numbers became more obvious, and for 
the first time in Rhodesia's history the white population was actually decreasing. This 
in itself was objectively damaging to the settler state, but the knowledge o f this 
population drain and its subjective effects on white morale and confidence in the 
future o f  white rule compounded this damage. Chapter four traces the phenomenon of 
white emigration from Rhodesia, and exposes the remarkable transience o f the white 
population. It was partially out o f the Rhodesian Front’s frustration over Prime 
Minister Winston Field’s failure to reverse these migration trends that it became 
possible for Ian Smith’s internal party coup in 1964. Immediately upon entering 
office, Smith began to initiate policies with the purpose o f rebalancing and mitigating 
the effects o f  the racial ratios in Rhodesia.
As Rhodesia continued to flounder in a constitutional stalemate after the 
disintegration o f the Federation, unable to convince Britain to release it to white 
dominion status, the settler population began to drift away to more politically stable 
destinations, and few new immigrants arrived to replace them. It was out o f an effort 
to restore white confidence in the future o f white rule in Rhodesia and reverse 
migration flows, that Smith decided upon his most ambitious act in office, the 
Unilateral Declaration o f Independence from Britain. A decade after UDI, Smith
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asserted that his most important accomplishments in office were achieving the 
twinned goals of restoring white confidence and replenishing white numbers that were 
lost in the early to mid 1960s, and it was this bolstering of the white population that 
he considered to be the primary rationale behind UDI. Yet as will be discussed in 
chapter five, it would perhaps be more accurate for Smith to have stated that he won 
back a settler population, even as he lost another. Upon coming to office, an integral 
part of Smith’s population agenda consisted of lowering the selectivity requirements 
for white immigrants to Rhodesia in order to draw bigger yields. The loosening of 
Rhodesia’s selectivity standards included changes in the economic, educational, and 
ethnic criteria that prior Rhodesian governments had in place. Economically, this 
meant a lowering or dropping of the capital and skills requirements for white 
immigrants, and ethnically this meant allowing in greater numbers of non-British 
whites, particularly southern Europeans and Afrikaners. There was thus a significant 
population shift in the years following UDI that was distinct from the longstanding 
Rhodesian population turnover, as there were marked differences economically, 
ethnically, and politically between those who left and those who came to replace 
them.
In confronting the problems associated with African population growth, 
Smith’s government was less successful in lowering natural growth rates than in the 
mitigation of their harmful effects to the regime. It was in this regard that his 
government aimed to stop the political progress of Africans under the 1961 
constitution by introducing and campaigning for the 1969 republican constitution, 
which limited African political power to a distant parity, regardless of total numbers. 
In the referendum campaign, government propaganda relied heavily upon population 
fears, and the regime cynically timed the release of both phases of the 1969 census 
results to add rhetorical fuel to the campaign. Through the policies of charging for 
some social services, and pegging other costs to factors unrelated to actual African 
numbers, Smith’s government pursued ways in which the Treasury would not have to 
bear the increasing burden of African population growth. Less successful, were the 
state’s efforts to halt the urban influx, harden job reservation policies, and set into 
motion the broader separate development policies—all efforts to mitigate the 
byproducts of African growth.
Even as Smith’s efforts to confront the population problem yielded some 
successes in the form o f more immigrants and the mitigation o f some o f the effects o f 
African growth, his government was never able to fully stem the flow o f emigrants 
from Rhodesia or slow the growth o f the African population, failures that were in part 
the fruit o f  nationalist successes. While the state’s family planning efforts increased 
in scale in the 1970s, they were met with increasing resistance from the African 
population, in particular from the African male population in the rural areas. The 
traditional pronatalism o f African males and the embedded peasant suspicions o f the 
settler state’s motives were tapped into by the guerrillas and combined to frustrate 
state efforts at promoting family planning. By the mid 1970s, while the white 
population had regained lost numbers and even reached new peaks, their commitment 
to Rhodesia was always weak, making this population vulnerable to disintegration 
when faced with any significant hardship— vulnerabilities that were successfully 
exploited by the nationalists. With the escalation o f the military war in 1972, 
guerrillas began to attack white settler farms and commit high-profile acts o f political 
terror in part to both force emigration and discourage new immigration, and this new 
level o f violence, both real and perceived, had a marked effect on white migration 
patterns. The shooting war also had interesting effects on white fertility patterns. 
Chapter six analyses the scope and effectiveness o f African nationalist agency in this 
population war.
Eventually, the weight o f African numbers and the small size and transience of 
the white population proved too much for the settler state to resist majority-rule any 
longer. African population growth continued to drain the Treasury and increase 
economic pressures on the regime. It also continued to fill the urban areas with 
unemployed and disaffected African youths who were easily recruited into the 
nationalist cause. The frail white population began once again to drift away in large 
numbers after the increased call-ups beginning in the mid 1970s, despite draconian 
efforts to force them to stay and fight. More importantly, though, white immigration 
slowed to a drip and, as a result, the extent o f  white emigration was exposed to the 
broader white public. This evidence o f population decline was internalised by white 
society, and a sense o f decay seeped into the white Rhodesian psyche in the late 
1970s. This perception o f  decay became self-fulfilling, and by the late 1970s there 
was a full fo o d  o f whites fleeing Rhodesia by any means possible— a flood that
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included some prominent Cabinet Ministers and state officials. Unable to hold on to 
power with his shrinking base o f support and his disappearing military muscle, Smith 
was forced into sharing power with Bishop Abel Muzorewa in an ill-fated attempt to 
co-opt moderate African opinion. Even this position eventually proved untenable, 
and in 1979 the white regime negotiated its own demise at the Lancaster House talks 
in London.
l o J u
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This thesis repositions population issues as central to an understanding o f  the
collapse o f  white rule in Rhodesia, yet this account cannot be accurately characterised
as demographic determinism. Demographic determinism in this context would mean
that the collapse o f  the Rhodesian regime was inevitable and followed from fixed
demographic laws, and that human agency played no role in this process. Yet as Peter
O 'T oole’s Lawrence o f  Arabia emphatically pronounced in the classic movie o f the
same name, “Nothing is W ritten!"11 Demographic trends in Rhodesia were not
predestined, but were subject to change, susceptible to interference, and were the
result o f human agency, both on the individual and political levels. John lliffe writes,
“Population change is not an autonomous force; it results from other historical
processes, above all human volition...it is a sensitive indicator o f  change, the point at
which historical dynam ics fuse into an outcome which expresses... the most
* 12 , ,fundamental circumstances and concerns o f ordinary people." “ The population 
trends in Rhodesia were the collective amalgam o f thousands o f human decisions— 
whether to immigrate to Rhodesia, emigrate from Rhodesia, when to marry, the 
number and spacing o f  children, and other significant life choices— decisions that 
were personal, but which were influenced by these individuals' psychological, social, 
economic, and political environments. The conditions within which these 
demographic decisions were made were violently contested by African nationalists 
and the state, and it was in the shaping o f  the conditions where the war o f numbers 
was waged. That the settler state ultimately failed to reverse these demographic 
trends, and that the nationalists benefitted from them, does not lead to the conclusion 
that this course o f  events was inevitable and fixed, following mechanically from
11 Lawrence o f  Arabia (1962).
12 J. Iliffe, Africans: The History o f  a Continent (Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1995). 
Despite Iliffe's introductory caveat about the role of human volition in population change in Africans, it 
is his focus on the centrality o f population pressures in driving major historical developments in Africa 
that he has nonetheless been accused of laying out an overly deterministic historical argument. See: T. 
Spear, ‘Africa’s Population History \  Journal o f  African History, Vol. 37, No. 3 (1996).
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predictable natural laws. As will be discussed, the different components of 
J  Rhodesia’s demography were only unevenly affected by the various political actions 
that were implemented. Some engineering tactics were implemented and proved 
successful in altering conditions and influencing demographic decision-making, other 
actions that could have potentially impacted demographic numbers were considered 
and rejected, and still other initiatives were preempted or countered by their 
opponent’s policies.
Differentiating Rhodesia’s Populations
In its simplest form, the demographic war of numbers in Rhodesia concerned
only the white and African populations, yet this most important racial division belied
what was in fact a diverse spectrum of peoples with ambiguous and inconsistent racial
distinctions resting in the middle of these two primary racial poles. Between the
opposite poles of British-born whites and indigenous Africans, were complex
gradations that carried both social and legal significance. In Rhodesia, the social
stratification of ethnicities placed British-born Rhodesians, or those descended s
directly from Britain, atop the hierarchy; followed by those of northern and western
European descent who assimilated into the mainstream of Rhodesian society; then
below them, the largely self-segregated Afrikaner population; and then the southern
1 ^and eastern Europeans, particularly Greeks, Portuguese, and Jews. Lower in the 
social hierarchy were those whose position in white Rhodesian society was less clear, 
such as Turks, Arabs, and Persians who all inconsistently passed for whites.14 All 
those deemed to be white faced no legal barriers in Rhodesia, despite the often 
isolating social barriers some non-British whites confronted. The small Asian 
community did face legal barriers, in terms of occupational and residential 
segregation, as well as other pettier forms of discrimination. However, Asians were 
largely supportive of the white regime15 and enjoyed legal rights not afforded to
13 See Clements, for an explanation o f the white social hierarchy. Clements, Deterioration.
14 See Clements, Deterioration.
15 For example, when the Pearce Commission reported on the approval or disapproval o f the Anglo- 
Rhodesian Agreement in 1971, a fairly accurate proxy for the support o f the regime, the African 
population massively voted “no”, while 97% of the “Coloureds” and 96% of the Asians, along with 
98% of the whites, voted “yes.” ‘Rhodesia-Mzilikaze to Smith’, Africa Institute Bulletin, Vol. 15 
(1977).
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Africans or to those who in southern African parlance were termed ‘Coloureds. I6‘
This population who were described by others and who identified themselves as 
Coloured, was actually a diverse composite o f mixed race peoples, lighter-skinned 
Africans from outside Rhodesia, dark skinned Indians from Goa, natives from St.
17Helena, and even included some assimilated indigenous Africans. This population 
faced greater legal barriers than did the Asians, but still were relatively privileged in a 
legal sense, compared against indigenous Africans, who were on the bottom o f 
Rhodesia’s social and legal hierarchy and were constrained by a wide variety o f legal 
and social barriers. The Rhodesian state did not preferentially differentiate among the 
indigenous African tribal and ethnic groups, as legally all were collapsed in the larger 
indigenous category, referred to as ‘African.’
The Rhodesian state’s population policies in the war o f numbers reflected the 
shifting relative worth o f different ethnic populations o f whites, even while racial 
divisions hardened. Since its founding in the late nineteenth century, Rhodesia had 
sought to restrict the immigration o f  non-British whites to maintain the British 
character o f  the colony, a policy intending most directly to address the fear o f a large
io
Afrikaner population. This pro-British bias in immigration continued until the mid 
1960s. With the rise to power o f Ian Smith, these former ethnic barriers to white 
immigration were jettisoned, and the Rhodesian Front's definition o f  desirable 
populations expanded to include southern Europeans and Afrikaners. Indeed, under 
Sm ith's governments, the M inister o f Immigration post was held by two Afrikaners, 
which in itself reflected a broader ethnic view o f white Rhodesia. Despite this 
softening o f  white ethnic biases, there were never any corresponding efforts to expand 
immigration selectivity further to include the non-white populations who were 
politically and economically allied to the white state, most notably Asians and 
Coloureds. Thus, despite the complex and subtle distinctions between ethnic and 
racial categories that carried both legal and social significance in Rhodesia, the 
demographic policies o f both the nationalists and the state focused exclusively upon 
the white settler population and the indigenous African population, with the more 
ambiguous middle groups ignored or disregarded as insignificant.
16 See J. Muzondidya, ‘Towards a Historical Understanding of the Making of the Coloured 
Community in Zimbabwe, 1890-1920’, Identity, Culture, and Politics, Vol. 3, No. 2 (December, 2002).
17 See Muzondidya, for a more in-depth description of Coloured identity. Muzondidya, Coloured 
Community.
Is A. Mlambo, White Immigration.
Racial coalescence after UDI had a profound influence on the formation o f 
white Rhodesian identity, a process complicated by continued white transience. The 
psychological anxieties and pressures brought on by the growing numerical disparities 
within Rhodesia, the consolidation o f African political power in the continent, and the 
near universal condemnation o f the white settler regime in the international 
community created a triple besiegement for white Rhodesians.19 This triple siege 
mentality interacted with white transience in interesting ways. It had the effect o f 
weakening ethnic divisions within white society, and forced a coalescence o f the 
white community within R hodesia/ Yet the constant population shuffle meant that
this racial unity within Rhodesia was necessarily inculcated to, and adopted by, new
\JJXM
immigrants quickly, and thus this acculturation process was deep but brief, similar to 
the acculturation o f undergraduate students into the life o f the university. As will be 
argued, however, these feelings o f white solidarity and o f a common defiance might 
well have engendered a bond among whites within Rhodesia and created a location 
for sentimentality afterwards, yet they did not for most constitute a true national 
feeling. Nonetheless, the anxieties engendered by the triple besiegement were 
internalised and absorbed by the whites in Rhodesia, if  only during their short 
residence, so much so that in the last decades o f settler rule, demographic issues not 
only permeated Rhodesian politics, but also defined what it meant to be a white 
Rhodesian, however brittle and ephemeral this identity may have been.
The Hidden Ubiquity of Population Pressures
The anxiety over racial demographics permeated Rhodesia’s political
9 Iatmosphere like a miasma^ during the final decades o f white rule, and its ubiquity
19 See for example: R. Hodder-Williams interview, Oral Archives, British Empire and Commonwealth 
Museum (hereafter BECM).
20 This coalescence o f white society in Rhodesia after UDI has been described by several historians, 
including Barry Schutz, Sue Onslow, Robert Blake, and Colin Leys. See, B. Schutz, ‘European 
Population Patterns, Cultural Persistence, and Political Change in Rhodesia’, Canadian Journal o f  
African Studies, Vol. 7, No. 1 (1973); S. Onslow, ‘’A Scheme of National Importance’: Winston Field 
and the Italian Settlement Scheme’ (unpublished, no date): R. Blake, A History, C. Leys, European 
Politics in Southern Rhodesia (London, Clarendon. 1959).
■' In a different context, William McNeill referred to the ubiquity o f population change to “the drones 
of the bagpipe” setting “a background tone against which the shriller voices of political debate compete 
for attention.” W. McNeill, Population and Politics Since 1750, (Charlottesville, University of 
Virginia Press, 1990), quoted in D. Kaplan, ‘Population and Politics in a Plural Society: The Changing
served as a unifier for all sorts o f facially dissimilar political phenomena. These 
anxieties innervated nearly every level and department o f the settler state, and 
influenced almost the entire range o f state policy. The connection between these 
political phenomena and the demographic motivations behind them, despite being 
retrospectively ignored by the participants in the conflict and overlooked by 
historians, are not the result o f fallacious cum hoc, ergo propter hoc reasoning, as 
these connections and the ubiquity o f demographic motives were public knowledge at 
the time and obvious to contemporaries in Rhodesia. During the last decades o f 
settler rule, racial demographics were a dominant theme in white Rhodesia’s public 
discourses: monthly migration numbers were consistently reported in the media as 
important news items; the reporting o f the 1962 and 1969 censuses garnered 
widespread public interest and fueled a stream of editorials and opinion letters; the 
Rhodesia H erald's editorial page regularly focused on population issues as diverse as 
urban influx policies, family planning, immigration, and emigration; Rhodesia's 
Parliament dedicated a great deal o f time to debating population matters; the Cabinet 
expended a disproportionate amount o f energy on attempts to reconfigure population 
numbers and mitigate their effects; and white politicians, academics, and lay people 
could be regularly heard expounding on the impending neo-M althusian doomsday, the 
urgent need for greater numbers o f white immigrants, the racial swamping o f the 
urban areas by dangerous African masses, or the problem o f white emigration.
Politicians and policymakers, the national media, and African nationalists explicitly 
linked a large proportion o f  Rhodesia’s political phenomena with their demographic 
impetuses. In other policy areas, the linkages between demographic motivations and 
public policy were so obvious as to often go publically unstated. Still other policies 
were motivated by racial demographics, but their linkages were purposefully obscured 
by policymakers: efforts at concealment that were at the time rarely a complete 
success. Population anxieties were thereby an open and notorious influence 
throughout Rhodesian politics clouding most policy considerations.
While population ‘problem s’ were often discussed and debated in the public
A ^
domain, they were nearly always cloaked in a more polished language o f economics
A , 96^w
and development, as opposed to the more raw language o f  racial domination. Oddly
Geography of Canada's Linguistic Groups,’ Annals o f  the Association o f  American Geographers. Vol. 
84, No. 1 (March, 1994).
enough, this cloaking was less effective in obscuring the role o f racial demographics 
at the time than it has been to subsequent observers. Several examples illustrate this 
cloaking o f language that hid demographic motivations: The state's drive for more 
white immigrants was always portrayed as solely an effort to import skills and capital 
to promote economic growth; controls on non-white immigration were defended as 
efforts to protect indigenous jobs; the state’s family planning policy was defended as 
an effort to alleviate scarcity, lessen unemployment, liberate women, and stem 
ecological degradation o f the rural areas; restrictions on white emigration were 
described as a way to protect the currency reserves and bolster the regim e's military 
conscription force; limiting the number o f Africans drifting into urban areas was a 
way to save urban infrastructures, limit urban unemployment, and encourage the
development o f the Tribal Trust Lands (TTL); separate development and the
22hardening o f racial job reservation policies*"' were both efforts to maintain a proper 
economic balance in Rhodesia, both spatially and in terms o f labour reserves; pegging 
social spending to factors other than population numbers was defended as the only 
way to wisely apportion competing demands on the Treasury; and finally, the 1969 
constitution capping African political potential to a distant parity was a method to 
ensure that no one race could dominate the other. Quite obviously, even these more 
palatable rationales all contained racist assumptions— dichotomies in which the white 
population was equated with the positive attributes o f economic growth, enterprise, 
and general national well-being, and the African population was equated with 
economic burdens, a drain on the Treasury, political demagoguery, and a national 
problem to be solved. Even so, the state argued publically that these policies were not 
‘political' in their origins, meaning that they were not malevolent attempts to 
reconfigure the racial ratios out o f concerns o f power, but were instead rational efforts 
to ensure growth and prosperity for all Rhodesians, white and African. Nonetheless, 
this cloak was easily pierced to reveal the baser reasoning o f the settler state, and it is 
unlikely that this obscuring on behalf o f the state was convincing for many 
contemporary Rhodesians, white or African. It was certainly not convincing for 
African parliamentarians who consistently identified the racist political motives 
behind such policies; nor to African nationalists, whose propaganda often exposed the
22 Rhodesia did not refer to its job reservation policies as such, but instead the policy eventually 
adopted by the Rhodesian Front was named "the rate for the job ,’ which was in all practicality another 
method to enshrine racial employment discrimination.
state's racist motives (even while also identifying what can be termed ‘false- 
positives’); nor did this cloak even prevent the more impolitic o f white Rhodesian 
Front backbenchers from directly arguing for the baser racial ends that underlay the 
state’s policies. However unconvincing this cloaking might have been to people at 
the time, these state efforts to downplay the importance and the ubiquity o f 
demographic motivations as political power concerns has successfully caused the 
majority o f historians and analysts to look clear past the ubiquitous influence of
23population matters in Rhodesian history.-
Notwithstanding the profound importance o f the population war, there have 
been incentives on both sides o f the Rhodesian conflict to retrospectively downplay or 
disregard the role o f population matters in the collapse o f the settler regime. 
Emphasising the importance o f  population issues muddies the clean narratives that 
both the Zimbabwean nationalists and Rhodesian apologists have constructed in the 
years following independence. For nationalist and ‘patriotic’ Zimbabwean historians 
and commentators, the narrative o f the liberation war was one o f  triumph won through 
blood and sacrifice against a formidable enemy and their imperialist allies.-4 Theirs' 
is a story o f heroes and villains. National liberation was something that was forcibly 
taken, and did not come about as the result o f  thoughtless, faceless demographic 
trends. Any narrative that assigns great weight to population trends lessens the roles 
o f those whom these writers seek to celebrate or vilify. Similarly, Rhodesian 
apologists portray the narrative o f  Zimbabwean independence also as a heroic 
struggle, albeit one in which the roles o f hero and villain are reversed. But the 
Rhodesian narrative takes on the form o f a tragedy. Theirs’ describes a futile struggle 
o f Rhodesians against foreign and domestic Communists, a struggle in which the 
heroic, but ultimately na'ive Rhodesians were betrayed during the climactic battle by 
their own pusillanimous kith and kin. This betrayal narrative was being formulated
25 • jeven as the regime was still collapsing,-- and has since become the predominate 
narrative among white Rhodesians in the diaspora. The most famous example o f this 
genre was written by Ian Smith him self in his autobiographical account o f the
23 See chapter five for a fuller discussion o f this cloaking discourse.
4 For an account of the shifting political uses o f history in Zimbabwe, see: T. Ranger, ‘Nationalist 
Historiography, Patriotic History and the History of the Nation: the Struggle over the past in 
Zimbabwe’, Journal o f  Southern African Studies, Vol. 30. No. 2 (June, 2004).
25 The then Minister o f Transport and Power. PK Van der Byl. claimed that the British government’s 
refusal to recognise the internal settlement regime of Zimbabwe-Rhodesia constituted a total and utter 
betrayal. ‘’Betrayal’ Claims Van der Byl,’ RH, 19 November 1979.
collapse o f the white regime, The Great Betrayal.26 As with the nationalists' 
accounts, the Rhodesian narrative also downplayed the significance o f demographic 
factors, as the impact o f population trends would seem to reduce the role o f historical 
actors to mere flotsam on the indomitable tides o f demography.
The collective amnesia concerning the population war that afflicted the 
politicians, nationalists and policymakers who actively took part in it, only became 
symptomatic after independence in 1980. Prior to this synergistic forgetting, the 
Rhodesian state, international bureaucrats, diplomats and politicians, African 
nationalists and guerrillas, and lay people inside and outside Rhodesia, all 
acknowledged the primacy o f population matters in the fate o f the white regime. 
Former Prime Minister, Ian Smith, clearly exemplified this pattern by the sharp 
differences in his statements and writings concerning the role o f population matters 
during white rule and since independence. Throughout his tenure in office, Smith 
publically and privately positioned population matters as central to the fate o f the 
white regime. His internal party coup in 1964 was in part made possible by the 
inability o f his predecessor, Winston Field, to reverse the negative migration flows, 
and his most dramatic achievements in office, the Unilateral Declaration o f 
Independence in 1965 and the 1969 constitution, were both expressly inspired by 
population pressures: the former to convince whites to stay in Rhodesia, and the latter 
to limit the impact o f African population growth. In the mid 1970s, Smith declared in 
a series o f speeches that his greatest achievement in office to that point had been to 
bring about positive white migration flows. Contemporaneously with these self- 
congratulatory appraisals o f his rule in the mid 1970s, Sm ith's Cabinet Ministers and 
government officials frantically schemed over how best to increase the white 
population, slow the African growth rate, and mitigate the adverse effects o f widening 
racial ratios. As the war escalated in the later 1970s, and white emigration continued 
to drain the already limited white conscript reserves, a lack o f white manpower was 
consistently cited by state officials, and by Smith himself, as being the greatest 
military problem faced by the state. While the strategies to alter and mitigate the 
effects o f population numbers dominated so much o f his government’s energies, and 
were openly acknowledged by Smith as representing the most formidable challenge to
26 I. Smith, The Great Betrayal (London, Blake Publishing, 1997).
the regime, after independence Sm ith 's population amnesia set in. In his controversial 
autobiography The Great Betrayal, there is no mention o f the significance o f 
population matters, and the demographic backdrop to many o f the events o f  the 1960s 
and 1970s are strangely omitted. Following this same pattern o f  forgetting, the 
popular memories o f the Rhodesian conflict among the Rhodesians o f the diaspora 
likewise contain blanks in places where population matters played a major role. 
Similarly, the nationalist and 'patriotic ' histories o f Zimbabwe omit population 
references in their politicised war narratives. As a result, this other war has been 
conveniently forgotten by all sides.
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The Historiography of Demographic Engineering
Population matters, then, have not been sufficiently addressed, analysed, 
periodised, or properly contextualised in Rhodesian history. When racial 
demographics have been addressed, it is most often as raw numbers inserted into the 
text, with little explanation o f their significance. These population trends have been 
tracked over time, but always as a sub-plot outside the main narrative, and rarely 
incorporated into the main analysis. As little scholarship as there has been on the 
significance o f population matters generally, there is even less on the ubiquity o f 
white population anxieties, how these pressures shaped white society, or on the efforts 
o f both the settler state and African nationalists to engineer these demographics. A 
small number o f studies have analysed different aspects o f  this engineering, but no 
single work has linked all the many components o f  this multifaceted population 
struggle into a coherent whole within the Rhodesian context. Nor indeed has the 
outcome o f this demographic struggle been presented as a primary cause o f  the fall o f 
the settler state. When addressed at all, the demographic struggle has typically been 
positioned as a byproduct o f the military conflict, and efforts to re-configure 
population numbers as merely an adjunct to the shooting war. Because o f  the 
synergistic forgetting by the participants, and the lack o f subsequent historical 
analysis, Rhodesia’s war o f number remains clouded and barely visible.
The phenomenon o f demographic engineering has been analysed in the 
comparative literature o f other regions and in other time periods. The population 
anxieties o f Rhodesian whites in the 1960s and 1970s can find parallels in inter-war
Europe. Historians o f this period have described how these national population 
anxieties were often expressed through the use o f anthropomorphic analogies to the 
vitality o f the national body, the interest in demography as a science closely linked to 
politics, and the formation o f  state population policies to address these concerns, all o f 
which were remarkably similar to ideas and policies that emerged some 40 years later
in Rhodesia.27 More recently, Milica Bookman has analysed inter-ethnic population
28 *struggles in Europe since the Cold W are Bookman describes these ‘wars o f
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num bers' and demonstrates how population size often translates into political and 
econom ic power, and the incentives this equation creates for engineering 
demography. In the African context, Omari Kokole focuses upon inter-ethnic
29com petition and population policies within post-colonial African states. In these 
zero-sum competitions that Kokole surveys, such as Rwanda, Burundi, and Sudan, 
fertility was a powerful political weapon, and there were thus politicised initiatives to 
encourage high birth rates in order to gam er more power at the expense o f ethnic 
rivals. In a study on apartheid South Africa, Madi Gray describes white fears o f being 
overwhelmed by African numbers, a fear very much shared by whites in Rhodesia 
during the last decades o f settler rule.30 Gray characterises South Africa as a dual 
state, in which a developed nation existed side-by-side with a developing one, and 
traces how the two nations experienced drastically different demographic trajectories, 
and the implications this had for settler power. A more thoroughgoing analysis o f 
South A frica's population policies was written by Barbara Brown in 1990 /' Brown's 
article outlines a comprehensive policy o f  population control by the South African 
state very similar to that o f Rhodesia's, in a context that was in many ways a close fit, 
including the state's efforts to lower African fertility through family planning and 
massively increase white immigration to narrow widening racial ratios. All o f these 
com parative studies highlight certain anxieties and exertions that resemble different
27 See C. Ipsen, ‘Population Policy in the Age of Fascism: Observations on Recent Literature,’
Population and Development Review , Vol. 24, No.3 (September, 1998) and P. Weindling, ‘Fascism 
and Population in Comparative European Perspective’, Population and Development Review , Vol. 14 
(1988).
”s M. Bookman, ‘Demographic Engineering and the Struggle for Power’, Journal o f  International 
Affairs, Vol. 56, No. 1 (Fall, 2002).
J) O. Kokole, ‘The Politics of Fertility in Africa’, in L. Bondestam and S. Bergstrom (eds), Poverty 
and Population Control (London, Academic Press, 1980).
"  M. Gray, ‘Race Ratios: The Politics of Population Control in South Africa’, in Bondetam, Poverty. 
71 B. Brown, ‘Facing the ‘Black Peril’: The Politics of Population Control in South Africa’, 
International Migration Review, Vol. 24, No. 4 (Winter, 1990).
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aspects of Rhodesia’s war of numbers, but for all the usefulness of comparisons and 
the identification of commonalities of experience in a wider context, there were 
unique qualities to Rhodesia’s demographic struggle that facial comparisons with 
other regions and societies, even apartheid South Africa, do not adequately address.
Demographic engineering in the Rhodesian context has received little 
attention. Lovemore Zinyama has written on the migration trends of whites in and out 
of Rhodesia, and the push and pull factors influencing them.32 Likewise, Alois 
Mlambo has analysed the state’s immigration policies from its founding to the end of 
the Federation, and in so doing convincingly argues that immigration was always 
politically vital to the Rhodesian state.33 George Kay’s work touches upon the 
pressures that African population growth brought to bear upon the state, and parses 
through the discourses concerning family planning and ‘overpopulation.’34 Kay also 
analyses the demand-side competition for immigrants and how this migration market 
influenced Rhodesia’s policies. Three other works conceptually combine more 
aspects of these broader strategies to manipulate racial demographics, and move 
closer towards properly contextualising the significance of racial demographics: Peter 
Godwin and Ian Hancock’s Rhodesians Never Die, Martin Meredith’s The Past is 
Another Country, and Amy Kaler’s Running After Pills: Politics, Gender and 
Contraception in Colonial Zimbabwe35 Both Godwin and Hancock and Meredith’s 
works address the political, psychological, economic, and military significance of the 
shifting racial demographics in the 1970s, as well as touch upon state efforts to 
manipulate these demographics through immigration promotion and emigration 
restrictions. Though importantly, both cast these demographic policies as an adjunct 
to the war effort, and therefore do not properly periodise or contextualise this 
population war. Amy Kaler’s book is a thorough examination of the battles over 
African fertility in Rhodesia, as well as the political, psychological, and economic 
effects of the African population growth on the settler state. Focusing on the
32 L. Zinyama, ‘International Migrations to and from Zimbabwe and the Influence o f Political 
Changes on Population Movements’, African Affairs, Vol. 79, No. 314 (January, 1980).
33 A. Mlambo, White Immigration.
34 G. Kay, ‘Towards a Population Policy for Zimbabwe-Rhodesia’, African Affairs, Vol. 79, No. 314 
(January 1980).
P. Godwin and I. Hancock, Rhodesians Never Die: The Impact o f  War and Political Change on 
White Rhodesia, 1970-1980 (Oxford, Oxford University Press, 1993); M. Meredith, The Past is 
Another Country: Rhodesia, 1890-1979 (London, Deutsch, 1979); and A. Kaler, Running After Pills: 
Politics, Gender and Contraception in Colonial Zimbabwe (Portsmouth, Heinemann, 2003).
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ideological, strategic, and tactical background to the competing efforts of both the 
state and the nationalists to engineer the African fertility, Kaler’s work is alone in 
revealing the nationalists’ interests and efforts in the population realm. But while 
Kaler’s work adroitly analyses the struggle over African population growth, she does 
not piece this important part of the war of numbers together with the other 
corresponding efforts of this wider conflict. Thus, even these more comprehensive 
works fail to combine all such efforts of both the settler state and African nationalists 
into a conceptual whole, encompassing the counting and registering of population 
numbers, migration trends, differential fertility trends, and the efforts to mitigate the 
effects of unwanted growth, nor do any periodise the population anxieties and efforts 
to engineer population patterns as preceding the shooting war. Consequently, none 
fill in the entire picture of the war of numbers. As a result, there is still a hidden story 
running throughout the last decades of settler rule that has been either conveniently 
forgotten, incompletely constructed, disarranged or deemphasised, if  not ignored 
completely, in the current literature. This thesis aims to address these deficiencies in 
the historical literature, reposition population issues as central to the fate of white 
Rhodesia, and relate the hidden story of Rhodesia’s war of numbers.
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Chapter II
The Rationalisation of the Racial Population Problem
A generalised fear of ‘racial swamping’ was long an anxiety among settlers 
and white colonialists in all of Africa. The overwhelming disparity in numbers 
between whites and Africans was always known, but the perceived significance of 
these racial imbalances varied over time and space. Colonial military superiority on 
the spot; the potential accessibility of metropolitan resources; technological and 
communication advantages; effective divide and rule policies; and a trust in the 
political apathy and/or cowed ambitions of the African populations, all at times 
militated against these numerical disparities translating into insurmountable political 
vulnerabilities. From the early 1960s, however, these abstract anxieties became more 
concrete for settler communities across Africa, Rhodesia in particular, and the 
political implications of these racial population numbers became much more serious. 
The reasons behind this shift in white attitudes in Rhodesia towards racial population 
numbers, from abstract and vague anxieties to concrete and specific ones, were 
threefold: the momentum of decolonisation; the rise of African nationalism; and more 
specific population information that for the first time enumerated racial population 
trends in accurate detail.
From the 1960s, the Rhodesian state attempted to discover the contours of 
Rhodesia’s demography by identifying, counting, registering, and tracking the racial 
populations.1 The population numbers that were discovered were deployed in 
different ways and for different purposes by the state. The numbers could at times be 
weapons to use against political enemies, they could provide a pretext for actions, 
they could be evidence of success to boost popularity, or at other times they could be 
hidden away or obscured as signs of failure. As such, the counting of people and the 
control over these statistics were very important political issues in Rhodesia. This 
chapter will track the state’s attempts to rationalise, regulate, manipulate, and control 
these demographic factors and examine this shift in white settler attitudes in Rhodesia 
regarding racial populations, from abstract anxieties to concrete fears.
1 For a good overview o f the political significance o f censuses in other contexts, see: D. Kertzer, 
Census and Identity: The Politics o f  Race, Ethnicity and Language in National Censuses (Cambridge, 
Cambridge University Press, 2001); L. Dudley-Jenkins, Identity and Identification: Defining the 
Disadvantaged (London, Routledge Curzon, 2003); F. Mimiko, ‘Census in Nigeria: The Politics and 
the Imperative o f Depoliticization’, African and Asian Studies, Vol. 5, No. 1, (January, 2006).
28
The Impact of the 1962 Census
Since the founding of the colony, whites in Rhodesia knew as a self-evident 
truism that they were grossly outnumbered, but they did not know the exact extent of 
the population differential, nor was this differential viewed as presenting an 
insurmountable obstacle to the long-term viability of white Rhodesia. Both of these 
factors would change after the 1962 census: the first immediately, and the second 
rapidly thereafter. The African population, and especially the rural African 
population, was the great unknown in Rhodesian politics prior to 1962: hidden, 
massive, and remote. Rural Africans were largely outside the pale and beyond the 
state’s writ, and earlier attempts to regulate the rural population in a more 
interventionist fashion all met with intense resistance. The timing of the first 
comprehensive census in 1962 corresponded with the beginnings of the disintegration 
of the Federation, and was a demographic accounting of the territories on the cusp of 
independence. Within only a year-and-a-half of the census, Rhodesia’s two northern 
Federation partners would both split off as independent African countries, with 
Rhodesia’s fate as a minority settler regime increasingly uncertain. The census was 
the first of its kind conducted in Rhodesia, as it was extended to include all the 
Africans in the colony, a group whose numbers had previously only been counted 
using wildly inaccurate sampling methods. It was the ambition of the 1962 census to 
finally grasp the contours of this hidden population, and in so doing, enhance and 
consolidate state control over the entire territory.
The 1962 African population census, unimaginatively named “Operation Big 
Count,” was conducted over 15 days from the end of April to early May, and involved 
3,000 enumerators who set out on bicycles and on foot to determine the age, sex, 
territory of birth, education, physical disabilities, and employment of the African 
population. The enumerators distributed a half a million hand bills and 80,000 
booklets in the Shona and Ndebele languages to explain the government’s purpose 
behind the census. The number of enumerators—3,000—was chosen to allow for an 
approximate ratio of one enumerator per 1,000 Africans, as the pre-census estimates 
for the African population was 3,000,000.
2 ‘Census in April o f Africans in the Colony’, RH, 16 February 1962.
3 ‘Census Teams Will Risk Lives to Collect Vital Facts’, RH, 9 March 1962.
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A month before the enumerators were to begin their work, ZAPU’s then 
Publicity Chief, Robert Mugabe, announced that ZAPU would instruct its followers to 
ignore the census and not cooperate with the settler government’s enumerators.4 
From the nationalists’ perspective, censual knowledge meant power and control, and 
any state action that sought to gather information and bring the African population 
under greater state regulation was to be opposed. The nationalists appreciated 
immediately that the facially apolitical census was political indeed, and the counting 
was thus encumbered by this consistent opposition. The Central Statistical Office’s 
Director of Statistics, Dr. F. T. Russell, seemed to be genuinely puzzled by ZAPU’s 
politically motivated opposition to what he and many others considered a purely 
apolitical, technical and administrative task, especially one that he was at pains to 
point out was intended to aid in the provision of state services to Africans. Despite 
official bemusement, the enumerators were met with a great degree of organised 
opposition as they conducted their work. In the Mufakose Township near Salisbury, 
enumerators were physically threatened and many resigned, and similar obstructions 
occurred in sections of the Harare, Mrewa, and Sipolile districts.5 In addition to 
verbal threats and intimidation, a number of enumerators were reportedly stoned.6 In 
districts where enumerators had resigned, Dr. Russell expressed that the government’s 
policy was to return to these “trouble spots” with larger teams of enumerators. 
Awakening to the extent of the resistance, the government instituted a “Get Tough” 
policy, directed towards the “ringleaders” of the censual opposition, who would be 
prosecuted under the “obstruction” provisions of the Federal Census and Statistics 
Act.7 After a little more than a week into the census, already 13 arrests and 
convictions were handed out under Census Act; convictions that could have resulted
o
in a fine of up to £50 or 6 months imprisonment. Notwithstanding the government’s 
insistence that “irresponsible and ignorant elements”9 would not delay the census 
work, by 10 May, a day after the Director had hoped to finish, only a quarter of the 
colony had been covered.10
4 ‘Census Director is Baffled by ZAPU Ban’, RH, 27 March 1962.
5 ‘Opposition to ‘Big Count’ in Some Areas: ‘Get Tough’ Plan’, RH, 27 April 1962.
6 ‘Census on Schedule Despite Opposition’, RH, 10 May 1962. In an unrelated incident, the Herald 
reported that one enumerator was even treed by a charging Rhino.
7 ‘Opposition to ‘Big Count’ in Some Areas: ‘Get Tough’ Plan’, RH, 27 April 1962.
8 ‘Southern Rhodesia Census: Keogh is Satisfied with Progress, Aims at 100%’, RH, 28 April, 1962.
9 ‘Census on Schedule Despite Opposition’, RH, 10 May 1962.
10 ‘Census on Schedule Despite Opposition’, RH, 10 May 1962.
The Nationalists' decision to sabotage the 1962 census was consistent with 
ZAPU’s overall policy o f  “non-cooperation and sabotage,’' 11 o f  all state initiatives in 
rural areas at that time. These sabotage efforts targeted most specifically the 
intrusions o f  the Land Husbandry Act, including the enormously unpopular cattle de­
stocking policies and the digging o f  contour ridges, but moved beyond these specific 
state interferences into attacking all visible state property and administrative arms in 
the rural areas, including cattle dips, and any structure containing the taint o f  colonial 
interference in ‘traditional’ rural life. In Matabeleland, for instance, state
development programmes had a long history o f  being thwarted by this sort of
12widespread non-cooperation, " and it was in this receptive environment where 
nationalist efforts to sabotage the census emerged. These censual disruptions should 
be viewed as an early effort at ‘cultural nationalism’ on the part o f  African 
nationalists, who tapped into and used traditional peasant resentment o f  colonial 
interference in rural life for political advantage. Thus, the ambitious administrative 
outreach o f  the 1962 census in this context was an obvious target for nationalist 
disruptions, despite the fact that these disruptions seemed to take the state by surprise.
Despite these interferences, not even two weeks into Operation Big Count, the 
CSO began to realise that African numbers most likely far exceeded their pre-census 
estimates o f  3 million.13 Enumerators attributed this apparent discrepancy to 
“remoteness” and higher than expected birth rates.14 In late June 1962, early CSO 
estimates claimed that the African population was nearer to 3,610,000 Africans, 20 
percent higher than previous estimates,15 and later revisions increased this number 
again to 3,616,600.16 In analyzing these figures, the CSO revised their assumptions 
made in 1954 that African population growth averaged 3percent per annum and 
retrospectively altered their population estimates to account for an estimated growth 
rate o f  3.5 percent annually.17 A contemporaneous census o f  Northern Rhodesian
io
Africans likewise discovered a vast previous undercounting. A Herald  editorial
11 J. Alexander, J. McGregor, T. Ranger, Violence and Memory: One Hundred Years in the 'Dark 
Forests ’ o f  Matabeleland (Oxford, James Curry, 2000) p. 103.
I_ Alexander, Violence and Memory, pp. 132-134.
13 ‘African Census in SR Going Well, Says Director’, RH, 25 April 1962.
14 ‘Southern Rhodesia Census: Keogh is Satisfied with Progress, Aims at 100%’, RH, 28 April 1962.
15 ‘3,610,000 Africans— 20% Above Estimate’, RH, 22 June 1962.
16 ‘3,616,600 Africans in SR’, RH, 24 October 1962.
17 ‘European Population Increases By About 1,335 in 4 Months’, RH, 2 June 1965.
18 ‘Census Finds One Million Lost Africans’, RH, 21 August 1963.
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addressing the discrepancy asserted that the African population growth was a 
testament to the quality of the Federation’s health services, and went on to argue that 
this unintended byproduct of the Federation’s own successes created significant 
challenges for the white state. These challenges included greater strains on the 
economy and increasing land pressures, and the editorial also worried that African 
nationalists, in particular ZAPU’s Joshua Nkomo, would find the larger African 
population and wider racial population ratios a source of political strength, and would 
increase calls to scrap Southern Rhodesia’s new (1961) constitution.19 Higher 
population numbers and faster than expected growth instantly were interpreted by 
white settlers as a problem with many heads attached to it. Not long after the spring 
census appeared, the first calls for state-sponsored family planning began to appear in 
the Herald. One letter from November 1962 laid out the case affirmatively: ‘"[the 
Federation’s] population problems are so great, so important, and so immediate, that 
only state supported programmes, inspired by private initiative, can attack them on the 
scale required.”20
Population analyses following the 1962 census at first centered on the static 
size of the African population and its size discrepancy from what was previously 
estimated, but it was not long before future growth predictions added to these 
population fears. Predictions as to the speed of the African population doubling 
would later become almost a bettor’s sport throughout the post census period, 
although unlike horses, it was one with supposed apocalyptic consequences. One of 
the first such predictions to come out was issued by the CSO in June 1964, which 
estimated that the current African population—then cited as 3.5 million—would 
double to 7 million by 1982, a mere 18 years from then.21 In the spring of 1965, the 
Rhodesian Freedom from Hunger Campaign claimed that the African population
99would be trebled to over 12 million by the year 2000. Soon after this last prediction,
19 ‘Growth of the Population’, Editorial, RH, 23 June 1962. As the Herald had predicted, Nkomo did 
seize upon these new numbers and reiterated his call that self-government had to mean immediate 
majority rule. However, one letter writer to the Herald made the interesting if  specious argument that: 
“It is hard to see in view o f these facts [regarding the white state’s responsibility for higher African 
growth rates] how the Africans can claim any moral right to majority government... Had the ‘settlers’ 
left them to their own devices and to fend for themselves, it is doubtful if  today they would have been 
in the majority anyway.” ‘Original Numbers Small’, letter from John Bull, RH, 4 July 1962.
20 ‘Family Planning Needed in the Fed’, letter from Joyce Wickstead, RH, 9 November 1962.
21 ‘African Population is 3.5 Million— Will Double by 1982, Census Report Reveals’, RH 27 June 
1964.
22 ‘’Another 8m Rhodesians by Year 2000” , RH, 26 March 1965.
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a former MP and Cabinet Minister stated that Africans would number 16 million by
9 92000, quadrupling instead o f  trebling.*" Most public citations regarding the African 
population in the mid 1960s settled on the figure o f  the African population doubling 
every 20 years. After the findings o f  the 1969 census demonstrated that official 
estimates for the African population were still far too low, this prediction sport 
continued: in 1970 the government’s Chief Town Planning Officer predicted 20
94
million by 2000,~ and in a full page article entitled, ‘‘Rhodesia’s Birth Bomb,” in the 
summer o f  1971 the H erald  predicted 25 million by 2000.25 As it was, Zimbabwe's 
population was nearer to 11 million in 2000,26 but these demographic projections 
were more interesting for what they revealed about the projectors themselves, than 
their accuracy.
Counting, Controlling, and Regulating the African Population
Soon after the census, several measures were proposed by the government to 
obtain more accurate information about the African population, so as to better track 
their demographics. Additional measures were also introduced that aimed to limit 
African immigration into Rhodesia generally, and specifically restrict the influx into 
the urban areas. In 1962, a bill was presented that sought to mandate registration for 
all African births and deaths. This law was intended to bring all Africans into line 
with what the other racial groups were already required to do. This initiative was 
contemporaneous with a bill introduced that would eliminate African migratory 
labour in Rhodesia. Another bill was proposed in 1964 that would issue mandatory 
identity cards to control the African influx into the cities, and still another sought to 
regulate the cross border migrations o f  Africans. As it was, all o f  these initiatives 
were met with great opposition due to their logistical difficulties, if  not their intent, 
and all were significantly watered down before becoming law.
As the state attempted to rationalise the population problem after the 1962 
census, officials began to delineate what was knowable and what was unknowable, 
and extrapolating from this, what populations and areas were the state’s full
23 ‘Abrahamson's Warning on Population’, RH, 6 May 1965.
"Population Soars in Rhodesia’, RH , 25 July 1970.
25 ‘Rhodesia’s Birth Bomb’, RH, 1 June 1971.
26 The Zimbabwean Central Statistical Office reported 11,631,657 people in 2002 undifferentiated by
race. CSO web site: www.zimstat.co.zw (viewed 13 March 2008).
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responsibility and which were not. During the debates over the Births and Deaths 
Registration Bill, the idea o f  making the registration o f  all African births and deaths 
mandatory as it was for the other races, was offered but rejected as being unfeasible.27 
The resultant Act mandated that only Africans in certain urban areas had to register 
these statistics, and that in other regions the registration o f  births and deaths was 
voluntary. It is significant that only urban Africans were designated as being within
f
the reach o f  the new birth registration law, and were thereby worth counting because 
they were a part o f  the formal and visible economic and political life o f  Rhodesia, 
while rural Africans were deemed to be largely an uncountable mass. Despite their 
inclusion in the watered down birth registration law, urban Africans still widely 
ignored the registration requirements.~
Before 1964, there were no mechanisms in place to monitor Africans crossing 
in and out o f  Rhodesia, and legislation was introduced in April 1964 to remedy this.29 
The Departure From Southern Rhodesia Bill as introduced aimed to regulate the flow 
o f African citizens in and out o f  Rhodesia, funneling them through assigned points of 
entry and exit, and requiring travelers to carry the appropriate travel documentation. 
The failure to comply with these proposed requirements would constitute a criminal 
offence. In introducing the bill, the Minister o f  Internal Affairs, Jack Howman, had 
falsely assumed that the vast majority o f  border crossings were already through 
designated points o f  entry and exit, a proposition ridiculed by other MPs, in particular 
the former Prime Minister Edgar Whitehead. Whitehead asserted that every five 
miles or so there are footpaths connecting Rhodesia and Mozambique, and the same 
was true across the Limpopo during the dry season, concluding that, “unless you are 
going to build a Berlin Wall or something o f  that kind you will not stop this ancient 
custom of people crossing.” The number o f  people using these ancient crossings he 
estimated to be in excess o f  one million annually.,0 In its amended final form, people 
crossing the borders were not funneled through a few staffed points o f  entry and exit, 
but instead, pre-existing unstaffed border crossing points were retrospectively 
designated as points o f  entry and exit, and the permit requirement would remain a law
Parliamentary Debates, Vol. 18, ‘Births and Deaths Registration (SR) Bill’, 18 July 1962.
The response to this compulsory registration law in force since 1963 was slow, as only 574 African 
births were registered in all o f 1963. Whether or not this was because of a generalised reluctance to 
register with any state initiative, a passive form o f resistance, or simple oversight is unclear. ‘Africans 
Neglect to Register Births'. RH , 18 February 1965.
2> Parliamentary Debates, Vol. 56, ‘Departure From Southern Rhodesia (Control) Bill’, 2 April 1964.
30 ‘Departure’, 2 April 1964.
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more honoured in the breach than in the observance.31 In truth, it must have been 
recognised that the administration of the state could never handle the actual 
observance of the law. If this law did not regulate border crossings in any meaningful 
way, from the state’s perspective it at least provided a ready cause for prosecution of 
nationalists returning from abroad, who like everybody else, failed to gain the 
requisite permit. The Departure Act was amended in 1966 to cover aliens as well as 
citizens, but yet again a legal framework was established without any corresponding
32 >,iienforcement mechanisms, and it was again essentially state play-acting. The cross 
border migrations of Africans in and out of Rhodesia that was the subject of these 
laws continued to remain in the realm of un-regulated and unknowable, despite the 
legislation imagining control.
After UDI, there was a renewed interest and a greater boldness in 
reconstituting Rhodesia’s population numbers, including manipulating African 
migrations. In December 1965, Smith stated that he intended to replace alien African
33labour in Rhodesia with indigenous African labour and repatriate alien Africans.
This move to reorganise African labour was long called for by right wing Rhodesian 
politicians as a way to both slow the African growth rate by limiting what are in the 
United States pejoratively referred as ‘anchor babies,’ the offspring of alien males and 
indigenous females, and as a strategy to lower indigenous African unemployment. 
Despite the bold plan, Smith’s attempt to force indigenous Africans to take up rural 
employment to replace those who would leave immediately met with resistance from 
the business community, and was soon abandoned. This abandonment was a 
reflection of the lack of interest that rural employment had for Rhodesian blacks, at 
least at the wages then offered by employers, and a realisation that if  alien labour left 
there would be either no replacement at all, or that a comprehensive wage increase 
would be necessary to attract indigenous labourers. These wage increases, and the 
resulting increases in overhead costs to do business, would have been unacceptable to 
Rhodesia’s white business community. The compromised labour policy that was 
finally introduced in 1966 created Closed Labour Areas in urban regions, where 
previously employed alien labour was exempted but new alien labour could not be
31 Parliamentary Debates, Vol. 56, ‘Departure From Southern Rhodesia (Control) B ill’, 3 April 1964.
32 Parliamentary Debates, Vol. 64, ‘Departure From Rhodesia (Control) Amendment Bill’, 27 July 
1966.
33 ‘Direction o f Labour’, Editorial, RH, 10 December 1965.
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introduced, and attempted to direct new alien labour exclusively into the rural areas. 
As to the application o f  the Closed Labour Areas applying solely to urban areas, and 
even there with exemptions, the Minister o f  Labour and Social Welfare, Ian McLean, 
stated with resignation: “I would willingly re-apply the Order to the rural areas if  I 
could be satisfied that Rhodesian Africans would genuinely seek and stay in 
employment in the rural areas, but regrettably at this point o f  time they are not 
prepared to do so to the extent required by the agricultural and mining industries ../ '34 
The South African state attempted to impose similar labour controls, but the 
differential outcomes between the Rhodesian and South African examples in this and 
other racial policies, reflected less a difference in ideology, than a reflection of the
35relative weakness o f  the Rhodesian state/ This measure can be viewed as another 
delineation o f  those Africans who were within the visible world o f  the urban areas, 
and those invisible African numbers outside the regulatory grasp o f  the settler state.
As the African population continued to grow, Rhodesian Front politicians 
began plans to develop the Tribal Trust Lands to allow for a greater ability to absorb 
indigenous African numbers, and relieve the influx into the cities.36 These policies 
and other decentralisation efforts would come to be called separate development or 
‘provincialism/ and were essentially moves toward apartheid-style racial homelands. 
While always a popular idea among the Rhodesian right, provincialism in its full form 
was never adopted because o f  the practical obstacles to its implementation, rather than 
a principled white opposition to the ideology behind it. The idea's popularity 
reflected the appeal for whites o f  disclaiming responsibility for growing African 
numbers, and a frustration among white politicians that Africans should be forced to 
reap what they themselves had sown, instead o f  burdening the largely urban white 
population. Yet the fluidity o f  the movement o f  the African population between rural 
and urban areas meant that in actuality this idea o f  a rigid dichotomy between urban 
and rural Africans was blurred almost to the point o f  meaninglessness.
34 ‘75,600 Decrease in Foreign Workers’, RH, 1 May 1969.
35 The closed door Cabinet debates regarding the Whaley Commission’s constitutional proposals 
provide a window as to the Rhodesian Front’s views towards South African apartheid as a potential 
model for Rhodesia. Regarding “partition” as a possible goal for Rhodesia, the Cabinet concluded that 
partition, “appeared extremely attractive at first, particularly when comparisons were made with the 
success which South Africa was making with their partition policies. But it later appeared from 
evidence that the position was too complicated in Rhodesia for partition to be a practical proposition.” 
Smith Papers, Box 3/001 (SSF), Cabinet Minutes, ‘Note of Discussion between Cabinet Ministers and 
Representatives of the Constitutional Commission at Cabinet’, 27 August 1968.
36 ‘Opening o f Tribal Areas May Support 4m Africans’, RH, 3 June 1967.
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Influx control legislation that sought to limit the movement of Africans into 
urban areas was another priority of the Rhodesian Front, but it too was met with great 
resistance. In the mid 1960s, a debate in Parliament raged over a bill mandating the 
issuance of identity cards as a way to track African movements, but the bill was 
ultimately abandoned. The issue of urban influx was reopened in the autumn of 1968 
with a report given by the Director of the Salisbury Municipality’s African 
Administration, R.C. Briggs. In his fiery and paranoid report, Briggs warned if the 
urban influx of Africans continued unabated, Salisbury would soon be witness more 
overcrowding, worsening unemployment, a breakdown in African family life, more 
drinking, a spike in violent crime, civil strife, and an alarming rise in sexual crimes. 
Briggs called for more accessible birth control to be provided for poor Africans in the 
cities as a method to reduce unemployment, in addition to a policy proposal 
euphemistically calling for indigenous Africans to be “drafted” to work in rural work
o
camps away from urban areas. The national government responded favorably to 
Briggs’ concerns, if not his recommendations, and legislation was again formulated to
•>n
regulate the drift of Africans into urban areas. As part of Smith’s end-of-the-year 
message, he admonished employed Africans in the city to, “work hard and not risk 
losing [your urban jobs] through laziness or indifference... to those who have no 
employment I would say leave the towns and go into the country where there is ample 
work available.”40 But the same pulls of the cities that killed earlier attempts to 
replace alien African labour in the rural areas with indigenous labour did not suddenly 
fall away, despite Smith’s schoolmarm advice. More concretely than Smith’s 
admonition, the identification and regulation of aliens within Rhodesia was enhanced 
by the Aliens Act of 1966, which amended an earlier 1954 law regulating aliens by 
providing the administrative devices to identify and locate aliens within Rhodesia, but 
the actual means to do so was beyond the practical reach of the state.41 In 1968, a 
government Committee was created to re-investigate the problem of urban influx, but 
by 1970 it had rendered no policy recommendations.42 As perceived by the right 
wing, the problem did not go away, and the RF Congress of October 1971 approved
37 ‘Concern Expressed over African Influx Into Salisbury’, RH, 30 November 1968.
38 ‘Birth Control Pills Wanted For Jobless’, RH, 2 December 1968.
39 ‘Present Laws Cannot Stop Urban Influx’, RH, 6 December 1968.
40 ‘’Have No Fear’ PM Broadcasts to Africans’, RH, 1 January 1969.
41 Parliamentary Debates, Vol. 64, ‘Aliens Bill’, 27 July 1966.
42 ‘Influx Committee Still Working’, RH, 19 December 1969.
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resolutions to reverse the influx of Africans into urban areas and create African 
townships in the TTLs.43 In May 1973, another bill mandating African identification 
cards was introduced. These cards would distinguish aliens from indigenous Africans 
and it was presented as an effort to more effectively enforce the Closed Labour Areas 
Act, but this half measure was hardly enough to satisfy hardliners convinced of the 
horrors of urban influx and the effects of a large alien population.44 To address these 
continued complaints, an amendment to the Foreign Migratory Labour Act was 
passed in 1976 making the punishments for violations of the Closed Labour Areas 
harsher.45 This was a further effort to enforce the areas in which alien labour could 
legally be employed, and though it was presented as an effort to protect indigenous 
African labour, it was in reality another attempt to force black Rhodesians into fuller 
employment at lower wages in order to relieve the urban influx and growing 
unemployment pressures. A more ambitious population identification plan was 
introduced in 1976 that sought to create identification cards for all Rhodesians over a 
period of five years. These cards, which citizens would be required to carry at all 
times, would be backed up by a centralised and computerised documentation system, 
with instant data recapture, which would include fingerprints and photographs.46 
Seeing as the regime collapsed within three years of its passage, the five year 
implementation of this Act was never completed, but it did represent the most 
aggressive attempt to administratively regulate all Africans. These policy failures all 
exposed limitations as to the state’s knowledge of, and control over, Rhodesia’s 
African population: indigenous and alien, rural and urban.
Proposed Solutions to the Population Problem
A debate over what exactly the proper solutions to the population problem 
would be, had already begun by late 1962. In 1963 several reports were published in 
the Western media that began to ignite what would later rage into the global neo- 
Malthusian population paranoia of the 1970s. One such report, issued by the 
Population Reference Bureau proclaimed that a new ‘Dark Age’ would soon be upon
43 ‘RF Urges Reversal o f African Influx’, RH, 9 October 1971.
44 Parliamentary Debates, Vol. 83, ‘Africans (Registration and Identification) Amendment Bill’, 21 
November 1972.
45 Parliamentary Debates, Vol. 92, ‘Foreign Migratory Labour Amendment Bill’, 17 February 1976.
46 Parliamentary Debates, Vol. 93, ‘National Registration B ill’, 9 July 1976.
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humanity if world birth rates, in particular Africa’s world leading birth rates, were not 
soon reduced.47 These neo-Malthusian fears found a receptive audience in post 
census Rhodesia, as these Western fears of Third World birth rates were seemingly 
being experienced in microcosm within Rhodesia. The title of an editorial running in 
October 1963 fatalistically wondered if fellow Rhodesians had to: “Prepare to Meet
A O
[Their] Doom?” Contemporary economists and politicians feared that if the 
African population continued to grow relative to the white population, there would be 
growing unemployment and all the related problems of a massive, disaffected, 
unemployed urban African population. Strategies to manage this growing population, 
especially to limit its economic consequences, were also proposed, and combined 
with calls for more white immigration. As such, the white and African populations 
were deemed to be linked, especially in terms of an ideal ratio corresponding to the 
labour needs of white employers and unemployment rates of Africans. A Herald 
editorial from September 1964, expressed relief that Rhodesia’s population problems 
were finally receiving the public attention they deserved. Situating the significance of 
population pressures thus, the editorial stated: “most public arguments on other topics 
are like a domestic quarrel in a farmhouse, while outside the fields on which the 
prosperity of the farmhouse depends are being eroded.”49
This perceived population imbalance strained the state’s education and 
employment policies. African school-leavers were graduating at unprecedented rates 
and were finding that there were no slots in the economy to fit into. With white 
paramouncy in the economy sacrosanct, these educated Africans merely added to the 
disgruntled unemployment numbers, or emigrated, and led several Rhodesian Front 
backbenchers to call for a lower percentage of secondary degrees to be awarded so as 
to limit educated Africans’ unemployment. In 1967, one RF backbencher even 
argued that if education was to continue to be provided for all at current costs, then 
African parents should have to agree to use birth control, as a quid pro quo.50 More 
numbers meant more schools and teachers and greater expenses, which exacerbated 
state spending pressures. Smith’s government in 1965 decided to peg education 
spending at 2 percent of the GNP, regardless of African population numbers. This did
47 ‘Curb Needed on Birth Rates to Avert New ‘Dark Age’: World’s Population Rose by 185 Million in 
3 Years— Bureau’, RH, 7 October 1962.
48 ‘Prepare to Meet Our Doom?’, RH, 8 October 1963.
49 ‘The Greatest Problem’, RH, 2 September 1964.
50 ‘Population Explosion Warning’, RH, 19 August 1967.
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not have any antinatalist effect on the growing African population, and a Select 
Committee on Education report from 1969 reported that the growing funding gap in 
African education that resulted from this policy was leading to a deterioration of 
African education standards and a rise in illiteracy. In addition, the racial economic 
divisions were straining at the seams with the declining white population and rising 
African population of the mid 1960s. A government Select Committee on Education 
from May 1967 concluded that, barring massive white immigration, many job 
categories formerly the preserve of whites would have to integrated, as Africans 
pushed against the reservations and there was a dearth of qualified whites.51 The 
state’s conundrum was that further integration, the resultant filling of employment 
openings with Africans, and the generalised weakening of white preserve that would 
inevitably follow, would lower the attractiveness of Rhodesia to those white 
immigrants deemed necessary to save white Rhodesia. It also threatened to cause 
current residents to flee. In response to these pressures, the RF government after UDI 
actually strengthened the de facto job reservation through the fixing of rates for 
/  certain jobs, effectively sealing off white jobs even if there were no whites to fill
52them. The creation of false demand for skilled white labour was explicitly both a 
protection to current white residents and an economic incentive for potential 
immigrants, and any negative effects that accrued to the African population were 
viewed to be largely a result of their own irresponsible fertility rates and 
unwillingness to take up rural employment.
The discourses concerning African population growth all tacitly assumed that 
the white and African populations were economically linked in such a way that their 
sizes needed to pegged to some ideal ratio range, and that the growth of the African 
population portended disaster unless a rebalancing could be achieved. A Herald 
editorial from February 1964, following a year of enormous net migration losses of 
whites, explicitly connected racial population trends with the labour market, and again 
took for granted the white/employer African/labourer dichotomy. The editorial 
juxtaposed the high African birth rates with the slumping white birth rates and queried 
how this racial-come-economic imbalance can ever be remedied, asking rhetorically:
51 ‘Basic to the Report’, Editorial, RH, 8 May 1967.
52 ‘Persistent’, Editorial, RH, 2 October 1967.
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“Is any problem more pressing today than that o f  population trends?”53 Though the 
slumping white birth rates o f  Rhodesian whites were at various times bemoaned by 
public figures, it was widely recognised that it would be through white immigration 
and African family planning, not white pronatalism or African out-migration, that the 
state could best hope to more favorably rebalance the racial populations.54 It was 
assumed among a growing percentage o f  the electorate that these population problems 
could all be mitigated by re-pegging the white and African growth rates such that the 
white population could sufficiently carry the load o f  African numbers economically, 
both through employment and through expanding the tax base. Within months o f  the 
census in 1962, Federal economic planners, who unquestioningly applied racialised 
notions o f  race and economic niches, began to call for an increase in white 
immigration to Rhodesia in an effort to employ these surplus Africans that had been 
discovered in the census. In a published report by the Ministry o f  Home Affairs, it 
was asserted that Rhodesia's immigration policy should aim for 12,000 white 
immigrants for the 1962/63 year, and increase by 1,000 every year thereafter, so that 
by 1969/70 there would be an annual white influx o f  20,000/ ’ It was argued that only 
immigration at or around this level could ensure that ideal racial/economic ratios 
could be achieved in the light o f  the recent census numbers. A specific target ratio for 
Africans per European was proposed by Professor Jan Sadie, from Stellenbosch 
University, when he conducted a wide-ranging government-sponsored survey of 
Rhodesia’s economy in 1967. In his report, he stated that on average every European 
employed 7.4 Africans.56 Stemming from this ratio, Sadie concluded, and subsequent 
governments concurred, that white population growth must provide at least so many 
whites as to create employment for Africans as they entered the job market. Sadie 
concluded that this pegging o f  white immigration to African natural increase meant 
that Rhodesia should aim for at least 12,000 immigrants a year. It is also significant
53 ‘Population Trends’, RH, 28 February 1964.
4 It should be noted, that at least some in Rhodesia recognised the impossibility o f white immigration 
keeping pace with African natural increase, even at a set ratio. See for example a full page 
advertisement by the politically moderate Centre Group 'Population Explosion Threatens Rhodesia’, 
RH, 31 May 1968.
55 ‘20,000 Immigrants a Year is the Aim’. RH. 13 November 1962.
56 Parliamentary Debates, Vol. 72, ‘Sadie Report’, 13 August 1968. Professor Sadie arrived at this 
number through dubious calculations.
For a summary of the Sadie Report, see ‘Economic Report calls for more Immigrants’, Editorial, 
RH  13 October 1967. The state substantially supported Sadie’s thinking on planning methods, and
that the Sadie Report attached equal importance to African family planning as another 
means to redress the racial imbalance. The Report concluded that only by achieving a 
more favorable racial balance could there be any hope o f  maintaining economic 
growth. Sadie's findings and the demographic solutions sections of his report were 
affirmed by the government and set out an informal blueprint for the state’s 
population policies to follow.
Control over the Numbers
As population numbers were matters o f  such political importance, the settler 
state was always very careful in controlling and distributing demographic 
information. There was a cessation o f  the publication o f  all state-issued statistical 
information in the mid 1960s that was consistent with the general censorship trends 
immediately following UDI. Choosing to include statistical information that related 
solely to population demographics in the censorship blackout might seem odd when 
the purported purpose of the post UDI censorship was to protect Rhodesia's sanctions
busting and to guard against Rhodesia's enemies gathering vital economic
JU *
measurements. However, the ban also served further hidden purposes, which were 
certainly to quell any public panic regarding the possibility o f  a white exodus from 
Rhodesia after UDI, and to deny international opponents o f  the regime from receiving 
any damaging information. A follow-up to the 1962 census was initially scheduled 
for October 1966, but in keeping with the infonnation blackout, it was cancelled with
58no official explanation given. The government's statistical infonnation blackout 
finally ended in April 1967, with the publication o f  new state-issued population 
statistics quarterly, most likely made possible by the surprisingly positive white 
migration numbers since UDI that the RF government would certainly want to 
publicise.5 ’ It was not until August 1969, though, that the monthly digest o f  statistics 
were again published in their full form.
Already a year prior to the findings o f  the 1969 census, and before the 
resumption o f  the publication o f  the monthly digests, there was another wave of
only disagreed with his recommended state machinery. See ‘In Parliament Yesterday: Sadie Report 
Debated’, RH  14 August 1968.
5X ‘Planned Census of Population is Postponed’, RH, 18 October 1966.
59 ‘Coming Out of the Dark’. Editorial, RH, 15 April 1967.
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population panic in the summer of 1968. The panic was precipitated by the Minister 
of the Treasury, John Wrathall’s, budget for the fiscal year, and the concurrent debate 
regarding the Sadie Report on the linkages between racial ratios and economic 
growth. Wrathall’s lengthy Budget statement encapsulated much of the thinking of 
the RF government concerning the racial population contest: the explicit linkage 
between economic growth and African population growth, the need for greater white 
immigration to soak up African unemployment, the frustration over the continued 
need for foreign African labour when Rhodesian Africans were unemployed in the 
cities, and finally the need for intensive family planning to stem African growth.60 
The reasons behind the government’s focus on African population growth was 
reiterated by the Secretary of Health, Dr. Mark Webster, who declared African growth 
rates “frightening” and the promotion of family planning a health priority.61 Later in 
the year, the Minister of Health, Ian McLean, proposed “strong, even harsh, economic 
and other disincentives to unrealistic and irresponsible population growth, as well as
f r y
postulating attractive and similar incentives for the opposite view.”
Notwithstanding his Cabinet whipping up public anxieties over African population 
growth to a fever pitch, Ian Smith, in an interview from September 1968, presented a 
calmer and more measured face to the issue in a television interview in which he 
claimed he did not think the African birthrate would unduly worry him for about 6 to
6310 years. How much of his statement was an effort to put forward a tough pose on 
the eve of the Fearless talks the next month, or to what extent he was genuinely less 
concerned about these population pressures than his Cabinet officials, is unclear. It 
might also be the case that it was the RF government’s design to begin seasoning 
public opinion for the racial population control measures that many in the settler 
regime were already envisioning, even prior to the findings of the 1969 census.
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60 Parliamentary Debates, Vol. 71, ‘Finance Bill: Budget statement’, 18 July 1968.
61 ‘Growth of Population is ‘Frightening’ Says Health Minister’, RH, 21 August 1968. Webster cites 
the African population as 4.5 million, and the growth rate at 3.4 percent.
62 ‘Punishing the Prolific’, RH, 11 December 1968.
63 ‘Smith Discusses Settlement: Agreement Would Mean new Constitution: Insistence Stressed on 
Being Satisfied’, RH, 27 September 1968.
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The Casus Belli for the War of Numbers: The 1969 Census Results
The next full population census after 1962 was again scheduled for two 
phases, and was to begin in the spring of 1969. The first phase was scheduled to 
cover the European, Asian, and Coloured populations, and the second phase would 
include an enumeration of all Africans in the territory, with questionnaires more 
detailed than the 1962 basic forms.64
On 23 May 1969, the front page of the Herald published the results of the first 
phase of the census, counting Europeans, Asians, and Coloureds.65 The census 
reported that whites numbered 228,040, 15,000 less than was previously estimated. 
Before the census went public, the Rhodesian Cabinet debated how best to approach 
this “matter of political consequence,” the publication of which “might have serious 
effects on public morale...” The Cabinet concluded that the difference could be 
attributed to an undercounting of white emigration around the time of UDI, and that a 
public statement, “should highlight the fact that since then there had been a 
satisfactory and substantial increase indicating that the country had recovered well.66” 
The statement that was eventually released by the government attributed this under­
estimation to many Rhodesians being away on holiday, unrecorded losses up to the 
middle of 1964, and the fact that the Federation never recorded inter-territorial 
migrations. All of these reasons, even when combined, are not wholly satisfying, and 
were much more a product of political maneuvering than real statistical conjecture. 
Most specifically, periodising the majority of the losses before the middle of 1964 
obviously absolved Smith from any blame for these out-migrations, as he came to 
power in April 1964. Notwithstanding Smith’s attempts at obfuscation, after the full 
reporting of the census political opponents4ttacked the RF government explicitly for 
allowing the population ratios to drift from 17.5 to 1 in 1962, to 22 to 1 in 1969.67 
That the parsing of demographic statistics created so much political heat indicates the 
degree to which population numbers, and even the esoterica of demography, could 
carry deep political significance in post-UDI Rhodesia.
64 ‘Full Census is to be Held Next Year’, RH, 22 March 1968.
65 ‘Non-Africans Number More Than 250,000’, RH, 23 May 1969.
66 Smith Papers, Box 022, Cabinet Minutes, 20 May 1969.
67 ‘Bashford Hits at RF Over ‘Isolation’ o f Europeans’, RH, 2 September 1969
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The political impact o f  the 1969 census numbers harmed the Smith 
government in some respects, but those same numbers were also used by the Smith 
government to further longstanding political objectives. A new republican 
constitution that limited African political representation to a distant parity was long a 
political priority by many in the RF, and the White Paper proposals for a new 
constitution were published on 22 May 1969, a day before the publication o f  the non- 
African phase one o f  the census, yet only two days after the Cabinet discussed the 
census’ findings.68 The RF's campaign for the new constitution began in early June.
The franchise requirements under the 1961/65 constitutions were a combination of 
educational attainment and income levels, which while certainly creating a disparate 
impact on racial voting power, were facially non-racial. In the campaign for a “Yes” 
vote in favour of  the new constitution, the RF relied heavily on African population 
trends in an attempt to prove that if the 1965 constitution remained in force, Africans 
would soon dominate the voting rolls. Their referendum campaign disingenuously
cited as evidence for their predictions the rise in the number o f  Africans coming
• inthrough the education system, a function obviously o f  the general population increase.
On the basis o f  education evidence alone, the Minister o f  Education, A.P. Smith, cited
a potential African voting strength of 80,000 by 1975, a spectre intended to mobilise 
support for the capping o f  African political power in the proposed constitution. A 
week later, Ian Smith predicted that 550,000 Africans could qualify by 1977,69 and the 
Minister o f  Infonnation, Immigration, and Tourism, P.K. Van der Byl, estimated 
586,073 by 1976.70 However, as a Herald  editorial explained, the RF’s campaign of 
using attained education levels alone to predict voting eligibility, and not calculating 
that few Africans would also meet the requisite income requirements, especially 
considering the racial job reservation barriers limiting African advancement, was 
dishonest and even ridiculous.71 This RF population rhetoric was augmented by print
(SvdLQue £X/ . 3  t ■- cbv d J  ^
advertisements; one for example stating: ‘irresponsible government leads to chaos 
and anarchy. Need we remind you of  events in the Congo, Nigeria, Ghana,
Zanzibar— o f the proposed land grab in Zambia? If you are thinking o f  a future—
^  A  o  P-rf r ■€.. ( j w  .
68 'M ajor Changes are Proposed: Republican Constitution Rules Out Majority Rule: ‘Objectionable 
Features’ in Present Constitution'. RH, 22 May 1969.
09 'P M ’s Estimation of African Voters’, RH, 17 June 1969.
70 'Van der Byl’s Estimates on A-Roll Voters’, RH, 17 June 1969.
1 'What is the Real Reason?’, Editorial, RH, 11 June 1969.
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77think o f  the need for responsible government.” Adding more details to this ‘Parade 
o f  Horribles,’ the Minister o f  Internal Affairs, Jack Howman, described on television jv 
the raping o f  white women, including nuns, in the Congo, and suggested that a “No” 
vote o f  the constitutional would allow for Rhodesia to lapse into that sort o f  chaos.
The Rhodesian Front’s propaganda campaign behind the “Yes” vote, which 
relied heavily upon images o f  the chaos o f  independent Africa, was given a boost by 
the timed release o f  the phase two findings o f  the census detailing the African 
population. Phase two was scheduled to take three weeks and use 4,500 enumerators 
to fan out into the countryside. The official estimate for the African population prior
74to the census count was 4.5 million. On 19 June 1969, the day before the 
constitutional referendum, the preliminary reports o f  phase two were published by the 
RF government, in which the Director o f  the Census and Statistics reported that 
Rhodesian Africans numbered 4,818,000, over 300,000 more than was previously 
estimated.  ^ In total, the 1969 census revealed a total net increase o f  only 7,000 
whites since the last census in 1962, compared against a net increase o f  980,000 
Africans. This fear o f  African numbers swamping Rhodesia into Congo-style chaos 
was certainly enhanced by the early release o f  the African census numbers. Whether 
or not the publication o f  the preliminary census report was intentionally timed to 
bolster the referendum campaign remains a matter of speculation, but the fact that the 
White Paper proposals were published one day before phase one reported and that the 
referendum was held the very next day after phase two reported, certainly points 
towards the timing o f  these releases not being simply coincidental. As it was, the new 
constitution passed by referendum overwhelmingly, quite likely due in large part to 
the RF's orchestrated fanning o f  white anxieties regarding the expanding racial 
population differentials.
The 1969 census statistics had immediate political consequences beyond the 
constitutional referendum campaign. After phase one o f  the census had reported, but 
before phase two was made public, a Committee was secretly set up to investigate a 
broad policy o f  African population control, and make recommendations as how best
RF Advertisement, RH, 6 June 1969.
73 ‘Howman’s Half Hour’, Editorial, RH, 18 June 1969.
74 ‘Over 4.000 Enumerators in Next Phase of African Census’, RH, 16 April 1969.
75 ‘Number of Africans in Rhodesia Nears 5m’, RH, 19 June 1969.
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to slow African growth.76 The timing of  the formation o f  this secret Committee, 
immediately after the preliminary phase two census figures would have been known
( 1L f WT/v° • )to those in government, almost certainly points to it being motivated by the results of
  —  —  . <£> rthe African population census. Four months after phase two reported, the Rhodesian
Front Congress of October 1969, unanimously passed a resolution that white
immigration should be as “unselective as possible” and that more jobs should be
reserved for whites in Rhodesia, which was an obvious effort to increase white
numbers solely for political purposes .7' As will be discussed below, mass
immigration was a policy long in the making, but the adverse population numbers
reported from the 1969 census provided the right impetus for its serious re-
introduction.
The 1969 census was the last o f  its kind for Rhodesia. The abstract population 
anxieties that had long festered beneath the surface broke out into the public sphere as 
very specific fears in the 1970s. The next census would have likely been scheduled 
for sometime in the mid 1970s, but by then more pressing uses o f  state funds and 
energies were apparent, and there was obviously the security situation which would 
have seriously affected the enumerators’ safety. It is also quite clear that the Smith
regime, after the war escalated and white numbers began to decline, had little interest 
in creating a body of statistical infonnation that would dishearten political supporters 
and give faith to his enemies, and as with the proposed 1966 census, the probable 
adverse findings o f  any mid 1970s census convinced the government to quash it.
Conclusion
Most o f  the policy proposals described in this chapter were cloaked as being 
apolitical and administrative, yet the registration o f  births and deaths, the restrictions 
on foreign African labour, efforts to create national identification cards, and the 
conducting o f  censuses were all intensely political. How this information was 
collected and presented to the public, in particular the censual information, was a 
/  matter o f  political strategy, not mechanical bureaucratic calculations. And from these
76 Smith Papers. Box-023, Cabinet Memorandum, "Population Control’, 13 June 1969. It was 
ultimately decided that there was no easy solution. The state focused their activities on the 
dissemination of propaganda and increased funding for family planning. Box-023, Cabinet Minutes, 
‘Population Control’, 8 December 1970.
‘More Jobs for Europeans and Wider Immigration Are Called For’, RH , 25 October 1969.
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new sets o f  infonnation, white Rhodesians began to view population numbers very u*
fdifferently than they had prior to the publication of  the two censuses, a conceptual 
change that would come to have a dramatic impact on the fate o f  the regime.
.
Despite the state's interest in rationalising Rhodesia s racial demographics, the C .
hidden African population remained a frightening mystery that was beyond their
v \  fvv GA • r
regulatory grasp. State efforts to regulate the massive African population through the
~  -  • ~registration of births and deaths, tunneling them through assigned points o f  entry and 
exit, identifying them as indigenous or alien, reversing migration flows, and keeping 
them out o f  urban areas largely met with failure. These administrative failures forced 
the state into a dichotomous split o f  the African population between: the 
known/unknown, regulated/unregulated, and visible/invisible, which corresponded 
roughly with the urban/rural divide. This was in some ways analogous to what
\ Y
Frederick Cooper describes as the difference between the legal city and the real city,
“a distinction between the regulated, controlled space o f  planners' imagination" 
versus the more chaotic “ lived realities" o f  most Africans. 1 Dividing the African 
population thus, relieved some pressures from the state, and this divide between the 
regulated and the unregulated was seized upon by the right wing o f  the RF as a 
disclamation of responsibility for rural Africans through their policies o f  separate 
development. As the guerrilla war escalated, the state again tried to gain
Ti.1 o.1 u4-e<vcu nf io : r r . .
administrative control of rural Africans, but these efforts also met with failure, as by 
then the state's regulatory power was that much more constricted. These efforts at 
regulating the African population in a way that had never occurred in the past exposed 
( M 9  the superficiality o f  the settler state’s control outside o f  urban a r e i ^ ^ m - i  
foreshadowed the state’s difficulties in promoting family planning in rural areas.
Population numbers were used in many different ways depending on political 
strategy and expediency. Adverse numbers were at times hidden or obscured from 
public view by the state, as during the post-UDI statistical blackout and the tortured 
explanations for the 1969 phase one discrepancy between the white population 
estimates prior to the census and the census findings. Out o f  this same logic, the 1966 
and mid 1970s censuses were both cancelled, likely due to their potentially damaging 
findings. Numbers could also be used as additional evidence to push through
U?
s F. Cooper, Africa Since 1940: The Past o f  the Present (Cambridge, Cambridge University Press,
2002) p. 120.
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preexisting plans and provide rhetorical fuel, as with the timed release of the 1969 
phase two results o f  African population growth which bolstered the government’s 
plan to push through a new constitution limiting African political power, and the RF 
Congress’ vote to increase white immigration. African population estimates and 
future predictions were also employed during the 1970s to draw support for the 
government's expanding family planning initiatives. Population numbers that were 
deemed to be positive, such as the white migration gains after UDI, were widely 
trumpeted by the government, as evidence o f  their successes. The reintroduction of 
the published CSO reports in 1967 came out o f  this same instinct, as the state then 
saw the positive numbers after UDI as a justification, a defence, and a reassurance o f  
the Rhodesian Front’s leadership. Smith, in a series of interviews in the mid 1970s, 
proclaimed that these post UDI migration gains were his greatest accomplishment, as
79 r*they saved Rhodesia. From the mid 1970s onwards, the significance of these same 
figures was publically downplayed by the state for obvious reasons. All sides o f  the 
political contest, including those who followed Rhodesian politics internationally, 
understood the significance o f  population numbers and the nexus between racial 
population trends and the fate o f  the regime. This created a unique situation in which 
Rhodesian politics became highly statisticised, as political and economic trends were 
analysed and interpreted almost as tea leaves from the statistics o f  racial migration, 
fertility, and mortality rates, thereby reducing complex political and social phenomena 
to simple arithmetic.
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Chapter III
The African Population ‘Explosion’
The African population ‘explosion* in Rhodesia through the 1960s and 1970s 
roughly paralleled other population growth rates in sub-Saharan Africa, and to a 
broader degree, population growth rates throughout the developing world. This 
population boom ran alongside other developments in sub-Saharan Africa, all o f  
which had an enormous impact on white society and the settler state in Rhodesia. 
These included: the political decolonisation o f  the countries north of Rhodesia, the 
growth of  African nationalism in Rhodesia, declining white birth rates in Rhodesia, 
and Rhodesia's Unilateral Declaration o f  Independence. This growth rate also 
occurred in the global context o f  the neo-Malthusian population fears o f  the 1970s: a 
theory that enjoyed widespread popular, institutional, and governmental support in the 
Western world. Exact information regarding the size and growth o f  the African 
population in Rhodesia was unknown before the 1962 and 1969 censuses, but once 
discovered, this knowledge had dramatic effects on Rhodesian politics, as it added a 
desperate urgency to the state's population policies, in particular efforts to boost white 
immigration and decrease African fertility. The problems that emanated from 
African population growth were not merely perceptual or irrational, however. This 
growth brought intense, and ultimately fatal, pressures on the settler state, that 
included a drain on the treasury due to increased social spending on education and 
housing, a growing urban influx that strained the infrastructure and threatened white 
preserve, swelling urban unemployment numbers, rural food shortages, and more 
overcrowding and environmental degradation in the TTLs.1 Several politicians 
located population growth as the biggest problem facing the regime, even after the 
escalation o f  the shooting war.2 This chapter will contextualise white Rhodesian 
ideas regarding African population growth, study the demographic theories behind 
this African population explosion, the pressures that this growth applied to the settler 
state, and state efforts to slow down this rapid growth.
1 Over 60 percent of the African population lived in the TTLs, lands which became increasingly 
strained ecologically throughout the period of settler rule. A. Kaler, Running, p. 33.
' The Minister of Manpower and Social Affairs. Health and Education, Rowan Cronje, declared that 
population growth was a greater threat than the war or sanctions. "Rhodesia’s Public Enemy No. 1 
RH, 20 May 1978.
This chapter will also explore a longstanding tension between two broad 
philosophies that was never resolved in the Rhodesian politics o f  population control, 
concerning the proper relationship between the white state and the African 
population: between pulling Africans closer to white society, so as to better 
understand, regulate, and control them, and pushing Africans away from white 
society, to protect white preserve, hoist off the perceived burdens o f  rule, and disclaim 
white responsibility for their fate. Both of these philosophies had old histories in 
European colonial thought, and had in various forms and instances been described as 
the doctrinal conflicts between reform, modernisation, assimilation, and inclusion 
versus relativism, preservation, segregation, and exclusion— competing visions over 
white responsibilities, duties, and goals in governing subject populations. Although 
these two broad philosophies were in conflict with one another, to white politicians 
and the white electorate in Rhodesia both were attractive in some respects, and 
unattractive in others. Pulling Africans closer to white society, through a loosening o f  
residential segregation, softening o f  economic restrictions on African advancement, 
and an opening up o f  political and social spaces within white society, would allow for 
greater regulation and the easier acquisition o f  demographic information. Most 
importantly, it was known that pulling Africans closer to white society, and thereby 
fulfilling the socio-economic preconditions to fertility transitions, was empirically 
proven to lower African birth rates. Yet this also inevitably meant a weakening of 
white preserve, a result that would probably have negative effects on the state’s 
simultaneous efforts to attract white immigrants to Rhodesia and limit the flow of 
white emigrants from Rhodesia. Pulling Africans closer was also an acceptance on 
the part o f  white society o f  the burdens associated with African population growth. 
Pushing Africans away, through the continuation o f  rigid job reservation policies, 
enforced residential segregation, policies to stem the urban influx, and the 
promulgation o f  separate development policies, was an appealing option for many, in 
particular the rightwing of  the RF, precisely because it did protect white preserve.
But in protecting white preserve as sacrosanct and conceding responsibility over the 
African population, the state acknowledged that it had little power or control outside 
o f  traditionally white areas, either spatially, economically, or conceptually. This 
pushing away was also known to correlate with higher birth rates, even as this 
strategy sought to cut white society off  from the burdens emanating from this growth.
As it was, the RF governments oscillated between these two extremes of inclusion and 
exclusion, at times pulling Africans closer, and at others pushing them away, never 
fully reconciling the logical inconsistency between these contrary approaches. This 
tension played itself out clearly in the debates over the state's population control 
policies explored in this chapter.
Wealthy Populations, Poor Populations, and Neo-Malthusianism
Rhodesia's two major racial populations experienced drastically different 
fertility rates in the 1960s and 1970s, which resulted in a wide variety of economic, 
social, and political consequences. The birth rates for the white population began to 
drop rapidly from the early 1960s. As explained in chapter six, this drop was much 
steeper than other comparable populations around the globe, yet white Rhodesia's 
drop in fertility roughly followed the general fertility trends o f  other affluent societies 
in its downward slope. In contrast, the African Rhodesian birth rate remained very 
high, despite a drop in mortality rates. This resulted in a very high rate o f  growth for 
the African population; a growth rate that roughly corresponded with other sub- 
Saharan African populations, though at a rate even higher than most comparable 
populations. These two populations in Rhodesia, both followed the two contrary 
global trends o f  affluent/poor, First World/Third World fertility rates, yet importantly, 
both o f  these contrary global trends existed in microcosm within the same territory, 
and both occurred as exaggerated exemplars o f  these global trends.
The two contrary population trends in Rhodesia were explained by 
contemporary commentators, both academic and lay, by the different stages that the 
white and African populations were in under the demographic transition theory 
(DTT). This linear transition terminology originates from the birth o f  demography as 
a science. Early demographic scientists, in particular Warren Thompson and later
•j
Frank Notestein, analysed European population numbers during the past several 
hundred years, in an attempt to explain both the sharp population rise during the 
industrial revolution, and the leveling off o f  growth rates thereafter. The demographic 
transition theory that emerged from these and other studies divided fertility patterns
3 See for example: W.S. Thompson, Population Problems (New York. McGraw-Hill, 1930) and F. 
Notestein, ‘Population— The Long View’ in T. W. Schultz (ed), Food fo r  the World (Chicago, 
University of Chicago Press, 1945).
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into distinct historical stages that corresponded with levels of economic and 
sociological development. The classical version of the theory4 posits that in 
preindustrial societies high birth rates matched high death rates so that population 
levels remained steady. Following this first stage, improvements in health and 
wellbeing as a result of agricultural, industrial, and medical advances, led to a drop in 
death rates, with birth rates remaining high. This stage of high birth rates and low 
death rates created a spike in population, as that experienced in many European 
countries during the industrial revolution. Next is the demographic transition stage, 
which describes a drop in birth rates as various factors such as consumption patterns, 
access to contraception, and family wealth flows changed, resulting in slower growth. 
Finally, in the last stage of the classical theory, birth rates stabilised and corresponded 
with low death rates such that the overall population again reached equilibrium.
Within Rhodesia, it was widely asserted that the white population had already 
experienced the demographic transition of stage three and had reached the equilibrium 
of stage four. The African population was considered to be in stage two, the growth 
stage, and had yet to experience the transition.
Globally, the demographic transition theory leapt from academia to 
governments, NGOs, and eventually the wider lay public with remarkable speed. The 
reason behind this leap from demographic esoterica to public knowledge lay with 
growing fears in the West following World War II of the effects of rapid population 
growth, both because of its short term potential for political instability and revolution, 
and its long term potential to overrun world resources.5 These fears all found their 
theoretical footing in the rise of neo-Malthusianism, which laid out the alleged 
incompatibility between population growth rates and the resources needed to sustain 
human life. Yet as Betsey Hartmann argues, it was not a generalised fear of all babies 
that fueled the West’s neo-Malthusianism, but instead it was the fears of the wealthy 
countries over the political and economic effects of the growing poor, non-white
4 There are still many active controversies within the demographic discipline regarding various 
components of the transition theory, including the number and relevance o f  the developmental stages. 
Other scholars have also criticised the entire Eurocentric premise o f the developmental stages, and 
question their applicability to the non-Westem world. For a recent examination of DTT, see: J. 
Caldwell, Demographic Transition Theory (Dordrecht, Springer, 2006).
5 For an excellent overview the West’s population control policies, see: B. Hartmann, Reproductive 
Rights and Wrongs (Boston, South End Press, 1995). See also the recent publication: M. Connelly, 
Fatal Misconception: The Struggle to Control World Population (Cambridge, Harvard University 
Press, 2008).
masses that led policymakers to make the reduction o f  population growth rates a 
foreign policy priority.6 Demographic transition theory was the explanatory model 
for how Europe came to reduce its fertility rates, however, this European pattern 
inevitably became universalised as an ideal, and Third World peoples were widely 
seen to be floundering in the pre-transitional phase. This was what neo-Malthusians 
believed would continue until either a demographic transition occurred, or barring 
that, a global catastrophe. The DTT soon took on nonnative and prescriptive 
elements, as a model to be followed, as opposed to merely a model to explain past 
behavior. And it was the nexus between the DTT and neo-Malthusianism that 
explains the interest of the United Nations, NGOs, and the United States government 
in promoting birth control as a catalyst to push the Third World into the final 
demographic transition stage before it was too late.
Widespread popular fears in the West over population growth gathered steam 
in the early 1970s. A major reason for the timing o f  these public fears was the 
publication o f  the bestselling book by Paul Ehrlich, The Population Bomb. The 
Population Bomb was based on the neo-Malthusian premise o f  population growth 
outstripping resources, and it quickly entered into the public consciousness and 
became a well-known frame o f  reference for lay people, even if  the science behind it 
was at the time challenged by many scholars.x Shortly thereafter, the Club o f  Rome 
promulgated the influential book by Donella Meadows, Jurgen Randers, and Dennis 
Meadows, The Limits to Growth , which offered a computerised model backing the
\
neo-Malthusian thesis.6 As the neo-Malthusian momentum continued, 1974 was 
declared World Population Year, and a World Population Conference was hosted that 
same year by the United Nations in Bucharest. Contributing to these spreading 
population fears, were frequent statistics published in the popular press by various 
environmental and population control groups throughout the 1970s describing 
frightening Biblical catastrophes if  world population growth rates continued at their 
current pace, the next report always more shocking than the one that preceded it. So 
dominant were these ideas in the public mind, that the truth or falsity o f  the neo- 
Malthusian premise o f  arithmetic growth o f  resources and geometric growth o f
6 B. Hartmann, Reproductive Rights.
7 P. Ehrlich, The Population Bomb (New York. Ballantine Books, 1968).
s For a controversial criticism of Ehrlich’s book, see: J. Simon, The Ultimate Resource (Princeton, 
Princeton University Press, 1981).
” D. Meadows, et al, The Limits to Growth (New York, Universe Books, 1972).
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population was not seriously questioned by most lay people, even as this theory was 
contested in scientific circles. The population pressures o f  the 1970s had an even 
more biting urgency for whites in Rhodesia. While these neo-Malthusian horrors may 
have seemed distant and abstract to most people in the West, combining easily with 
the West's simultaneous fascination with disaster movies in the 1970s,10 to white 
Rhodesians, population growth was a disaster movie that appeared to be occurring, 
quite literally, within their own backyards.11
k o  '  N
AFRICAN POPULATION GROWTH A ND RACIAL RATIOS IN RHODESIA ( 1960-1979)1
u-
A
Year
1960
1961
1962
1963
1964
1965
1966
1967
1968
1969
1970
1971
1972
1973
1974
1975
1976
1977
1978
1979
African Population (to nearest 100k)
3 .600.000
3.700.000
3 .800.000
3.900.000
4 .100 .000
4 .200.000
4 .400.000
4 .500.000
4 .700.000
4 .800.000  
5,000,000
5.200.000
5.400.000
5.500.000
5.700.000
5.900.000
6.100.000
6 .400.000
6 .600.000  
6,800,000
Population Ratio W hite/African
16.5 
16.8
17.5 
18.1
19.7 
20.2
20.6 
2 1 . 1  
2 1 . 1  
21.2 
21.1
20.9  
20.6
20.7  
2 1 . 1
21.5  
22.3
23.9
25.5  
28.1
Historicising White Population Anxieties in Rhodesia
Political interference in indigenous population and fertility matters has an old 
history in Rhodesia, as well in all o f  Africa, and indeed in the entire colonial
10 This enormously successful disaster genre included movies such as: Airport (1970), The Poseidon 
Adventure (1972), Earthquake (1974), The Towering Inferno (1974), and The Swarm (1978). One 
could almost as easily imagine a neo-Malthusian disaster film out o f this 1970s genre, possibly entitled: 
Attack o f  the Hungry Babies.
11 There are many examples of the Rhodesian media’s paranoiac portrayal of African population 
growth: ‘Rhodesia's Birth Bomb', RH , 1 June 1971; ‘Five Minutes To G o ...’, RH , 4 June 1971; ‘Curb 
Needed on Birth Rates to Avert New ‘Dark Age’: W orld’s Population Rose by 185 Million in 3 
Years— Bureau’, RH , 7 October 1962; ‘Prepare to Meet Our Doom?’, RH. 8 October 1963. ‘Growth of 
Population is ‘Frightening' says Health Minister’, RH, 21 August 1968.
12 Statistics derived from the CSO Monthly Digest of Statistics and Rhodesian Secretary of Health 
Reports.
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experience.13 The Rhodesian colonial regime had long had concerns about the growth 
and configuration o f  the African population, yet during the colony's early days the 
primary concern was that the African population was not growing fast enough to meet 
the colony's labour needs.14 As Diana Jeater has written, Rhodesians also had an 
interest in African sexual practices that they considered deviant, immoral and/or 
irresponsible, though they vacillated over who or what were the causes of these 
deviances.171 Thus while these anxieties over African sexual matters were old, they 
did not always correspond with the perception o f  African ‘over'-population. As 
decolonisation proceeded apace from the late 1950s, and as the British Central 
African Federation experiment came to a close in the early 1960s, white settlers in 
Rhodesia began a process o f  taking stock o f  the racial populations in their territory. 
The resulting 1962 census concretised earlier colonial anxieties regarding African 
sexual practices and fertility, as this revealed growth o f  the African population was 
immediately recognised to pose a threat to the future stability o f  the settler state, and 
therefore these old fears had found a new focus.
Prior to the collapse o f  the Federation, the relative sizes o f  the white and 
African populations were o f  administrative interest, but did not appear to present a 
threat to the stability of white power in Rhodesia. As discussed in chapter two, 
accurate estimates o f  the size o f  the African population were even unknown before 
the 1962 census. Even after the 1962 census, there was insufficient political will 
behind any comprehensive efforts to reduce the size of the African population before 
the rise o f  Ian Smith in 1964, and even thereafter such efforts were uneven and 
inconsistent before 1968.16 This was despite rumours to the contrary that buzzed 
around colonial Rhodesia from at least the 1940s that white society long connived to 
sterilise the African population.17 These rumours o f  surreptitious sterilisations, 
despite being untrue, resonated among the African population o f  Rhodesia until
13 See for example: A.L. Stoler, Race and the Education o f  Desire: Foucault’s History o f  Sexuality 
and the Colonial Order o f  Things (Durham, Duke University Press, 1995).
14 A. Kaler, Running, citing M. Vaughan, "Measuring a Crisis in Maternal and Child Health: An 
Historical Perspective’, in M. Wright, Z. Stein, and J. Scandlyn (eds), Women’s Health and Apartheid: 
The Health o f  Women and Children and the Future o f  Progressive Primary Health Care in Southern 
Africa (Frankfurt, Medico International, 1989) pp. 130-142.
15 D. Jeater, Marriage, Perversion, and Power: The Construction o f  Moral Discourse in Southern 
Rhodesia, 1894-1930 (Clarendon, Oxford 1993).
1(1 Kaler likewise concludes that even though African nationalists accused the government of 
attempting to reduce population numbers long before UDI, there was no evidence of any officially 
sanctioned efforts to reduce the African population before 1965. A. Kaler. Running, p. 57.
17 A. Kaler. Running, p. 181.
independence, rumours that were tapped into and used as vehicles for the nationalists’ 
pronatalist agenda. In the late 1960s, however, several factors coalesced to make 
family planning an increasing priority for the Rhodesian Front government. These 
factors included a new jolt of demographic information concerning growth rates in 
1969, continued high rates of white emigration that reinforced whites’ political 
insecurity, a new interest in the political and economic effects of a growing dependent 
population, the growing neo-Malthusian hysteria in the wider Western world, and a 
greater political boldness of the Rhodesian right-wing after UDI.
The rapid rate of African population growth added serious strains on the settler 
regime, strains that were exacerbated by the unwillingness of the white regime to 
more equitably distribute the benefits and burdens of power. These strains were 
certainly administrative, economic, and political as will be discussed in later chapters, 
but there was also a moral component, as this population growth challenged the 
longstanding, albeit ambivalent and inconsistently applied, colonial efforts to fulfill 
their ‘burden’ of modernising the African population. In this context, African 
population growth exerted weight on the spatial and theoretical divisions of the 
territory, as the regime sought desperately, but unsuccessfully, to keep Africans in 
their proper place conceptually and physically. African population growth was 
regarded as ‘overpopulation’ only because it outstripped the resources the white 
regime was willing to devote to that population. In matters of education spending, 
health spending, housing, and employment opportunities, this growth overcrowded 
the limited physical, economic, and conceptual space the white regime allocated to the 
indigenous population. Specifically, this meant limiting African economic and 
political advancement, and keeping Africans from drifting into the urban areas. Yet 
despite constricting urban opportunities, Africans continued to come to the cities. 
Salisbury’s African population had increased an enormous 5 percent from 1967 to 
1968, and in total numbered 236,000, roughly 10,000 more than the entire white
1 Rpopulation of Rhodesia at that time. African males in wage labour employment
declined as a percentage of the total African male population from 78 percent in 1956 
to 58 percent in 1968, even though in absolute numbers it increased over this same 
period, which created the large unemployed urban population so dreaded by the white
18 ‘Concern Expressed over African Influx Into Salisbury’, RH, 30 November 1968.
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state.19 Likewise, in the fields o f education and health the state limited spending to a 
set percentage o f GNP, regardless o f the actual needs o f the African population. This 
arbitrary pegging o f  spending on total GNP had deleterious effects on the quality o f 
African education in Rhodesia. Overpopulation was always a distributive and an 
allocative problem more than an absolute scarcity problem, as the white regime was 
concerned that increased pressures building on the African side o f the legalistic and 
conceptual wall would soon burst over into the white side, sweeping away privilege 
and white preserve. African population growth thus exposed the limits and
9 1 .
contradictions o f the colonial burden," and this was the true meaning o f  'racial 
swamping.'
The linearity o f the demographic transition theory’s progressive stages easily 
jibed with white Rhodesian perceptions o f the backwardness o f the African 
population relative to the white population. These two developmental stages o f the 
white and African populations were referred to as post-transitional and pre- 
transitional, respectively, and mirrored white attitudes about the more general linear 
progress o f the two races. Since the African populations' pre-transitional birth rates 
were seen to threaten the settler state, it was not surprising that the state attempted to 
force the African population into the next transition stage, as this intervention was 
consistent with earlier intrusions into African fertility. Efforts to forcibly push the 
African population into the next demographic transition stage and the African 
populations' resistance to these intrusions engendered frustration within the settler 
state. African aversion to white efforts to control their fertility was conceived by 
white Rhodesia as the same sort o f intractability that had stifled other efforts at 
modernisation, in particular cattle de-stocking and immunisation campaigns. 
Expressing this exasperation, a regional chairman o f the RF raged in 1974 that, 
“ [Africans] cannot look for improvement— can never hope to achieve good living 
standards even in the absence o f sanctions— while they indulge in their abysmal
19 A. Kaler, Running. p. 34, citing D.G. Clarke, “Population and Family Planning in Economic 
Development of Rhodesia”, Zambezia, Vol. 2 (1971).
20 'Report Urges reorganisation of Division of African Education: Danger in Gap Between Funds and 
Population Growth Rate’, RH, 18 April. 1969.
-1 A Herald editorial from 1971 expressed the view that the Smith government had already “written 
off” the subsistence sector of the economy, as an Economic Survey reported that African employment 
problems were “insuperable" and persistent African growth made development impossible. ‘Is This An 
Admission of Defeat?’, RH. Editorial, 28 April 1971.
58
00fecundity.” The Minister of Finance, John Wrathall, expressed this same point in a 
Budget Speech from 1971: “The African people should have no illusions about the 
future. If they wish to attain a reasonable standard of life for their children, free from 
the frustration of thwarted aspirations and free from the misery of poverty, the
O'5
realities of the situation demand a concerted effort to limit population growth...” 
There was thus the older paternalist strain of the ‘white man’s burden’ that ran 
alongside the more blatantly self-serving motivations to reconfigure African birth 
rates, which both suggested efforts to pull Africans closer to white society. Be that as 
it was, African reluctance to recognise the alleged modernising benefits of reducing 
their birth rates, in terms of female empowerment, more disposable income for 
consumer spending, and less scarcity generally, reinforced ideas in some sectors of 
the white community of the hopelessness of ever civilising the African population.
It was out of this instinct, one with an equally old colonial pedigree, that right- 
wing Rhodesians sought to cut white society off from the burdens and responsibilities 
of the massive and unresponsive African population. The Minister of the Public 
Service stated this frustration over the asymmetrical burden distribution when he 
stated in Parliament: “We cannot have the European continuing to be wholly 
responsible for the development of Rhodesia, as has been the position for many 
generations...Africans in increasing numbers [need] to come forward to help in 
shouldering the immense burden of developing and improving Rhodesia.”24 The 
Cabinet debated how best to effectuate this distribution of the burdens of population 
growth, and a Cabinet memorandum from 1970 concluded that Africans needed to,
“make a fair and realistic contribution towards the cost of social services they enjoy
0 ^and [the government should charge] Africans accordingly.” These two statements 
reflected the twin prongs of the state’s approach to redistribute population burdens: 
shift development and devolve economic responsibilities to African areas, and charge 
Africans for state social services. Describing the Rhodesian Front’s policy of 
provincialisation, a Herald editorial from 1972 stated: “In essence, the scheme 
outlined means that the least developed parts of Rhodesia would no longer be the 
direct concern of the Rhodesian government...Rhodesia’s central government and its
22 ‘Africans’ Job Problem Due to Breeding—RF Leader’, RH, 11 May 1974.
23 ‘More Africans Must Earn From Land’, RH, 16 July 1971.
24 Parliamentary Debates, Vol. 85, ‘Motion: Employment o f Qualified Africans’, 5 December 1973.
25 Smith papers, Box 024, Cabinet Memorandum, ‘Report o f the Committee on Population Problems’, 
27 November 1970.
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Civil Service would then, of course, be free to concentrate entirely on the white half
9 f \of Rhodesia.” If the African population refused to be responsible in their fertility 
rates, so these arguments went, then the state and white settlers should not have to 
subsidise their irresponsibility.
The state’s attribution of the causes behind the African population growth 
necessarily influenced their strategy to stem this growth. Whites regarded this 
population growth as partially a reflection of the success of the settler state’s 
modernising efforts in the realms of maternal and child health. Self-congratulation, 
however, ran uneasily alongside their efforts to clip this troublesome byproduct. One 
Herald editorial shortly after the 1962 census, even showed an obvious degree of 
circumspection about the wisdom of ever guiding Africans into stage two of the 
demographic transition, stating: “Without these improved services [provided by the 
Federal government] life expectancy and infant mortality would be at levels which 
would have hindered the rapid growth of the African population,” the editorial 
explained, before continuing on to analyse the political, economic, and administrative 
problems resulting from this rapid growth.27 More explicitly, the head of obstetrics 
and gynecology at the University College of Rhodesia, R.H. Philpott, said in a public 
address advocating for immediate efforts to remedy the population problem: “In one 
generation the world’s population multiplied out of all proportion to food supplies, 
and the benefactor, the philanthropist, the physician, and the peacemaker faced the 
starving multitudes of their own creation.. .Those of the technologically advanced 
nations of the world have brought their new knowledge to the developing nations and 
are therefore in part responsible for the population explosion”28 White intellectuals 
conjectured that the cultural clash of modernisation had a warping effect on African 
culture, and had corrupted the African population’s traditional equilibrium, creating a 
new pathology that was manifesting itself in irresponsible, and ultimately self-
9Qdestructive, growth rates. Amy Kaler, citing Dr. Philpott and others, described how 
white Rhodesian intellectuals viewed African growth as a result of the “benevolent,
26 ‘Keep Feet on Ground’, Editorial, RH, 11 July 1972.
27 ‘Growth of the Population’, Editorial, RH, 23 June 1962.
28 R.H. Philpott, ‘Motives and Methods in Population Control: An Inaugural Lecture Given in the 
University College o f Rhodesia’ (unpublished pamphlet, Salisbury, 1969) p. 3,5.
29 A. Kaler, ‘Fertility Running Wild: Elite Perceptions of the Need for Birth Control in White-Rule 
Rhodesia’, in A. Russell, E. Sobo, M. Thompson (eds), Contraception Across Cultures: Technologies, 
Choices, Constraints (New York, Berg Publishers, 2000).
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albeit fallible” dispensation of Rhodesia’s colonial burden. This fallibility was 
exemplified by the unintended effects of only partially modernising the African 
population, and pushing them into the second stage of the DTT, without inculcating 
the concomitant responsibility that could guide them into the transition stage. To 
many it was better perhaps a job not done at all than a job half done, and as the 
population problem was purported to be the white man’s creation, it must of necessity 
be solved by white men.
The Origins of a Population Policy
Though the Family Planning Association of Rhodesia (FPAR) was formed in 
1964, before 1968 state efforts to control African population growth were uneven and 
desultory. Amy Kaler, in her book, Running After Pills: Politics, Contraception, and 
Gender in Colonial Zimbabwe, thoroughly analyses the origins, methods, and effects
31of the Rhodesian state’s efforts to promote family planning in Rhodesia. As Kaler 
describes, the state’s family planning policy used as the vehicle of its efforts FPAR, 
which while ostensibly an independent nongovernmental organisation, relied on state 
revenue to operate. But the RF government’s support for FPAR was neither 
immediate, nor without reservation. In the spring of 1966, a private member’s bill 
from a Rhodesian Front backbencher was introduced calling for a wide-ranging effort 
to reduce the African birth rate, but after a lengthy and heated debate, the mover, Mr. 
Owen-Smith, withdrew the motion.32 In October 1966, the Rhodesian Cabinet for the 
first time agreed to “the principle of family planning” and contributed a nominal sum 
to FPAR. Several months later in the Committee of Supply Votes, the Minister of 
Labour and Social Welfare, Ian McLean, included a supplementary increase of £2,000 
for family planning.34 This was also a nominal sum in terms of the overall budget— 
tourism promotion, for instance received, £113,000 from that same budget —but this 
amount did signal a growing ambition on the part of the state to enter into family
30 A. Kaler, Fertility Running Wild, p. 92.
31 A. Kaler, Running After Pills: Politics, Gender and Contraception in Colonial Zimbabwe 
(Portsmouth, Heinemann, 2003).
32 Parliamentary Debates, Vol. 63, ‘Motion: Family Planning’, 9 March 1966.
33 Smith papers, Box 020, Cabinet Minutes, ‘Family Planning’, 18 October 1966.
34 Parliamentary Debates, Vol. 66, ‘Revenue Vote 33— Social Welfare’, 8 February 1967.
35 Parliamentary Debates, Vol. 68, ‘Revenue Vote 31— Information, Immigration and Tourism’, 31 
August 1967.
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planning, even if Owen-Smith, the mover of the 1966 motion, retorted that the figure 
would be better set at £100,000. Three months after the supplementary vote, a 
Cabinet Meeting discussed further increasing family planning funding as a method to 
thin the backlog of African school-leavers entering the labour market every year. At 
the same meeting, direct state propaganda was proposed and rejected, and it was 
decided that more money should be allocated to FPAR via the Ministry of Social 
Welfare and Labour. As an adjunct to family planning efforts, a report was 
presented to the Cabinet that autumn by the Minister of Social Welfare and Labour 
arguing that to fully address the problem of Africans falling into urban 
unemployment, it was “emphasised that the important thing should be to divert the 
aspirations of [African] school children from white collar jobs... [though teachers]
38found it difficult to put this across when dealing with future employment prospects.” 
In a related effort to relieve African unemployment, the Cabinet also agreed to 
investigate the possibility that an agreement could be reached for South Africa to 
employ black Rhodesians for mine work, which would partially mitigate adverse
TQ
migration flows and alleviate unemployment. It is significant that these first 
initiatives were already conceived in terms of allocative and distributive imbalances 
in the workforce, and conducted through the Ministry of Social Welfare and Labour, 
though eventually this responsibility would later shift to the Ministry of Health.
Throughout the post-Federation period, white Rhodesians experienced 
periodic waves of panic concerning the growth of the African population.40 Often 
these waves were precipitated by censual information, but they were also occasionally 
a product of deliberate fear-mongering on the part of the government. A wave of 
population panic among the white public, and a new energy behind demographic 
engineering policies arose in the summer of 1968. This panic was precipitated by the 
Minister of the Treasury, John Wrathall’s, budget for the fiscal year,41 and the debate 
regarding the Sadie Report on the linkages between racial ratios and economic growth
36 Parliamentary Debates, Vol. 66, ‘Revenue Vote 33— Social Welfare’, 8 February 1967. Col. 1325.
37 Smith Papers, Box-022, Cabinet Minutes, ‘African Education: School Leavers’, 7 May 1968.
38 Smith Papers, Box-022, Cabinet Minutes, ‘Employment: African Youth’, 6 November 1968.
39 Smith Papers, Box-022, Cabinet Minutes, ‘Foreign Labour and Unemployment-Eight Report’, 3
December 1968.
40 For a good overview o f white discourses in Rhodesia regarding African population growth, see: A. t 
Kaler, Fertility Running Wild.
41 Parliamentary Debates, Vol. 71, ‘Finance Bill: Budget Statement’, 18 July 1968.
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one month later.42 Wrathall’s lengthy Budget Statement in July focused extensively 
on the detrimental economic effects of the growing African population, and the urgent 
need for a reduction in African growth rates, and echoed the main conclusions of the 
Sadie Report. Regarding the relationship between African population growth and 
total economic growth, Wrathall stated:
[African family limitation] is a delicate subject with moral and political 
overtones. The facts, however, are easy to understand. For an economy to 
grow it needs capital, skills, opportunities, markets, and not least, the 
entrepreneurs to exploit the opportunities. The lack of all or some of these 
elements limits the growth rate which can be achieved. It will not be easy for 
the Rhodesian economy to grow in real terms over a long period at a rate 
exceeding the present population growth rate of 3.5% per annum. During the 
last 10 years the average annual growth rate in real terms has been of the order 
of only 2.5%.43
The racialised assumptions embedded in Wrathall’s speech publically laid out 
the direction of the state’s population policies of limiting unproductive, burdensome 
growth (Africans) and attracting capitalised and entrepreneurial growth (whites), in 
the characteristically cloaked language of pseudo-economics. This budget statement 
and the 1968 budget’s priorities represented the firmest determination on the part of 
the state to enter into family planning promotion, even if it was primarily through the 
medium of FPAR. This decision to boost funding to FPAR was consistent with the 
Cabinet’s decision that spring to funnel family planning money through the Ministry 
of Social Welfare and Labour. Thereafter, the Rhodesian Front government began to 
enter into family planning funding with greater deliberateness, as evidenced by the 
percentage of FPAR’s operating revenue provided by the state rising from 12 percent 
in 1965, to 51 percent in 1974, to 98 percent in 1979 44 This increased financial 
commitment to family planning reflected a greater political commitment and will to 
slowing the growth of the African population, a political will that would be further 
stiffened by the publication of the results of the 1969 census.
Coming right on the heels of Wrathall’s Budget statement was the delayed 
debate over the controversial government-sponsored Report on long-term economic 
planning by Dr. Jan L. Sadie. The essence of the Report, and the sections affirmed by
42 Parliamentary Debates, Vol. 72, ‘Sadie Report’, 13 August 1968
43 Parliamentary Debates, Vol. 71, ‘Finance Bill: Budget Statement’, 18 July 1968.
44 A. Kaler, Running, p. 51.
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the government, dealt with the detrimental economic effects of the population 
imbalance between whites and Africans in Rhodesia, and the urgent need to re­
balance this ratio. Sadie’s Report was explicitly premised on the idea that Africans 
were incapable of endogenous economic growth, and therefore it was vital for 
Rhodesia’s economic future to match the African population growth with overall 
economic growth: growth that must originate with whites. Sadie calculated that on 
average every economically active white person created employment for 7.4 Africans, 
which meant that 5,400 whites needed to enter the labour force every year to 
accommodate the annual cohort of 40,000 Africans who entered into the labour 
market.45 The government concurred with Sadie’s recommendations that both ends of 
this ratio—rapid African growth and negligible white growth—needed to be attacked, 
with family planning addressing the former and increased immigration the latter. The 
Report was tabled in Parliament in October 1967, but was not debated until August 
1968, a delay that was explained by Finance Minister Wrathall as an attempt have the 
Report be widely read and commented upon from various persons inside and outside 
government,46 yet the content of the Report and the timing of the debate so soon after 
the controversial Budget, strongly suggest that the delay was quite likely a deliberate 
effort of the RF government to build support for its newly created demographic 
reconfiguration policies. As was stated in the resulting debate, the gist behind Sadie’s 
Report was nothing new, and it was even referred to as “stating little more than has 
been obvious to men involved in commercial and industrial affairs for many years,” 
but it provided an academic gloss to balder political motivations, and lent the 
credence of apolitical economics to an issue that the right-wing had long supported.47 
Sadie’s Report can therefore be viewed in many ways as the theoretical blueprint for 
the RF government’s massive intervention into demographic engineering, a blueprint 
for a war in need of a casus belli.
In the 1970s, the state’s population efforts increased significantly in scale.
The reasons behind this redoubling of effort are several, but most importantly it was 
the publication of the 1969 census numbers which had the most immediate and 
dramatic effects on white society generally, and especially on white policymakers.
Six days before the publication of the phase two census numbers, the Minister of
45 Parliamentary Debates, Vol. 72, ‘Sadie Report’, 13 August 1968. Col. 20-21.
46 Parliamentary Debates, Vol. 72, ‘Sadie Report’, 13 August 1968. Col. 2.
47 Parliamentary Debates, Vol. 72, ‘Sadie Report’, 13 August 1968. Col. 22.
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Health and of Social Welfare presented a memorandum to the Cabinet recommending 
“that a Cabinet Committee, or a committee of Senior Officials, be set up to examine 
the problem [of African population growth] and... make recommendations as to the 
responsibilities of various Ministries in this regard with a view to mounting a positive 
and collective attack on the [population] problem as part of overall government
A O
policy.” In an oral amplification of his memorandum a month later, after the census 
results were published, the Minister stated that the Cabinet should render the terms of 
reference for the proposed population committee rather broad, as it should, “also 
examine incentives for increasing the population in certain racial groups as opposed to 
disincentives for controlling the population of other groups.”49 The Cabinet 
ultimately decided, however, that the bolstering of the white population “would have 
to be handled in a different way and should be the subject of a completely separate 
action,” lest these two contrary population policies “lead to political difficulties.”50
The first standing Committee on Population Problems was formed, albeit with 
the narrower terms of reference, with representatives of the Ministries of Local 
Government and Housing, Finance, Health, Education, and Internal Affairs, and 
reported its unanimous findings in November of 1970.51 This initial Report laid out 
the government’s current population control policies in Rhodesia, the state of 
scientific and demographic theory in the field, and in the final section delivered 
recommendations. The findings of the Report give an eye to what the state actually 
knew about Rhodesia’s African population and contemporary fertility transition 
theories, and revealed that at the very outset the state was aware of some very 
uncomfortable contradictions in their population policies. One irony that the Report 
discovered was that the state’s urban influx policies ran counter to the state’s policies 
aimed at lowering African birth rates, as it was reported that urban birth rates ran on 
average about 5 percent lower than rural African birth rates. In this regard, these 
contradictory policies could be reconciled, the Report stated, by encouraging the 
development of urban centers in the TTLs, and pulling more Africans into the cash 
economy. This urbanity/fertility correlation and the desirability of creating African 
urban areas was accounted for in the following way by the Minister of Health a year
48 Smith Papers, Box-023, Cabinet Memorandum, ‘Population Control’, 13 June 1969.
49 Smith Papers, Box-022, Cabinet Minutes, ‘Population Control’, 16 July 1969.
50 Smith Papers, Box-022, Cabinet Minutes, ‘Population Control’, 16 July 1969.
51 Smith papers, Box-023, Cabinet Minutes, ‘Report o f the Committee on Population Problems’, 
November 27 1970.
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later: “The alternative [to economic development in the TTLs] was a continual drift 
of Africans into European areas, which, although it might lead to a decline in the
c'y
African birth rate in these areas, was in itself undesirable.”
Consistent with contemporary scholarship at the time, the Report also 
commented on the connection between standard of living, education levels, and 
fertility rates, and that economic preconditions also needed to be met alongside the 
simple distribution of contraceptives—the very same preconditions idea that the head 
of FPAR derided publically as a “dangerous dogma.” As Kaler notes, there were 
obvious “silences” in Rhodesia’s family planning policies regarding the socio­
economic preconditions for demographic transitions.54 Yet these silences were only 
public silences, and did not reflect the state’s ignorance of this scholarship, but were 
instead a rational realisation that altering these fundamental preconditions, even to 
address a problem as significant as African growth rates, would fatally damage white 
preserve. As Kaler argued in the context of FPAR’s public strategy, “if such changes 
had been undertaken on a large enough scale to produce an appreciable national 
effect, they would have threatened the racial inequalities on which Rhodesia’s 
political and economic structures were founded.. .”55 And so this reasoning also 
permeated the thinking of the highest levels of Rhodesian state. It was out of this 
political calculation that these public silences regarding precondition theory were 
created. These silences were broken by a few errant voices, however. Some 
outspoken African MPs who were familiar with precondition theory argued forcefully 
that the Smith government was putting “the cart before the horse” in trying to impose 
family planning without first addressing socio-economic preconditions.56 Yet these 
isolated voices were effectively marginalised, and the creation of these socio­
economic preconditions, perhaps the best proven method to induce a demographic 
transition, was privately considered, consciously ignored, and publicly disreputed. 
Thereafter, the state publically defended its family planning policy as a method to 
bring about these socio-economic preconditions—that the cart will pull the horse 
behind it.57
52 Smith Papers, Box-024, Cabinet Minutes, ‘Population Control’, 27 July 1971.
53 A. Kaler, Running, quoting Dodds, p. 43.
54 A. Kaler, Fertility Running Wild, pp. 95-96.
55 A. Kaler, Fertility Running Wild, p. 96.
56 Parliamentary Debates, Vol. 88, ‘Committee of Supply Vote’, 1 October 1974.
57 ‘More Africans Must Earn from Land’, RH, 16 July 1971.
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In the recommendations section, the 1970 Report of the Committee on 
Population Problems explored various ways in which the African birth rate could be 
lowered in light of the general findings of the first section. The first 
recommendations focused on forcing the African population to internalise the costs of 
population growth to create antinatalist incentives. The Report advocated changing 
the system of grants to African Councils to provide incentives “to change [the] 
present system from the taxation of adult males to the taxation of the total number in
fO
the family.” Similarly, the Report noted that the “subsidisation by central 
government of social services is inconsistent with a policy aimed at reducing the birth 
rate because it insulates the people from the true cost of having large families, 
especially where a number of the services subsidised are for the benefit of children.”59 
Below-cost hospital charges for Africans were among those subsidies found to create 
incentives counter to government policy, as did state subsidised primary education.60 
In a further effort to better engineer African incentives, the Committee suggested 
“that more attention be given to stimulating the material wants of tribal Africans, 
particularly the women, whom, it is believed, would respond more readily to such 
action than would men. The Committee has in mind the expansion of extension 
activities for women’s clubs and of the promotion of sales of consumer goods.”61 In 
this same vein of redirecting the consumer impulses of African women towards 
antinatal ends, the Report explicitly stated: “the desire for emancipation among 
African women [should] be exploited to the fullest extent by the ministries of Internal 
Affairs, Health, and Local Government and Housing in their efforts to improve the 
standards of living of families, especially women and children.” Further cost 
internalisation was suggested by expanding prosecutions of criminal neglect for 
parents of underfed children. In an oral amplification of the Report, the Minister of 
Health again reiterated the importance of targeting government propaganda towards 
African women, and the greater introduction of Africans into the cash economy, an
58 Smith papers, Box-023, Cabinet Minutes, ‘Report o f the Committee on Population Problems’, 
November 27 1970.
58 Smith papers, Box-023, Cabinet Minutes, ‘Report o f the Committee on Population Problems’, 
November 27 1970.
60 These hospital fees were eventually raised in the early 1970s creating a raucous outcry among 
African MPs in Parliament. Parliamentary Debates, Vol. 81, ‘Committee o f Supply Vote’, 2 August 
1972.
61 Smith papers, Box-023, Cabinet Minutes, ‘Report of the Committee on Population Problems’, 
November 27 1970.
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economic system whereby the family wealth flows were such that children became an 
economic burden rather than an asset. Explaining in more detail the reasons behind 
this gendered approach to family planning, the Minister of Health later stated: “while 
African women showed interest in family planning the same could not be said of 
African males who, once they achieved a measure of material success, hankered after 
the pleasures of subsistence level tribal living which included several wives and large 
families.” In addition to the cost internalisation strategies, the Report also called for 
more intensive propaganda, including small family propaganda in school curricula, 
and for increases in the funds for the distribution of contraceptives. In his 
amplification, the Minister of Health expressed that the Report considered other 
antinatal incentives and disincentives, but these were “played down somewhat to 
avoid an accusation of ruthlessness. There were, of course, many other disincentives 
available to government [than those discussed in the Report] , but [these types] of 
action[s] would undoubtedly lead to criticism, especially overseas.” Other topics 
that were introduced in the Report, for which it was concluded further discussion was 
needed, were the legalisation of abortion and voluntary sterilisation. The Cabinet 
approved the Minister’s request for the creation of a second standing committee of 
senior officials to re-analyse the government’s options in the area of population 
control.64
The Failure of the State’s Population Policy
The ‘dangerous dogma’ of the necessity of preconditions before a fertility 
transition, was recognised to be on a collision course with the impatient demands of 
the rightwing RF members. Policymakers at the highest levels realised that they were 
constrained by contradictory policy objectives—African economic advancement 
lowered birth rates, but challenged white preserve; higher education levels resulted in 
lower fertility, but also increased employment frustrations for under-employed 
Africans; urbanity correlated with lower fertility, but whites were anxious to keep 
Africans out of white areas—and crucially all of these same modernisation efforts 
were vehemently opposed by the very same elements within the RF that pushed
62 Smith Papers, Box-024, Cabinet Minutes, ‘Population Control’, 27 July 1971.
63 Smith Papers, Box-023, Cabinet Minutes, ‘Population Control’, 8 December 1970.
64 Smith Papers, Box-023, Cabinet Minutes, ‘Population Control’, 8 December 1970.
hardest for a reduction in African birth rates. This presented significant practical and 
philosophical problems for the white regime. The science behind precondition theory 
was never challenged, but the state immediately sought to cram the square pegs o f 
precondition theory into the circle holes o f  a racialised economic and political system. 
Greater urbanisation had to mean new urban areas in African regions. Economic 
development and increases in wage labour employment had to be concentrated away 
from white areas, and education would have to be focused on vocational and 
agricultural training, so as not to threaten the spatial or economic preserve o f whites.
It was reasoned that standards o f living would not have to be increased on a relative 
racial scale, nor even necessarily on an absolute family-wide scale, but instead wealth 
could be effectively redistributed within African families with women gaining more 
economic power vis-a-vis men, which could achieve the same antinatal effect.
L'\Similarly, the supposed latent consumerist hunger o f African women could be fed by 
more retail stores and consumer goods available in the TTLs, spending temptations 
that, it was hoped, would prove more attractive than spending money on more 
children. It was in these ways that fertility precondition theory was awkwardly paired 
with institutionalised racial inequalities, as a strategy to simultaneously modernise 
and exclude. While this reconciliation appeared in Cabinet meetings and party 
congresses to be at least facially logical, if  not also redundant and expensive, there 
would never in Rhodesia be the full public support needed to implement these 
separate development policies, and this parallelism would remain only plans on paper.
In July 1971, arising from the recommendations o f the first meeting o f the new 
standing committee, the Rhodesian state’s second such committee, each M inistry was 
called upon to submit memoranda outlining what role they each could play in a state­
wide effort to lower African birth rates.6S The resulting memoranda, notwithstanding 
the excitement that population issues elicited in the wider public especially among the 
rank and file o f the RF, were generally equivocal and conservative, and were much 
more an expression o f prototypical bureaucratic caution than an all aboard approach 
to an existential problem facing the regime. As evidenced by the weak commitments 
expressed in these memoranda, the different government Ministries were unevenly 
committed to a broad-ranging attack on the population problem, even following the
65 Smith Papers. Box-024, Cabinet Memoranda 1971 Part 2, ‘Population Control’, 23 July 1971.
1969 census uproar, knd these memorapdafwere duly taken into consideration by the 
standing com hritte^
Even as the second standing committee on population began its work and the 
various Ministries equivocated over their prospective duties in the population control 
area, the RE rank and file clamoured for more activist policies to address the 
population problem. To a certain extent, this population panic was manufactured and 
certainly enflamed by the RF in the late 1960s, but soon this Frankenstein-like beast 
began to turn against its creator. This ground swell from the party base concerned the 
chair of the standing committee, the Minister of Health, and in particular there were 
several resolutions that were introduced in the RF’s national Congress in 1971 calling 
for drastic population control policies that he considered worrying.66 Among the 
radical proposals burbling up from the lower reaches of the party, were calls for 
compulsory birth control for Africans, or barring outright coercion, others had in 
various forms suggested establishing some form of quid pro quo of using birth control 
or being sterilised in exchange for receiving government services.67 Significantly, 
these views did only emanate from ihzpans culottes of)the RF, as exerting some ' 
degree of coercion in African fertility matters was at times suggested even by 1 “ 
Cabinet-level officials. Expressing an obvious frustration, the Minister explained that 
despite these urgent calls, there was no immediate, overnight solution to this problem 
of high African birth rates, involving as it did much larger socio-economic conditions. 
In his statement, the Minister explored some of the options considered by the 
committee, including legalising abortion and increased provisions for both male and 
female sterilisation, “particularly [for] women with large families seeking social 
welfare assistance,” but he asserted that there was no straight forward answer to the
/Q
complex problem. Candidly admitting to the Cabinet why the African birth rate was 
as yet apparently unaffected by state initiatives, he said “[it was] bome out by 
evidence from all over the world that family planning as such did not control the size 
of the population; it only enhanced the standard of living although it was an integral 
part of a population control plan as a whole.”69 In the spring of 1971, the Secretary of 
Health conveyed this same frustration with the state’s population control efforts this
66 Smith Papers, Box-024, Cabinet Minutes, ‘Population Control’, 27 July 1971.
67 ‘Population Explosion Warning’, RH, 19 August 1967.
68 Smith Papers, Box-024, Cabinet Minutes, ‘Population Control’, 27 July 1971.
69 Smith Papers, Box-024, Cabinet Minutes, ‘Population Control’, 27 July 1971.
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way: “the Ministry o f  Health could provide the water but could neither lead or drive 
the horse to the water nor make it drink.”70
The full Report o f  the second Committee on Population Problems that was 
presented to the Cabinet in October 1971, called for a strong state commitment to 
attack the population problem. Among other things, it recommended that a new 
“broadly-based, high-powered,” permanent Population Council be formed.
Inevitably, the prospect o f such a powerful new body quickly excited ministerial 
jealousies. In the Cabinet discussion that followed, it was stated that such a body 
outside the government would in essence be a “ ’super' M inistry” capable o f “laying
7 Idown policy which involved a large number o f individual Ministries.” After debate, 
the Cabinet agreed that any new population com m ittee's functioning would be 
hampered by “the many differences in the views o f individual ministries and it 
appeared that it might be difficult to get this committee to function satisfactorily due
*7 2to an apparent reluctance on the part o f some ministries to become fully involved." 
Concluding that a committee again needed to “examine the whole spectrum of 
population control and not limit it to the pure aspect o f family planning,” the Cabinet 
called on a new committee to take a fresh look at the problem, and “examine the 
problem in the broadest aspect o f population control and to prepare an overall plan for 
the consideration o f government.”73 The Cabinet decided to appoint a third standing 
population committee: a committee that was eventually elevated to the status o f a 
Cabinet Committee with the Minister o f Health serving as chair.74 In the 
consideration o f this second committee Report, the Cabinet simultaneously expanded 
the third C om m ittee's terms o f reference, and in the same instance limited its powers 
to implement any conclusions they reached. The Cabinet’s decision was a 
pusillanimous punt back to a third committee, calling for yet another non-binding
/"*’ "X \
Report. In so doing, the Cabinet tacitly acknowledged that the state's broader 
population control proposals, beyond mere propaganda and contraceptive distribution, 
all contained insurmountable political, economic, and logistical problems.
70 Smith Papers, Box-024, Cabinet Memoranda 1971 Part 2, ‘Population Control’, 23 July 1971. 
Quoting M.H. Webster, 3 May 1971.
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Running alongside the Cabinet's internal bickering over the scope o f  its 
population control policies, the state’s sole reliance on contraceptive distribution and 
propaganda in lieu o f more holistic approaches was reinforced by the continual 
d e g ra d a tio n ^ th e  state's ability to administer effectively in the rural areas after the 
escalation o f the war in mid 1970s. In practice, this meant that the state’s more 
ambitious exclusionary policies o f separate development and the intensive economic 
development o f parallel tribal economies were impossible to implement. Any 
grandiose scheme like separate development would have taken time and money but 
also would require unfettered state access to the tribal areas, access that from the mid 
1970s was less and less frequent and much more dangerous. When the Minister o f 
Health finally presented the third standing committee Report in 1974, it was conceded 
that state action should remain concentrated prim arily on supporting FPAR, as the 
broader based initiatives to slow African population growth were increasingly 
unfeasible.75 In this way, contraceptive distribution and propaganda became, partially 
out o f default, the sole solutions to a problem in which state officials knew very well 
required broader action, and therefore their population control policies were doomed 
to underperform, in spite o f  the political steam vented from rank and file Rhodesian 
Front party members. And so the state's population control policy plodded on with 
the implicit understanding that despite the importance o f  the population boom only 
some remedies remained on the table.
Measuring the State’s Success
There is some evidence that the state's population control policies through 
FPAR did have some limited effect on African fertility in the short tenn, even though 
it was far from reaching the demographic goals hoped for by the proposers. By 1974, 
W.M. Castle and K.E. Sapire reported that 20 percent o f urban African women and 
2.7 percent o f rural African women were reliably using birth control.76 Kaler also 
notes the FPAR’s Salisbury Municipal Clinics increase in the distribution o f birth 
control pills from 43,254 in 1973 to 49,889 in 1979, and more significantly in Depo-
Smith Papers, Box-027, Cabinet Minutes, ‘Population Control', 22 January 1974.
76 Kaler, Running, p. 73, citing W.M. Castle. K.E. Sapire, ‘The Pattern of Acceptance by Blacks of 
Family Planning Facilities in Relation to Socio-economic Status’, South African Medical Journal, Vol. 
50, No. 25 (June, 1976).
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Provera shots from 13,279 to 45,336.77 In 1976, the head of FPAR had asserted that 
from 1970 to 1976 Rhodesia’s growth rate had dropped from 3.8 percent to 3.4 
percent, and that FPAR had by 1976 prevented 25,000 births—an interesting, if 
curious, statistic to say the least.78 But as impressive as these gains may seem, the 
results showed that the effectiveness was mostly localised in the urban areas, and as 
Castle and Sapire argue, urban areas correlated with more strongly with African
7Qfertility reduction than did socio-economic class. It was in the rural areas where the 
vast majority of Africans lived, and it was in those areas in which, as chapter six 
describes, the state’s policies were met with the greatest resistance. Yet even in the 
rural areas, the number of FPAR fieldworkers expanded from under 50 in 1969, to 
around 150 in 1976, to just under 250 in 1979.80 While these efforts, even as they 
expanded, were not nearly enough to even scratch the racial ratios, they did reflect 
some degree of administrative effectiveness in promoting birth control, and 
importantly they did lay the groundwork for Zimbabwe’s successful long-term 
reduction in fertility rates.
Ironically, the war did offer advantages to some of the state’s population 
control efforts, even as it limited others. The war provided captive audiences for 
family planning promotion through the state’s Protective Village (PV) scheme begun 
1976. Kaler claims that within the PVs the state’s family planning efforts had much
o 1
greater success. By the later stages of the war, however, even measurable shifts in 
African fertility, in or out of the PV’s, garnered a much lower level of interest for the 
white public than it would have prior to the escalation of the war, as more immediate 
concerns took precedence. Even so, it is unclear that the state’s efforts had any 
measurable effect at all on Rhodesian birth rates during the years of white rule, 
despite FPAR’s claims to the contrary. Total African population numbers continued 
to expand in the 1970s by the hundreds of thousands a year, even after the RF 
government stepped up support for FPAR, and the racial population imbalance 
therefore grew more and more lopsided. As explained in chapter seven, there is some 
evidence that the early introduction of family planning into Rhodesia did begin to 
yield results sometime in the 1980s, but this was certainly a cold comfort for ex-
77 Kaler, Running, p. 69.
78 A. Kaler, Running, p. 73.
79 Castle, Pattern o f  Acceptance.
80 Kaler, Running, p. 72.
81 Kaler, Running, p. 74.
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Rhodesian policymakers and the armchair neo-Malthusians o f southern Africa, for 
whom the overriding purpose behind such policies had already expired.
Conclusion
Francis Bacon wrote in 1620 that, “Nature to be commanded, must be
09
obeyed.’' “ That this old aphorism was ignored by Rhodesian policymakers in the 
construction o f their population control policies reflects the irreconcilable conflicts 
between different goals o f  the settler state. The state disregarded the established 
precondition theories o f fertility reduction, not out o f theoretical disagreement with 
those theories, but because the implementation o f those theories would undermine the 
very existence o f the white settler state and destroy exactly what UDI was intended to 
preserve: white privilege. A comprehensive population policy that would have 
resulted in demonstrable fertility change would have also required extensive 
coordination among different parts o f the government. Yet the mechanics o f such 
coordination met with bureaucratic resistance, as the super-Ministry proposal o f the 
Population Committee was rejected out o f petty ministerial jealousies over the power 
o f the new entity. In addition, the state was reluctant to ask for material sacrifices 
from the white taxpayers to fund any massively conceived population policy however 
popular this policy might have been as an abstract notion. All o f these were brakes 
pulling back on any comprehensive policy to adequately address the population 
problem. These brakes precluded any real solution, and the caution they reflected
reveal a broader truth about the nature o f the Rhodesian state. This was that however
* I (jH (7 I ,-y'] o
large a problem was and however much it threatened the existence o f the settler state,
and none did so more than the African population ‘explosion,' the solution to that
problem could never call for too much sacrifice on the part o f the white populace. It
was feared by policymakers that when called upon to make material sacrifices, many
white Rhodesians would merely drift away just as they drifted in: fears that would
prove well-founded, as chapter three describes. As a result o f these self-imposed
limitations, the state merely redoubled its efforts in two aspects o f fertility
87 Reprinted in, F. Bacon, Francis Bacon: The New Organon (Cambridge, Cambridge University 
Press, 2000).
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reduction—family planning provisions and propaganda—and hoped against hope that 
these two prongs would prove sufficient.
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Chapter IV
White Emigration: ‘The Hole in Rhodesia’s Bucket’1
The most politically significant demographic trend in Rhodesia was the
consistently high rate of white emigration compared against the total white
population. The fact that Rhodesia had experienced positive migration flows for
much of its history, with immigration outpacing emigration, obscured the scale and
consistency of emigration and created an illusion of demographic stability and
continuity within the settler population. Yet white emigration anxieties were never
far from the minds of Rhodesian state officials and provided an important backdrop
for some of Rhodesia’s most important political events. There were a range of
attempts to engineer white emigration on the part of those with particular interests in
the fate of the country, though the goals of doing so and policies themselves differed
according to whether the proposers were hostile or sympathetic towards the settler
regime. These population concerns, and the varied efforts to address them, reflected
the reality that the white population had very little continuity over time, and that
consequently, white Rhodesian loyalty and national identity were weaker than has
been supposed. As it was, Rhodesia’s white population was one of the most unstable
and demographically fragile ruling ethnic castes in any polity anywhere in the world.
In 1976, the then Rhodesian Minister of Immigration, Elias Broomberg,
informed the Rhodesian Parliament that:
We have a section in our Immigration Promotion Department which sends a 
letter to every emigrant who is leaving the country ... saying we understand 
that he is leaving and in a very tactful way asking, ‘why’ and if we can help, 
and if there is a chance of hi[m] changing his mind.. .[M]any of them 
appreciate it. They say: ‘We cannot believe anybody is taking the interest in 
the fact we are leaving.’ They think this would not happen in any other 
country.3
The intending emigrants were quite right that this would not have happened in any 
other country, yet it evidently still did not convince many of them to unpack and stay. 
These peculiar letters are revealing of Rhodesia’s unique demographic history: they 
show the odd symmetry between white immigration and white emigration, the settler
1 The title derives from ‘There’s a Hole in the Bucket’, RH, Editorial, 13 June 1970.
2 Robert Blake does note that high immigration rates hid high emigration rates, A History.
3 Parliamentary Debate, Vol. 94, ‘Committee o f Supply: On Vote 12 Information, Immigration and 
Tourism—$4,105,000’, 5 August 1976.
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state’s anxiety regarding the small size of the white population, as well as highlighting 
Rhodesian whites’ transient culture, and the desperation with which Rhodesia sought 
to bolster its white population.
This chapter analyses the transience of white Rhodesians in terms of five inter­
related factors. First, settlers had a long history of drifting in and out of Rhodesia and 
other British territories in eastern and southern Africa without ever acquiring any 
significant loyalty to Rhodesia in particular. Second, countries sending white 
immigrants to Rhodesia rarely either expelled them or imposed constraints on return, 
so that returning home was always a viable option. Third, with increasing restrictions 
on political opposition after UDI, white residents tended to emigrate when Rhodesia 
failed to meet their expectations rather than voice their grievances. Fourth, the 
economic and political power of South Africa was attractive to Rhodesian whites and 
destabilised the settler population in Rhodesia, especially after UDI. Finally, the 
emphasis in Rhodesian immigration promotion propaganda on the material benefits of 
Rhodesia’s way of life created an implied contract with new immigrants based upon 
the promise of easy living and material gain in return for settlement, such that any 
decline in material standards tended to provoke departure. All of these factors 
contributed to the profound lack of rootedness in Rhodesia for most whites, a 
vulnerability that would come to have an enormous impact on the fate of the settler 
regime after it severed its imperial connections.
The Historiography of White Demography and Identity in Rhodesia
Emigration, as a distinct and persistent Rhodesian phenomenon, and the 
efforts to manipulate it, have not been fully analysed in the existing historical 
literature. Previous studies have downplayed the significance of white emigration, 
either by ignoring or wrongly periodising it, and have thus failed to appreciate its 
central importance in the political, social, economic, and psychological fabric of 
Rhodesia. In the last decades of settler rule, demographic trends, in which white 
emigration played a part, were not merely an effect of Rhodesia’s collapse as most 
historians argue, but were a primary cause of it. In addition, emigration has been a 
persistent feature of white demography in Rhodesia, from the time of the first 
pioneers, and did not only emerge in the mid-1970s as a by-product of the war.
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Indeed, as Alois Mlambo points out, of the 700 or so members of the pioneer column, 
only 15 were still in Rhodesia by 1924.4 Even state officials in less guarded moments 
acknowledged the long history of emigration from Rhodesia. In 1970, the Minister of 
Immigration conceded that, “[emigration] has been part and parcel of a pattern of life 
in Rhodesia since the beginning of time.. .How many of the great heroes o f the past, 
Selous, Rhodes, Jameson, any one you like to think of, how many actually died in this 
country? In the end practically none of them.”5 The larger implications of this 
transient and fluid white population for Rhodesian national identity have not been 
adequately explored before and through the war years. The efforts of the Rhodesian 
state, African nationalists, and western governments to manipulate white migration 
patterns have likewise been overlooked or mischaracterised.
Historians have typically cast white emigration as a symptom of decline, 
fitting it into one of two predominant causal narratives of the collapse of white 
Rhodesia - the military victory thesis, and the betrayal thesis.' Though differing in 
emphasis, both of these narratives assume that prior to the war, the white Rhodesian 
state was healthy and viable, and that the war was responsible for bringing about a 
range of changes including high rates of white emigration, that brought about the
o
regime’s final demise. Little attention has been paid either to the problems that 
emanated from the expanding racial ratios before the war, or to the weakness that 
accrued not only from the small size of the white population, but also the deeply 
. rooted transience of whites.
Such thoroughgoing white transience has obvious implications for conceptions 
of white Rhodesian identity. Historians are in broad agreement that after UDI, most 
Rhodesian whites who stayed were politically united, if  only in the preservation of 
their economic, political, and social privileges. However, beyond this broad 
agreement, the historical consensus begins to fray. Good and Kinloch, for example,
4 Mlambo, White Immigration, p 1.
5 Parliamentary Debates, Vol. 77, ‘Adjoumement o f the House, ‘Immigrants” , 4 June 1970.
6 H. Ellert, The Rhodesian Front War (Gweru, Mambo Press, 1989); D Martin and P Johnson, The 
Struggle fo r  Zimbabwe (London, Faber, 1981); N  Bhebe, The ZAPU and ZANU Guerrilla W aif are and 
the Evangelical Lutheran Church in Zimbabwe (Gweru, Mambo Press, 1999).
7 See for example: I. Smith, The Great Betrayal (London, Blake Publishing, 1997); P. Scully, Exit 
Rhodesia (Cottswold Press, 1984). For an oral account o f this betrayal theory, see D. Chalmers 
interview, Oral Archives, The British Empire and Commonwealth Museum Archives, Bristol, UK 
(hereafter BECM).
8 Other work does not fit into these categories, and provides some analysis o f population issues. Peter
Godwin and Ian Hancock detail wartime pressures, but portray white emigration as primarily a by­
product of the war. P. Godwin and I. Hancock, Rhodesians Never Die.
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downplay political and cultural differences, arguing that Rhodesians were unified and 
differences superficial, while Godwin and Hancock cast white society as 
fundamentally divided, with any real unity after UDI being illusory.4 More nuanced 
are Schutz’ and Onslow’s accounts o f how the fractured and heterogeneous ethnic 
divisions o f white society began to coalesce under the Rhodesian Front into a broader 
vision o f white Rhodesia. The unifying effect o f  racial solidarity in the face o f 
overwhelming African numbers is also emphasised by Dane Kennedy and Lord 
Blake, while Leys discusses the uniting effects o f international isolation and 
sanctions.10 Kosmin in some ways reconciles these views by arguing that white 
Rhodesians were simultaneously culturally stratified in a pluralistic society, but at the 
same time broadly agreed on important political issues concerning race.11 The role o f 
white population turnover in these debates is highlighted by both Frank Clements and 
Alois Mlambo, who argue that it reveals a culture o f transience and that Rhodesian 
identity was only thinly felt. “ Mlambo convincingly demonstrates that this transience 
was a consistent feature o f the territory, and concludes that whites were only ever 
shallowly rooted in Rhodesia. This chapter differs in that it extends the timeframe o f 
analysis into the 1970s and the war for independence, as well as looking deeper into 
the causes and effects of white transience.
While some o f the Rhodesian state's efforts to stem white emigration have 
received attention from historians, they have been treated as an adjunct to the war 
effort,14 while nationalist efforts to engineer Rhodesia's white population numbers
l) K. Good, ‘Settler Colonialism in Rhodesia’, African Affairs, Vol. 73, No. 290 (1974); G.C. Kinloch, 
Racial Conflict in Rhodesia: A Socio-Historical Study (Washington, University Press, 1978).
1(1 B. Schutz, European Population', S. Onslow, A Scheme; D. Kennedy, Islands o f  White; R. Blake, A 
History; C. Leys, European Politics.
11 B. Kosmin, Majuta: A History o f  the Jewish Community in Zimbabwe (Gweru, Mambo Press, 1980).
12 F Clements, Deterioration; Mlambo, White Immigration.
13 The claim that Rhodesian identity was weak must account for its persistence. Katja Uusihakala 
argues that today’s Rhodesian identity only began to form in the diaspora. K. Uusihalaka, ‘Opening up 
and Taking the Gap: The White Road to and From Rhodesia’ (unpublished paper, no date), available at 
http://www.anthroglobe.ca/docs/white road.pdf Who is, or was a ‘Rhodesian’ is difficult to pinpoint, 
as large numbers passed through the colony and some stayed on after independence. R. Hodder 
Williams distinguishes ‘Rhodesians’ as unreconstructed loyalists from ‘white Zimbabweans’ who 
accepted the new order. ‘Some White Responses to Black Rule in Zimbabwe,’ (unpublished paper, 
presented in Harare, October 1982), quoted in A. Smith, ‘Rhodesian Immigrants in South Africa: 
Government, Media and a Lesson for South Africa', African Affairs, Vol. 87, No. 346 (1988).
14 Meredith mentions Broomberg’s emigration letters only in the context o f decline stemming from the 
war. M. Meredith, The Past is Another Country: Rhodesia, 1890-1979 (London, Deutsch, 1979), p. 
231.
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have never been analysed sufficiently in the historical literature.15 In addition, the 
British government’s efforts to induce white emigration as a means to bring about the 
collapse of the post-UDI regime have been ignored. The British government’s 
population policies regarding Rhodesia discussed here challenge the idea that the 
British government was largely complicit with the white minority regime.16
White Demography Reconsidered
In light of the critical importance of white net migration flows to Rhodesia’s 
survival, the consistent outwardjlow of whites from Rhodesia took on a heightened 
political and social significance. From 1955 to 1979, a total of 255,692 immigrants 
arrived in Rhodesia, but over the same period 246,047 emigrants left.17 This rate of 
turnover is especially noteworthy when compared against the total white population, 
which during this same period averaged only 228,583. An annual average of 4.1 
percent of Rhodesia’s total white population emigrated each year over the 24 years 
from 1955 to 1979, and an average of 4.6 percent entered every year. This would be 
the percentage equivalent of the entire cities of Birmingham, Leeds, Liverpool, and 
Manchester being completely replaced by new people every year in the UK.
This population turnover was surprisingly consistent over Rhodesia’s history. 
Intuitively it makes sense that when times were good, whites stayed on in Rhodesia 
and more arrived, and when times were bad, they left and few arrived. But this only 
ever happened within a certain numerical range, with neither immigration to, nor 
emigration from the settler colony going above or below certain base and peak levels. 
The six years of 1955 to 1960 (inclusive), were generally good years for whites in 
Rhodesia, which was then part of the Central African Federation, as white dominance 
seemed inviolable and the economy prospered. The average annual immigration
15 Amy Kaler’s work discusses in detail the nationalists’ and state’s competing efforts to engineer 
African population numbers. Kaler, Running After Pills.
16 Those claiming complicity include M. Loney, Rhodesia: White Racism and Imperial Response 
(Harmondsworth, Penguin, 1975). For a similar assertion leveled at the American government, see G. 
Home, From the Barrel o f  a Gun: The United States and the War against Zimbabwe, 1965-1980  
(Chapel Hill, NC, University of North Carolina Press, 2001). Nationalist propaganda also accused the 
West of complicity, Zimbabwe News (ZANU) and Zimbabwe Review  (ZAPU), 1964-1979.
17 CSO Monthly Digests. The statistics for 1979 are missing the months o f February, June, August, 
November, and December. The reporting seven months were averaged out for the entire year. It 
should also be noted that some o f these emigrants and immigrants were the same individuals being 
counted twice.
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1 ftintake during these years was 13,666. This same six year period also averaged 
7,666 emigrants. Following this period, were five years of constitutional uncertainty 
and dramatic change, as the Federation split apart, Zambia and Malawi gained 
independence, and Rhodesia’s future as a white settler state looked doomed. In the 
five year period from 1961 to 1965, Rhodesia averaged only 8,225 immigrants 
annually, and lost 12,912 emigrants, a net annual loss of 4,687. The following period, 
from 1966 to 1972, were the good years after UDI, when Rhodesia had seemingly 
defied the world and managed not only to survive, but apparently to thrive. But even 
during these seven years, when immigration averaged 11,395, emigration still ran at 
an average of 6,285 a year. Despite this old trend of high emigration, historians 
generally begin to treat emigration as a factor only during the last seven years of 
settler rule, from 1973 to 1979, considering it a by-product of the war. During the 
war, Rhodesia lost an average of 13,070 emigrants a year,19 but perhaps more ' 
surprisingly they still gained an average of 7,542 immigrants during this same period, 
thus losing an average annual net of 5,528. Yearly immigration during this 24-year 
period only fluctuated between a low of roughly 3,500 and a high of 19,000, 
averaging 10,207 immigrants a year, and emigration fluctuated between a low of 
5,000 and a high of 18,000, averaging 9,983 a year. These figures show an inverse 
relationship between immigration and emigration, but not as dramatic as intuition 
would indicate. Migration was only partially elastic to long-term political and 
economic changes, but also seemed to be to a large extent independent of these major 
historical trends, with people flitting back and forth across the border all the time.
y
18 Figures are from the Monthly Digest o f Statistics, CSO. Prior to the dissolution o f  the Federation, 
numbers are estimates as Southern Rhodesia did not keep separate statistics.
19 Many sources indicate that the actual numbers for white emigration could be as much as twice the 
officially reported figures. ‘Taking the Chicken Run’, Time Magazine, 1 August 1977.
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AVERAGED WHITE MIGRATION TO AND FROM RHODESIA (1955-1979)20 
1955-1960 1961-1965 1966-1972 1973-I9792' Average
Immigration 13,666 8,225 11,395 7,542 10,207
(Annual Average)
Emigration 7,666 12,912 6,285 13,070 9,983
(Annual Average)
Net Migration +6,000 -4,687 +5,110 -5,528 +224
(Annual Average)
White Population 194,500 216,000 233,000 270,83322 228,583
(Annual Average)
Rhodesian migration trends were particularly responsive to the vagaries of 
personal advantage in comparison to other global migrations. A Herald editorial 
commented on white movements in and around southern Africa: “There is so much of 
it—so much heated packing up and dashing about, accompanied so ofteji by high- ,
23 ^flown rationalisation—that it is a phenomenon in its own right.” This dashing about
was not new. Before the 1960s, eastern and southern Africa had a sizable population 
of migratory whites who floated freely from one African territory to another 
depending upon job opportunities and political conditions.24 Migrations to and from 
Rhodesia were private economic decisions, but were not prodded on by empty
9 Sstomachs. Most immigrants did not initially come to Rhodesia fleeing political or 
religious persecution, and most who left Rhodesia, likewise did not do so out of any
96dire hardship, but simply because other places looked comparatively better. Most 
migrants who arrived only personally invested in Rhodesia for the short-term, and 
were not overly concerned with the long-term prospects for the country as a whole so 
long as their personal situation was secure. Conversely, during times of general 
prosperity, if a resident was not themselves prospering, the ease of leaving made
20 Figures are from the Monthly Digest o f Statistics, CSO. Prior to the dissolution o f the Federation, 
numbers are estimates as Southern Rhodesia did not keep separate statistics.
21 The statistics for 1979 are missing the months o f February, June, August, November, and 
December. The reporting seven months were averaged out for the entire year.
22 This figure includes only the average total white population from January 1973 through November 
1978.
23 ‘Necessity— or Bad Habit?’, Editorial, RH, 20 January 1966.
24 Rhodesian media reported this hoping that more would settle in Rhodesia. See ‘Why Don’t they 
Come Here?’, Editorial, RH, 21 February 1968.
25 Blake, A History, p. 273.
26 Clements, Deterioration, p. 93.
emigration a viable economic option. This short-term bias explains why Rhodesian 
migration was only imperfectly elastic when it came to responding to national trends.
The common border Rhodesia shared with its powerful southern neighbour, 
South Africa, and the shared ideology between the two territories after UDI, affected 
migration patterns in several important ways. On the one hand, after UDI, South
77Africa provided the largest source o f immigrants to Rhodesia." South Africa also 
provided the easiest access route and initial stopping point for immigrants from 
elsewhere, as it openly flouted UN sanctions and provided legal cover for immigrants 
to circumvent their home countries’ domestic legislation by ostensibly immigrating to 
South Africa, then secretly crossing the Limpopo River. The presence o f  the 
powerful South African state directly bordering on Rhodesia no doubt also served as a 
psychological comfort for intending immigrants, lessening their fears about 
committing their future to the political uncertainty o f Rhodesia. However, these same 
characteristics rendered South Africa an easy and attractive emigration option from
7 8Rhodesia, and there was always a fear o f  whites ebbing back across the Limpopo. "c 
The profound lack o f Rhodesian rootedness had the effect o f lowering the 
social costs o f leaving, as residents tended to maintain ties to other countries. And it 
was not without reason that Rhodesia’s large-scale immigration drives described in 
chapter five, o f which the Settlers '74 campaign was the best known, tried to exploit 
these connections by urging residents to recommend Rhodesia to their friends and
7Qrelatives back home. Rhodesia lacked both strong retention factors and strong push 
factors, while m igrants' source countries also rarely exerted harsh push factors. This 
had the effect o f reducing differences that might encourage migration to Rhodesia, yet 
it also reduced the transaction costs o f moving such that emigration was always a 
viable option. Southern Africa, and Rhodesia in particular, can therefore be seen as 
close to the neo-classical economic model o f a perfectly efficient migration market, 
inhabited by informed, quality-conscious, non-loyal consumers, who responded 
quickly to product variations, unburdened by irrational attachments.
~7 The original source of Rhodesian immigrants is difficult to assess as only the departure country was 
listed, which was generally South Africa.
x In Eaton’s survey, 49 percent o f respondents emigrated from Rhodesia to South Africa, 29 percent 
to the UK, 8 percent to Australia, 3 percent to Canada, 3 percent to US, and 2 percent to New Zealand. 
W.G. Eaton, A Chronicle o f  Modern Sunlight: The Story o f  What Happened to the Rhodesians,
(Rohnert Park, Inno Vision. 1996) p. 3.
29 The method was also used in 1967. See 400,000 Air Letters Used to Launch Drive for 
Immigrants’, RH, 29 July 1967.
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Exit, Voice, and Loyalty Among White Rhodesians
Albert O. Hirschman’s theory of “exit, voice, and loyalty” has served as a
' i  -I
useful model in other work on emigration. Hirschman argues that when 
organisations do not meet expectations, members have two general modes of action: 
exit and voice. Voice entails vocalising grievances to the organisation’s leadership in 
the hope of provoking change. Exit, in contrast, describes the decision to leave. The 
suppression of one action renders the other more attractive. In Rhodesia, voice was 
more costly than exit, and was perceived to be ineffective, especially after UDI. As a 
result, Rhodesians typically did not utilise their political voice, or indeed were 
silenced if  they did so. Former Prime Minister, Garfield Todd and his daughter were
39detained for speaking out against the regime and its policies in 1972, as were 
numerous other dissidents. As Hirschman notes, organisations will often even 
encourage or force dissenters to exit, and from the time of UDI onwards, Rhodesia 
increasingly deported political dissenters. This politicised population turnover had a 
selective effect and acted to reinforce Rhodesian Front ideology, as disgruntled
3 3residents simply left and were replaced by new residents. Institutionally, the 
quelling of voice protected the state from troublesome critics, but also reinforced the 
tendency among settlers to emigrate when Rhodesia did not meet expectations rather 
than attempting to influence its course.34 f'\ \  j\ n [
In an effort to stop the exodus, the Rhodesian state imposed restrictions on t- 
emigration while also trying to quell political voice. Hirschman’s analysis of the 
behaviour of members in organisations that impose high prices for exit posits that in 
such cases the “threat of exit,” as an effective form of voice is eliminated, yet the final 
exit occurs at the same level of dissatisfaction or deterioration as with organisations 
with no exit price. This was certainly true with Rhodesia, as dissatisfied Rhodesians
30 A. O. Hirschman, Exit, Voice and Loyalty: Responses to Decline in Firms, Organizations and States 
(Harvard University Press, 1970).
31 See J. M. Colomer, ‘Exit, Voice and Hostility in Cuba’, International Migration Review, Vol. 34, 
No. 130 (2000); S. Gammage, ‘Exercising Exit, Voice and Loyalty: A Gender Perspective on 
Transnationalism in Haiti’, Development and Change, Vol. 35, No. 4 (2004); S. Ma, ‘The Exit, Voice, 
and Struggle to Return o f Chinese Political Exiles’, Pacific Affairs, Vol. 66, No. 3 (1993).
32 Godwin, Rhodesians Never Die, p. 81.
33 Clements claims Rhodesia lurched to the right due to post-UDI population transfers. Clements, 
Deterioration, p. 243
34 When settlement talks and imminent majority rule incensed the right, they too exited. ‘Taking the 
Chicken Run’, Time Magazine, 1 August 1977.
remained outwardly loyal, never threatening exit, until the very day they silently left.
A Scottish automobile worker in Rhodesia was quoted in an interview in 1977, for 
example, as saying: “Yes, w e’re taking the Chicken Run, but nobody wants to admit it 
publicly. If the word gets out, the revenue office will be breathing down your neck to
ic
see if  you’re fiddling some extra cash out.” The state's efforts to stem exit therefore 
proved only partially effective, and its combination with the restrictions on voice 
produced a two-faced citizenry who displayed public contentedness, while 
experiencing private dissatisfaction and secretly planning to exit.36
Hirschman defines his third major concept, loyalty, as tending to hold exit at 
bay and activate voice.3' Loyalty describes a deep attachment to the organisation, and 
when present, “exit abruptly changes character: the applauded rational behaviour o f 
the alert consumer shifting to a better buy becomes disgraceful defection, desertion, 
and treason.” Loyalists thereby suffer an internalised penalty for exit, whereas non­
loyalists do not. Were Rhodesians loyal as defined by Hirschman? There are several 
indications that typically they were not. There was a great deal o f hedging one's bets 
in Rhodesia. Many people looked to stay in Rhodesia as long as they could prosper, 
all the while preparing for the eventuality that on short notice they could exit. A large 
percentage o f the white population never became citizens, far fewer than qualified, 
even after the state sought to streamline white citizenship and make it easier to obtain 
in 1967.39 Many in Rhodesia, even long time residents, failed to register on the voting 
rolls. 0 There were even greater numbers who could have obtained Rhodesian 
passports, dual or otherwise, but refused to do so.41 Even during the good years o f 
UDI, UK passport offices were periodically mobbed with ostensible Rhodesians 
applying for UK passports.42 Furthermore, when call-ups began in earnest, many men 
quickly opted for evasion and/or emigration to avoid military service. Independently, 
any one o f these indicators does not necessarily mean national loyalty was weak, yet
35 'Taking the Chicken Run’, Time Magazine, 1 August 1977.
36 See ‘Chimurenga and the Chicken Run’, Time Magazine, 28 March 1977.
Hirschman, Exit, Voice and Loyalty, p. 78.
s Hirschman, Exit, Voice and Loyalty, p. 98.
30 'Citizenship Bill Gazetted’, RH, 18 February 1967.
40 ‘RF Congress Urges Voters to Register’, RH, 25 October 1969; ‘50,000 Whites not Voters or 
Citizens MP‘, RH, 28 July 1971; '19,000 Have Not Re-Registered as Voters’, 21 February 1974.
41 There were 12,760 dual Rhodesian/UK passports and 23,980 mono-UK passports. The FCO 
speculated that the latter figure was even higher. FCO memoranda o f 1972 citing 1969 Census, FCO 
36/1294.
42 ‘Demand is Big For British Passports’, RH, 8 January 1964: 'Rush at British Passport Office’, RH, 
19 April 1966; ‘Passport Office Chaotic’, RH, 4 July 1969.
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taken together they are clear manifestations of a weak loyalty to Rhodesia for most 
whites.43 The consistently high levels of white turnover further reinforce this 
conclusion. A surprisingly small percentage of white adults were bom in Rhodesia, or 
lived there most of their lives, and at no time did the Rhodesian-born whites 
outnumber the foreign-born.44 With the notable exception of a small core of lifers—a 
group including Ian Smith, who was the first Prime Minister to be bom in Rhodesia— 
for most whites, Rhodesia was simply a chapter in their lives both preceded and 
followed by longer stays elsewhere.45 Most whites were not in Rhodesia long enough 
to establish the level of loyalty discussed by Hirschman.46 Even if many had strong 
emotional and nostalgic ties, these were not strong enough to prevent, postpone, or 
even significantly complicate exit for most whites when Rhodesia failed to meet their 
expectations. V '
Any argumentc[uestioliing the strength of white Rhodesian loyalty, must 
account for themcredifde intransigence of the popularly elected Rhodesian Front 
governments in the face t>f strong pressures to capitulate to majority rule.47 How did 
this intransigence jibe with white transience? Rhodesia’s bell curve-like rise and fall 
of its white population from the 1950s through the 1980s occurred almost entirely in 
the urban areas, with the white rural population remaining consistently low, but more
AO
stable, and there appears to have been some correlation between urbanity and 
transience, and rurality and rootedness. But significantly, the short-term interests of 
transients and non-transients regarding race were not in conflict, as there was a 
genuine consensus of white opinion on certain important racial matters. However, 
this did not necessarily mean that transients and non-transients were equally willing to 
suffer the consequences if these risky political gambles came due. Indeed, this
43 A Herald analysis o f white ethnic heterogeneity concluded national identity was weak, ‘The 
Rhodesian Blend’, 13 October 1973.
44 The 1969 census revealed that three quarters o f Rhodesia’s white population over the age o f 16 
were bom outside Rhodesia, 59 percent o f these were bom in either South Africa or Britain. ‘59 
percent o f Whites over 16 Were Bom in Britain or SA’, RH, 8 May 1970. O f 1,460 people surveyed in 
the Rhodesian diaspora in the 1990s, only 36% were bom in Rhodesia, 39% went to Rhodesia for jobs 
and 22% went as children. Eaton, Modem Sunlight. In 1969, only 40% of Rhodesians were bom  
inside o f Rhodesia. Among adults it was only 25.5%. Mlambo, White Immigration, p. 2.
45 In 1975, 45% o f the White population had been in Rhodesia for under ten years, Loney, White 
Racism Imperial Response.
46 80 percent o f white Rhodesians in a survey had not seen Victoria Falls, ‘80pc Have Not Seen the 
Falls’, RH, 1 May 1974.
47 Popularly elected only for whites it should be noted.
48 Nine out of ten white immigrants from the 1950s onwards took urban employment and half lived in 
Salisbury. Blake, A History, p. 275.
asymmetry of transience also reflected an asymmetry of cost internalisation that 
seemed to have the effect of stiffening, not weakening, white resistance and 
defiance.49 The easy alternative of exit for migrants prevented what Hirschman 
referred to as the “raise hell” scenario of locked-in members vocally responding to 
changes in quality or policy direction.50 As it was, these short-term migrants had 
strong incentives to support state policies that protected white privilege in the short­
term, even as they could potentially mean greater risk in the long-term. As will be 
discussed below, though the state tried to more equitably divide the burdens of this 
intransigence, these policies proved extremely unpopular and not surprisingly 
contributed to greater emigration. This complex inter-play between exit, voice, and 
cost internalisation was recognised by British bureaucrats in the Foreign and 
Commonwealth Office as they approached the problem of how best to foment internal 
opposition to Smith’s government—a strategy premised on whites staying in 
Rhodesia to internalise costs, and hopefully raise hell.51 For these reasons, the 
strength of white political support behind the Rhodesian Front’s policies specifically, 
and the cause of white Rhodesia more broadly, does not lead in a straight line to the 
conclusion that Rhodesian loyalty was strongly felt among the broader white 
population.
White Transience Explored
Rhodesia’s white population was always especially susceptible to stresses that 
could induce emigration. One reason for this stemmed from the nature of their entry 
into Rhodesia. As described in chapter five, Rhodesia’s four main selling points to 
potential immigrants, as set out in their promotional literature, was its warm, sunny 
climate; the freedom to start a new life without the constraints of dour post-War 
Europe; the anachronistic imperial lifestyle evoked by Rhodesian publicity; and,
49 An analogy can be made to some recent arguments made in the United States positing that the U.S. 
would be decidedly more pacifistic if it reinstituted the military draft.
50 Hirschman, Exit, Voice, and Loyalty, pp. 44-45.
51 See for example, FCO 36/1221. Letter from C. M. Le Quesne, FCO, to Sir Arthur Snelling and 
attached memorandum to letter, ‘Commentary on ‘An Outsider’s Reflections on Rhodesia’”, 14 
November 1972.
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importantly, an inflated material standard of living for whites. The implied contract 
formed in the recruitment of immigrants was that if they settled in Rhodesia, they
C">
would prosper. This marketing strategy inflated migration numbers in the short­
term, but it also inadvertently contributed to the transient culture in Rhodesia.
Some commentators acknowledged the connection between white Rhodesian 
transience and the inducements offered to immigrants. Pat Bashford, leader of the 
opposition Centre Party, said in 1976 that residents were in Rhodesia for the lifestyle 
Rhodesia offered them, and “[w]hen that begins to deteriorate, they will take 
themselves elsewhere and who is to blame them?”54 It was no secret at the time that 
there was a large population of residents who were essentially ‘Good Time Charlies.’ 
An editorial from 1976, which acknowledged the “disturbing” emigration figures, also 
claimed emigration was occurring primarily among “people who have not put down 
roots in Rhodesia ... Those of longer standing tend to adopt the attitude that, whatever 
Rhodesia’s present imperfections or even dangers, every other country has problems; 
which one is better?”55 Rhodesia’s marketing strategy influenced the sorts of 
immigrants attracted, and while these appeals were effective in inflating migration 
statistics and boosting the Smith government in the short term, the immigrants’ lack 
of commitment to Rhodesia reduced their long-term value to the regime, especially as 
the material quality of life began to decline for almost all whites in the 1970s.
The Economic Effects of White Emigration
Rhodesia’s high rates of emigration had detrimental economic effects, many 
of which long preceded the war. From the early 1960s until the end of minority rule 
there was a net loss of skilled and professional workers, or “brain drain.”56 This 
occurred despite net migration gains in the good years of UDI from 1966-1972, and
52 See ‘Problems Face New Immigrants in Rhodesia’, RH, 7 October 1968; ‘New Rhodesians-V’, RH, 
12 October 1968; ‘New Rhodesians-III’, RH, 10 October 1968; ‘New Rhodesians-XII’, RH, 22 October 
1968.
53 See Immigration Promotion Department’s adverts in Dublin, ‘New Move to Attract Irish 
Immigrants’, RH, 19 March 1969.
54 ‘Smith’s ‘Stay On’ Plea ‘Useless’, RH, 2 August 1976.
55 ‘Seeking Utopia’, RH, 30 June 1976; Eaton, M odem Sunlight, p. xv.
56 The Ministry o f Labour and employers acknowledged a brain drain, while the Ministry o f
Immigration and unions denied it, until the findings o f a study in 1972. ‘Manpower Fact’, RH, 22 
April 1972.
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the corollary to the brain drain in an era o f  total net migration gains was the influx of 
unskilled and semi-skilled whites. This was partly a result o f  the skills barriers to
white immigration being gradually phased out under Smith's Premiership. A practical
57effect o f  this policy was an increased difficulty in assimilating new immigrants.' The 
population exchange was such that the newer immigrants could not slot into the 
skilled openings reserved for whites at the top of the economic pyramid, but instead
58 *n t joften challenged Africans for access to lower skilled jobs. 1 As will be argued in 
chapter five, despite the efforts by the Rhodesian state to promote mass immigration, 
there was simply no room for large numbers o f  unskilled and semi-skilled whites in 
Rhodesia's racialised economy.
African school-leavers in Rhodesia were compressed by racial job reservation 
which left the vast majority under-employed or unemployed despite shortages in 
many positions reserved for whites. During the war, state officials grew concerned 
with the competition between the economy and the military for white male 
manpower, and were adamant that this attenuation should not advantage Africans. By 
the time the war had further escalated in 1976, and the call-ups pulled greater 
numbers o f  whites from their employment, the state instituted a domestic volunteer 
service to fill in for called-up men as well as a scheme to temporarily employ white 
South A f r i c a n s . I n  1975, the Director o f  the Centre for Inter-Racial Studies o f  the 
University o f  Rhodesia declared that the frustrated aspirations o f  African school- 
leavers was the single most important problem concerning Rhodesia’s race relations, 
and plugging white employment gaps with both aged and foreign whites must have 
been particularly galling to skilled unemployed Africans.60 A further by-product of 
the state’s refusal to relax racial economic divisions was that white emigration 
reduced the tax base just as African demands for social services and other state 
expenditure were increasing. The expanding African population was viewed as an 
enormous economic burden by the state, yet ironically, maintaining white privilege
"Miscegenation, Prostitution and Allied Problems’, Smith Papers, Box-024, Cabinet Minutes, 24 
August 1971. These newer immigrants were also often not of "British stock’.
5S For anecdotal evidence: Mr. Samuriwo’s statements to the Committee o f Supply, August 1, 1969, 
col. 1063, Mr. Rubatika, Committee of Supply, 1 August 1969, col. 1076.
59 "Volunteers Ready to Fill Call-Up Gaps’, RH, 27 August 1976.; ‘Temporaries’ Rush to Help’, RH, 
30 July 1976.
60 "Frustration over Jobs ‘Biggest Snag’, RH, 16 August 1975.
89
necessitated that Africans be prevented from rising economically and thus sharing in 
the shouldering of this burden.61
White Emigration and the Military Conflict
A lack of white manpower greatly damaged military operations, particularly 
from the mid 1970s. Wing Commander Gaunt, stated bluntly in Parliament where he 
placed manpower issues in the priority of Rhodesia’s military problems in 1977: 
“There is no doubt in my mind that the single and most inhibiting factor of this war is 
the shortage of manpower.. .62” Many agreed with his assessment, most notably 
Prime Minister Ian Smith. Throughout the war, the state was always bedeviled by the 
low call-up yields.63 For example, a full half of the 3,000 eligible men called-up in 
1973 evaded conscription, and in 1976, 3,000 eligible men never even registered for 
the call-up.64 Before the February 1978 call-up, the Army stated that its minimum 
call-up requirement was 1,046. After the actual call-up, only 570 reported for Army 
duty, 476 short of their minimum stated requirement. All other services were likewise 
reduced for that period.65 To remedy the manpower situation, the call-up system was 
constantly tinkered with over the war years, and was a perennial target for attack from 
those both inside and outside government.66 Exemptions, deferments, age limits, sex
67biases, and even medical categories were reconsidered to pull in more soldiers. As 
early as 1973, the Minister of Defence Jack Howman, in announcing a re-examination 
of medical categories, slammed those draft dodging white Rhodesians whom he
61 Prior to the Lisbon coup in 1974, the US State Department believed that the minority regime would 
collapse, not due to the war, but as a result o f the African population explosion. ‘US Policy on 
Rhodesia Stays Firm’, RH, 21 July 1976.
62 Parliamentary Debates, Vol. 97, ‘Motion: Registration and Call-Up Procedures’, 12 October 1977.
63 For an interesting exploration o f the call-up system’s many effects on white society, and its 
implications for Rhodesian civic culture in the 1970s, see L. White, ‘Civic Virtue, Young Men, and the 
Family: Conscription in Rhodesia 1974-1980’, International Journal o f  African Historical Studies,
Vol. 37, No. 1 (2004).
64 White, Civic Virtue, citing Godwin, Rhodesians Never Die, p. 113-114, 136, 160; and Fireforce 
Exposed: The Rhodesian Security Forces and Their Role in Defending White Supremacy, (London, 
Anti-Apartheid Movement, 1979).
65 BECM 2001/086/007 Manpower Committee Meeting Minutes, 2 February 1978.
66 In a debate over call-up procedures, MP Mr. Parkin expressed what many inside and outside 
government suspected was behind the low call-up yields, “There is this visible avoidance o f obligation 
by many weak-kneed males between the ages o f 16 and 50 ...I believe they are selfish, I believe they 
are craven...” Parliamentary Debates, Vol. 97, ‘Motion: Registration and Call-Up Procedures’, 12 
October 1977.
67 See generally BECM 2001/086/007 weekly Manpower Committee Meetings, 1977.
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described as, “gun-sky sportsmen, athletes fit enough to play games, but not fit
zo
enough for military service.” Draft dodging was viewed to be such a problem that 
the military police were given powers to stop Rhodesian males of military age and 
require that they prove they had registered for military service.69 One Rhodesian 
Front back-bencher even suggested that all white males should be required to wear
7 0dog tags around their necks at all times after they register for call-ups. Despite the 
incessant tree-shaking for more men, the problem underlying Rhodesia’s various call- 
up systems was a simple lack of continuous access to a stable supply of white 
manpower.71
A related issue was how to guard against the reduction of this finite pool 
through emigration. Military and civilian bureaucrats regularly strategised how best 
to avoid pushing more Rhodesians to the point of emigration, while at the same time 
meeting escalating military demands on manpower. Emigration was seldom absent
79from the weekly Manpower Committee Meetings of the mid to late 1970s. In order
to bypass this conundrum of how to increase service commitments without inducing
70
emigration, it was decided to obscure the exact terms of service. Yet the creeping 
call-up commitments corresponded with increasing emigration of the primary call-up 
age group, as commitments could only be hidden so much. With each cohort that 
emigrated, the commitments of those who stayed increased, and the various call-up 
rules all had the perverse effect of increasing obligations on those who did report for 
duty. The Manpower Committee noted in 1977 that, “Experience had shown that few 
men in the under 38 age group actually served for 190 days during a 12 month period 
and that it was those men who did in fact come somewhere near to this figure that 
were leaving the country.”74 This created a self-sustaining cycle of increased service
68 ‘Government to Chase Draft Dodgers: Stiffer Medicals for ‘Unfit Sportsmen’, RH, 2 June 1973.
69 ‘New Moves by Army to Catch the Dodgers’, RH, 2 July 1976.
70 ‘Net Tightens on Manpower’, RH, 30 July 1976. The dog tag proposal was never implemented.
71 This is to be contrasted with the almost unlimited supply available to African guerrillas. ZANLA 
recruits, for instance, grew so rapidly that in 1977 the party appealed on Radio Mozambique to aspiring 
guerrillas to stay in Rhodesia because there were insufficient facilities to house, clothe, train, and feed 
all the Africans coming into the camps. N. Kriger, Zimbabwe’s Guerrilla War: Peasant Voices 
(Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 1992) p. 92, citing A. Wilkinson, ‘The Impact o f the War’, 
Journal o f  Commonwealth and Comparative Politics, Vol. 18, No. 1 (March, 1980) p. 116.
72 BECM 2001/086/007 Manpower Committee Meeting Minutes. General Walls, Commander of  
Combined Operations, called for full mobilisation in 1977, which was rejected due to its probable 
effect o f increasing emigration. BECM 2001/086/192 Combined Operations Meeting, 13 February
1978.
73 BECM 2001/086/007 Manpower Committee Minutes, 5 May 1977.
74 BECM, Manpower Committee Meeting Minutes, 29 August 1977.
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demands, increased white emigration, and a worsening military situation. After a 
flood of  internal memoranda, the conclusion was reached that the failures o f  the call- 
up were not a matter o f  administrative incompetence, nepotism, or shirking youth, but 
simply reflected the reality that increasing manpower demands could not be met by 
Rhodesia's small and shrinking white population, and efforts to squeeze the white
i • 75population further would prove counter-productive.
Low white manpower in the military directly dictated strategic and tactical 
capabilities. Most broadly, demographic constraints forced the state to rely upon 
smaller special forces-type operations rather than large-scale set piece manoeuvres 
More specifically, manpower shortages undermined the late-developed strategy of 
security forces permanently holding the Tribal Trust Lands rather than merely 
entering them reactively. This policy was declared unfeasible by the commanders of 
several operational theatres due to manpower constraints .76 Emigration also 
undermined the Protective Village (PV) programme, which was modeled on the 
counter-insurgency strategies in Malaya and Vietnam. As each call-up cohort shrank, 
the PV programme was continually passed over for priority to other services, and
77understaffing thus undercut a major strategic initiative. ' A top secret internal 
strategic directive in July 1979 concluded: “Even if  the best possible employment of 
troops evolves, our deployment levels in any given area will remain totally
7 0
inadequate/’ This deteriorating security situation, largely as a result o f  white 
manpower constraints, finally forced the regime to negotiate its own demise .79
75 BECM 2001/086/192 Minutes of Meeting, ‘Study the Implications of Phased Mobilisation, Strategy 
and Tactics’, 17 February 1978.
BECM 2001/086/007 Memorandum by RB Isemonger, BSAP, ‘Permanent Presence in Selected 
T T L s\ 2 April 1978.
7 BECM 2001/086/007 Letter from Yardley, Sec. for Internal Affairs, to Commander of Combined 
Operations, 1 November 1977.
7S BECM 2001/086/007 ‘Planning Requirements: Short Term (6-Month) Strategy’, July 1979. This
difficulty of Rhodesia white recruitment led to the extensive use of foreign mercenaries. By 1976, it 
was claimed that up to a third o f all white regular army personnel were mercenaries. N. Kriger,
Peasant Voices, p. I l l ,  citing W. Minter, King Solom on’s Mines Revisited: Western Interests and the 
Burdened History o f  Southern Africa (New York, Basic Books, 1986) p. 276.
70 In contrast, the rapidly increasing African population served as a boundless well for guerrilla 
recruitment into both ZANLA and ZIPRA, at the same time as Europeans were struggling to fill vital 
positions in their military. Meredith claims that ZANU recruitment was steadily around 1,000 a month 
by mid 1977, and that ZAPU recruits filled up to two daily chartered flights from the border areas with
Botswana to train in Zambia. See Meredith, A Past, pp 303-304.
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The Political Consequences of White Emigration
Losing people was an extremely sensitive issue for white Rhodesians, and it 
had significant political and psychological consequences in addition to the military 
and economic effects noted above. The Rhodesian press regularly analysed migration 
statistics: who was coming, who was going, and why. The political effects of these 
migration figures led the state to ban their publication at various times, in particular in 
the period immediately following UDI. In the autumn of 1978, the government 
debated again banning the publication of migration figures, but concluded that this 
would have the opposite effect intended, by exacerbating the public’s population 
anxieties.80
The small size and narrow geographical distribution of the white population 
made it so white migration could not be easily hidden. These white migration 
patterns provided the momentum behind many of Rhodesia’s most dramatic political 
events. Smith was able to carry out an internal coup within the Rhodesian Front in 
1964, for example, partly because of the public disappointment over Winston Field’s 
inability to stem white emigration, or more aptly, his failure to obscure emigration
O |
with immigration. When Smith was asked a decade later what he thought was his 
greatest achievement in office, he responded:
I would say that UDI was part of it, but I think the greatest achievement— and 
I am happy to have played my part in it—was restoring to Rhodesians the 
confidence in their own country which we found they had lost when we came 
to power... We found that Rhodesians were leaving because they had no more 
confidence in the political future of their country... I believe this government 
has succeeded in changing that. We first of all had to stem the tide of people 
leaving. Then we turned the tide, and I am happy to say we regained more 
than we lost. ... I believe this more than anything else is the greatest 
achievement that the RF government can claim. I believe we saved 
Rhodesia.82
According to Smith, the demographic turnaround from the mid 1960s to the mid 
1970s indicated the overall success of the settler state. UDI was considered a factor in 
this success, but only in so far as it helped to restore confidence in white rule such that
80 ‘Ban Emigration Figures— Ellis,’ RH, 22 September 1978.
81 See also Meredith, The Past, p. 46.
82 ‘10 Years After’, RH, 11 April 1974.
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the white population would stay and even grow. In a September 1975 interview, 
Smith again cast UDI as primarily an effort to stabilise the white population and to 
secure the future o f  white Rhodesia, and attributed the Rhodesian Front under his
0 7
leadership as saving Rhodesia by convincing whites to stay put. Yet as previously 
detailed, stable white population levels did not mean that whites were staying put, but 
that new residents were arriving, in a manner characteristic of Rhodesia’s long­
standing population shuffle.
In the settlement talks, Rhodesian Front politicians consistently asserted that 
whites in Rhodesia were there to stay, and that they had nowhere else to go. But this 
was undermined by the emigration that occurred soon after Smith's triumphant 
interviews in the mid 1970s, which was again exposed by falling immigration. 
Rhodesians clearly had somewhere else to go, and were going there at a fast pace. As 
the white population decreased from the mid 1970s, it was accompanied by a feeling 
o f  decline and decay, which was a distinct change from the past, even from the period 
marking the end o f  the Federation. In 1978, former Prime Minister Roy Welensky 
reflected the fears o f  many when he said that Rhodesian emigration was the 
“haemorrhage that will bleed us to death.” The newly exposed emigration damaged 
the morale o f  the white population, making the prophesy o f  decline self-fulfilling.
While white retention rates had long been considered an indicator o f  the 
overall wellbeing o f  the settler regime, this was turned on its head in the final months 
before independence. Retaining the white population came to be the central purpose 
of the internal settlement regime, and halting emigration became an end in itself. 
Shortly before the creation o f  the short-lived Zimbabwe-Rhodesia, the Combined 
Operation Headquarters issued a top secret “Total National Strategy Directive,”
85outlining the long-tenn strategy for the new government. As expressed in this 
comprehensive plan, the prime objective o f  the Security Forces and every Ministry 
was to “retain the confidence o f  whites ... in order to prevent an exodus.” Indeed,11
this was the only goal common to all the separate Ministerial reports. When seen in 
this light, the raison d 'etre  o f  the end o f  the post-UDI experiment was perhaps less
‘UDI Stopped the Rot says PM ’. RH, 20 September 1975. Significantly, after 1980, Smith 
downplays migration, perhaps because the negative net migration from 1973 indicated a lack of 
confidence in the RF government. See The Great Betrayal.
S4 ‘Sad Loss’. RH , Editorial, 30 December 1978.
s’ BECM Box 9271 2001/086/147. ‘Total National Strategy Directive’, Commops HQ, 21 March
1979.
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A
1 about maintaining white rule to safeguard the interests of the settler population, than 
\about maintaining the settler population to ensure the existence of white rule:
Engineering Emigration
Given the perception that migration was so closely connected to the political 
fortunes of Rhodesia, it is not surprising that efforts were made by both proponents 
and opponents of the settler regime to engineer emigration. Legislation aiming to halt 
white emigration in the 1960s took the form of erecting obstacles that were regarded 
simply as a nuisance by residents, such as making it illegal to emigrate with a vehicle 
that still had payments left on it. By the mid 1970s, however, restrictions included a 
dramatic drop in the allowances that emigrants were allowed to take out of the
87country. Strict exchange controls also made it very difficult to obtain foreign 
currency, making preparations for foreign travel or departure that much more 
difficult. In 1975, the onus of proving compliance with exchange controls was shifted 
from the government to emigrants themselves.88 These restrictions were greatly 
resented by many Rhodesians, yet efforts to combat them were hampered by the fact 
that those most affected carried little political clout. Nevertheless, the rules were 
widely circumvented by emigrants officially leaving the country for reasons other 
than emigration and/or by sneaking out assets.89 For example, in the late 1970s 
precious stones in Salisbury were sold for three to four times their actual value 
because they could be easily sneaked out.90 An emigrant from Rhodesia in the 1970s 
said the restrictions “turned just about everybody into crooks.”91 The creative 
avoidance of emigration restrictions came to form a part of a diaspora myth among 
ex-Rhodesians across the globe, who oddly evoke patriotic pride by displaying their 
ingenuity in evading not only international economic sanctions, but also their own 
domestic restrictions.92
86 ‘Emigrants Fail to Pay Car Installments’, RH, 29 April 1964.
87 In July 1976, the Rhodesian Minister o f Finance reduced emigration allowances from T?//$5,000 to 
RH$ 1,000.
88 Parliamentary Debates, Vol. 91, ‘Second Reading: Exchange Control Amendment Bill’, 21 August 
1975.
89 Uusihalaka, ‘Taking the Gap.’
90 ‘Taking the Chicken Run’ Time Magazine, 1 August 1977.
91 BECM Oral Archives, # 240, Mr. Ayers-Hunt, Interview (n.d, ca. 1994-1999).
92 Uusihakala, Taking the Gap, p. 18; L. Bolze and R. Martin, The Whenwes o f  Rhodesia, (Bulawayo, 
Books o f Rhodesia, 1978).
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The increased call-ups for national service meant that a large percentage o f  
emigrants were o f  conscription age. In response, the government restricted foreign 
travel for young men and limited foreign schooling, and the Defence Act was 
amended to make it an offence for a man to leave Rhodesia after having received call- 
up papers. It was hoped that this and other measures would encourage South Africa
no
to extradite offenders back to Rhodesia. In 1975, Ian Smith sent a personal note to 
South Africa's Prime Minister, John Vorster, asking for help with Rhodesia's 
emigration problem, stating: “I believe that I should put you in the picture regarding 
the deteriorating security situation here, the most serious aspect o f  which is our 
shortage o f  manpower. A major factor is the continuing emigration— mostly to South 
Africa— o f young men o f  military age, many o f  whom are trained soldiers. This has 
seriously reduced our effective potential force level. . . ”94 Smith went on to ask for 
South African aid in stopping the How. Thereafter, though South Africa publicly 
denied any secret deai with Rhodesia to deny residency to Rhodesian men with 
military commitments, some such men were nonetheless sent back to Rhodesia for 
technical immigration violations.9  ^ Rhodesia's restrictions on emigration were later 
extended to include any non-African aged 18-25 who had not yet completed national 
service.96 Later in 1976, the National Service Act was amended again to restrict even 
the departure ot 16 year-old boys. In the last gasp o f  settler rule, PM Muzorewa 
proposed that emigrating Rhodesians should pay a fine of RH$20,000 if  they wished
no
to re-enter Rhodesia at a later date, though this was not enacted.
These restrictions made many Rhodesians feel like prisoners. The H erald  
likened the Defence Amendment Act to the “Berlin Wall” , and accused the 
government o f  lowering the portcullis to keep civilian soldiers in against their 
will.”99 An African MP caused an uproar in Parliament by supporting greater
93 Smith Papers. Box 027, Cabinet Minutes, ‘Departure from Rhodesia (Control) Act: Amendment’, 
29 October 1974.
94 Smith Papers, Box 4/006(M) ‘Personal Message from Mr. Ian Smith to Mr. John Vorster’, 22 July 
1975.
95 “SA Denies ‘Secret Deal’ on Rhodesian Call-ups,” RH, 12 February, 1976.
96 Parliamentary Debates, Vol. 89, ‘Second reading: Defence Amendment Bill’, 13 November 1974.
’ Smith Papers, Box-037. Cabinet Minutes, ‘National Service: Restrictions on Travel Outside 
Rhodesia of Registered Male Residents’, 31 August 1976. Further restrictions were rejected as 
representing a virtual border closing. Smith Papers, Box-037, Cabinet Minutes, ‘Emigration Control’, 
18 May 1976.
9S Parliamentary Debates, Vol. 100, ‘Emigrants: Re-Entry Fee’, 25 July 1979.
99 ‘Over-Reaction’, RH, 15 November 1974.
emigration restrictions precisely because they would cause more whites to leave.100 
The Herald agreed in July 1976 that increased restrictions could actually have the 
effect of dislodging whites by making them feel trapped and lowering their morale.101 
The restrictions also adversely effected immigration drives. But the immediate need 
for manpower outweighed other long-term considerations, and the state even reduced
the so-called ‘grace’ period in which new immigrants were free from military service
102obligations, from five years to two years.
Legal sanctions were bolstered by social sanctions within Rhodesia, as 
prospective emigrants were accused of cowardice and disloyalty. State officials 
described emigrants as casualties of the psychological war. In a series of speeches 
given in the embattled Centenary area of north-eastern Rhodesia in 1975, a Cabinet 
Minister referred to those who fled Rhodesia when times were difficult as “Rainbow 
boys.”104 By the summer of 1976, Smith personally pleaded with whites to “Stay 
on.”105 Further measures were taken to convince whites to stay in Rhodesia through 
the desperate letter campaign discussed earlier, which was conducted by the 
Department of Immigration.106 Based on Benjamin Franklin’s dictum that an 
emigrant saved was an immigrant earned, white residents intending to leave received 
" v f, mailings of literature as if  they were prospective immigrants. In addition, media 
) -r advertisements unrelentingly promoted the benefits of life in Rhodesia concluding 
that, “Once you are a Rhodesian, no other land will do.”107 One wonders though to 
what extent those who protested the loudest against emigrants were actually
1 ORunderneath grumbling, “There but for the Grace of Ian Smith go I.”
African nationalists likewise appreciated the significance of white 
demography. In February 1972, Bishop Abel Muzorewa explained the ANC’s
100 ‘Bill on Call-ups Accepted’, RH, 14 November 1974.
101 ‘Mixed Bag’, RH, 17 July 1976.
102 Parliamentary Debates, Vol. 90/91, ‘Ministerial Statement: National Service Training for 
Immigrants’ 31 July 1975.
103 See Godwin, Rhodesians Never Die, p. 208.
104 ‘’Rainbow boys’ Under a Cloud’, RH, 20 June 1975. In 1976 a motion was brought before 
Parliament to deny five 15 year-old boys the right to sit M Levels in South Africa. Parliamentary 
Debates, Vol. 95, ‘Motion: Adjournment o f the House: Departure from Country o f Bulawayo School 
Children’, 10 September 1976.
105 ‘Smith’s Stay On Plea Useless’, 2 August 1976.
106 Parliamentary Debate, Vol. 94, ‘Committee o f Supply: On Vote 12 Information, Immigration and 
Tourism—$4,105,000’, 5 August 1976.
107 See Meredith, The Past, p. 321.
108 This hypocrisy was glaringly displayed by one-time Cabinet Ministe/, Wickus de Kock, who 
emigrated in 1977. ‘Taking the Chicken Run’, Time Magazine, 1 August 1977.
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opposition to the Anglo-Rhodesian settlement proposal to the UN Security Council, 
and urged member states to enforce UN Resolution 253 discouraging white 
immigration to Rhodesia, on the grounds that continued immigration only bolstered 
the regime .109 Muzorewa argued that Africans would be willing to forego the 
monetary aid included in the settlement package, as it would be better spent paying 
for the repatriation o f  whites unwilling to live under majority rule. His 'golden 
parachute' idea, while never implemented, was reconsidered in different forms over 
the next eight years, most intriguingly by Tanzanian president Julius Nyerere in 
1979 110 AvyTU
African leaders appreciated fully the manpower weaknesses suffered by the 
state, and interpreted high white emigration rates as positive indicators. Inducing
emigration was also part o f  ZANU and ZANLA guerrillas' military strategy, as 
Herbert Chitepo explained in 1973:
a s
...The strategic aim [of the guerrillas]...is to attenuate the enemy forces by 
causing their deployment over the whole country. The subsequent 
mobilisation o f  large numbers o f  civilians from industry, business, and 
agriculture would cause serious economic problems. This would have a 
psychologically devastating effect on the morale o f  whites, most o f  whom had 
come to Zimbabwe lured by the prospect o f  the easy privileged life promised 
by the regtme. " 1
ZAPU’s political newspaper, the Zimbabwe Review , argued, “ In Zimbabwe, white 
settlers are seriously affected by the liberation war and are leaving the country in large 
numbers. This affects the manpower reservoir on which the Smith regime depends
I 1 ^
for its fascist army.'' “ By instilling fear in the white populace, ZANLA guerrillas 
sought to force an exodus that would further thin white resources, and to this end they 
were quite successful, especially in the border regions. One white farmer put the 
targeting o f  the border areas this way: “People in Salisbury don't really know what 
the terrorist war is like. They regard it as they did the war in Vietnam— it’s remote 
and doesn't touch them. What they don't seem to realise is that we are standing
UNSC S/10540, 1640th Meeting, February 1972, paragraphs 3-20.
110 'N yerere's Plan for Whites’, RH, 7 August 1979.
111 M. Raeburn. We Are Everywhere: Narratives From Rhodesian Guerrillas (New York. Random 
House, 1978), p. 201.
11_ 'Mercenary Menace: What is the Solution?’ Zimbabwe Review. 3,4 (1976).
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113
between them and urban terrorism.'’ Writing about the eastern border regions near 
Mozambique, David Caute describes the fear and siege mentality o f  white settlers 
living there, who had sandbags piled up against bedroom walls to provide some level 
o f  protection against the constant threat o f  guerrilla attacks. 114
White Rhodesian emigration was viewed with equal interest in the 
international arena. Prior to, and immediately after UDI, the British government
thought that Rhodesia was headed irreversibly towards majority rule. In preparing for
N
such a scenario, the British Foreign and Commonwealth Office debated how best to 
handle the inevitable white exodus from an African-ruled Rhodesia. 15 Prime 
Minister Harold Wilson called upon his diplomats to see if  Australia would be 
prepared to offer assisted passage for white Rhodesians in the same way as they did to 
skilled British citizens.116 There were also feasibility studies on various schemes for
# 117compensating whites if  they sought to escape African rule. But how to best 
facilitate white emigration without inadvertently providing a safety net to intransigent
n o  .
white residents was in practice a tricky line to negotiate. After UDI seemed a semi­
permanent state o f  affairs, the primary focus turned away from humanitarian 
evacuations in the event o f  majority rule, and towards clandestine measures for 
inducing emigration as a means to bringing about majority rule.
Over the course o f  the 1970s, British officials contemplated several strategies 
to lure whites from Rhodesia, with the aim of weakening the regime. One such 
scheme was floated by the Ambassador to South Africa, Sir Arthur Snelling, in 
October 1972, immediately after the Anglo-Rhodesian settlement was quashed, but 
prior to the escalation o f  the war. Snelling called on Britain to buy-out young, skilled 
Rhodesian whites to force Smith to negotiate. His proposal sparked a flurry of 
activity in the FCO, but was eventually rejected as being too expensive, too difficult
113 ‘The Border farmers: ’It pays to be suspicious about everything— if you’re never frightened, 
you’re a fool,’ RH , 14 December 1977.
' 14 D. Caute, Under the Skin: The Death o f  White Rhodesia (London, Allen Lane, 1983) p. 43-44.
115 The British government dreaded the logistical, political, and moral problems a white Rhodesian 
influx presented, as it would coincide with restrictions on non-white immigration to Britain. It was 
unclear how many Rhodesians had the right o f abode in Britain - one estimate was 155,000, or 3/5 of 
the white population. ‘Right o f Whites to go to UK'. RH, 27 May 1976.
11(1 PREM 13/2349. Copy of Minute by the Prime Minister Re: ‘Canberra Telegram to 
Commonwealth Office No. 1698’, 6 December 1966. DO 207/228. Letter from P Le Cheminant to 
Oliver Forster, 27 December 1966.
11 FCO analysts researched French compensation packages for Algerian colonists, and earlier 
schemes for white Kenyans. DO 183/648.
IIS ‘Wilson Hits at Intransigent' Rhodesia'. RH, 21 February 1976.
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to conduct given that Rhodesia appeared secure, and because it could have the 
unintended effect of draining the very whites most likely to be amenable to a political 
settlement.119 Moreover, it was argued that any emigrants who were bought out 
would simply be replaced, given that Rhodesia was, “apparently prepared to accept
i 9nany number of Afrikaners and Mediterranean immigrants.” The conclusion was 
reached therefore, that “some scheme to help whites out of Rhodesia (for good) may
eventually be needed, but this will be when Rhodesia already looks like [it is]
121v» becoming a black country.” Though not named as such, this reasoning was based
b
largely on the Hirschmanian idea of encouraging internal voices of resistance within 
Rhodesia, instead of enticing those people away who might ‘raise hell.’ In 1974, this 
buy-out idea was reintroduced in the FCO, as some of the earlier barriers to induced 
emigration seemed to have disappeared. Most importantly, by 1974 white 
Rhodesians’ sense of security was severely compromised by the escalation of the war 
and the Lisbon coup, and the regime found greater difficulty in replacing the
1 99emigrants who left with new migrants. Furthermore, Harold Wilson returned to 
power in February 1974, and was determined to bring an end to the Rhodesia problem 
that had plagued his first term. These factors combined to make feasible a new effort 
Ny/ to bring down the regime. Once again, it was agreed that a covert buy-out plan 
presented insurmountable logistical problems, but instead, a secret propaganda 
campaign should be formulated by the Information Research Department of the FCO 
for distribution to the press inside and outside of Africa communicating to whites in 
Rhodesia that “the future looks black [for them].”123 It is difficult to trace the effects 
of this propaganda on actual emigration numbers, as the targeted recipients 
themselves would not have known the source. Nevertheless, this campaign clearly 
displays the importance the British attached to white Rhodesian demography
Rhodesian population matters remained prominent for Western politicians 
and diplomats throughout the settlement dramas and until the conclusion of the war.
119 FCO 36/1221. Memorandum by Sir Arthur Snelling to Alec Douglas Home, FCO, October 10, 
1972, ‘An Outsider’s Reflections on Rhodesia’. Memorandum appended to letter from CM. Le 
Quesne, FCO, to Sir Arthur Snelling, November 14, 1972 ‘Commentary on ‘An Outsider’s Reflections 
on Rhodesia’.
120 FCO 36/1221. Commentary Memo, 1972
121 FCO 36/1221. Commentary Memo, 1972
122 FCO 36/1634. Memorandum by DR Upton, Rhodesia Dept., ‘Encouraging White Emigration 
From Rhodesia’, 18 July 1974.
123 FCO 36/1634. Letter from DM Biggun, IRD, to Upton, RD, 31 October 1974.
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Initially, Western policy-makers thought that the best strategy was to encourage the 
exodus o f  whites in order to force the settler state back to the negotiating table. In 
early 1976, the US government and then the British High Commission in Lusaka 
issued statements instructing their citizens to leave Rhodesia for their own safety, 
both o f  which were dismissed by the Rhodesian state as efforts at “psychological 
warfare.” 124 Events in Angola in the summer of 1976, added a new urgency to the 
Rhodesian problem in the eyes o f  Western diplomats and politicians, and the 
continued defiance o f  the minority regime took on a broader significance. Although 
the changes in the region meant white Rhodesians could be more easily induced to 
leave, their presence began to be viewed as essential to the political and economic 
survival o f  a free Zimbabwe. Supporting this argument was the view that whites 
would be more willing to surrender if  they were assured o f  a future for them under 
African rule. There was also concern that enough dissenters remain in Rhodesia to 
put internal pressure on the regime. This reasoning underpinned the delicate policy of 
essentially paying whites to stay on in a free Zimbabwe, and Henry Kissinger crafted
'T* |25a proposal that included an incentive plan aimed at keeping whites in the country. 
Although the Kissinger initiative ultimately failed at the Geneva Peace talks, the idea 
of  being bribed into accepting African rule was not as indignantly dismissed by
Rhodesians in the mid 1970s as it had been immediately after UDI, a testament to
126Rhodesia’s deteriorating political confidence.
At different times Western politicians had proposed to pay white residents to 
leave, offered to pay them to stay, or suggested giving residents the choice. Yet these 
seemingly contradictory policies can be reconciled by understanding the shifting 
significance o f  whites in Rhodesia and the timing o f  their exit. It was always taken 
for granted that the size o f  the white population directly correlated with the success o f  
whichever government was in power. The West was fearful both o f  the continuation 
of the embarrassing settler regime and o f  a dilapidated Zimbabwe ripe for Communist 
intervention, and saw a sizable white population as a bulwark against Communism
14 See "Quit Rhodesia Warning “Kind of Blackmail” , RH , 21 May 1976.
1-5 Smith Papers, Box 4/005(M) “International Economic Support for a Rhodesian Settlement: US-UK 
Agreed Text’, 9 August n.d. [1976].
I2b “Package Deal’. RH, 21 July 1976 treats the Kissinger proposal as generous, in contrast to earlier 
defiance, “Rhodesia is not for Sale’. RH, 8 October 1968.
127 • • * i j iand an assurance o f  stability. But most immediately, the regime had to be 
weakened enough to negotiate its own surrender. The Lancaster House Agreement o f  
1979 that finally ended the war, sought to reassure white anxiety and win acceptance 
for the Agreement by entrenching existing property rights and providing for the 
possibility of a new fund to finance land redistribution. With the settler regime fully 
defeated, the earlier concems over white demography were transfonned into a new 
and perhaps stickier issue o f  post-independence land refonn.
\  Q //  \
Conclusion
Former Prime Minister Godfrey Huggins once described white society in 
Rhodesia as a white island in a black sea. This evocation o f  white isolation and racial 
numerical disparity was apt in some respects, yet it also created a false image o f  
constancy and solidity. Unlike a firmly grounded island, white society in Rhodesia 
was always shifting and shuffling. This characteristic transience was not o f  grave 
concern to the early settler governments, as Rhodesia was then an extension o f  the 
wider British imperial system. As British imperial policy regarding African 
decolonisation changed in the late 1950s, however, Rhodesian governments began to 
read more significance into white demography. Population issues came to be 
regarded as closely connected to the fate of the minority-ruled Rhodesian settler state, 
existing as it did in an increasingly African-ruled continent. Winston Field's inability 
to reverse migration losses provided part of the impetus for his replacement by Ian 
Smith in 1964, and UDI was, in large part, an effort to stabilise the white population. 
Smith's early years in power were publicly lauded as a success because he was 
perceived to have restored white settlers confidence, turning net migration losses 
turned into net gains. As Smith's first decade in power came to a close, however, 
migration gains reverted to losses, and new information on the widening gap between 
white and African demographic trends invoked older fears o f  whites being ‘swamped' 
by Africans, while also introducing new uncertainty about the viability o f  white 
Rhodesia in post-colonial Africa. Although the Rhodesian state tried to discourage 
white emigration, some o f  its policies were counterproductive and actually reinforced
127 This balancing of objectives was perceived by Nationalists as evidence of complicity. Zimbabwe 
Review, No. 8 (1977).
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whites’ culture of transience. The war, by exacerbating pre-existing strains and 
creating unbearable new pressures, exposed the vulnerability of white society. White 
Rhodesia is perhaps best thought of, not as a firm island, but as a floating mat of thick 
vegetation, which in calmer waters might have appeared to have been a grounded land 
mass, yet during stormier weather it loosened and broke apart rather easily.
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Chapter V
Rhodesia’s Immigration Policy: ‘To Save Civilisation in this Country’1
Immigration was the white population o f  Rhodesia’s greatest source of 
population growth, and the most crucial competition in Rhodesia's war o f  numbers 
was between the Africans' rate o f  natural increase and the whites' rate o f  net 
migration. Within white population growth, immigration formed a massive 
percentage compared against the white's rate o f  natural increase. Even when 
compared with other so-called ‘immigrant-hungry’ populations, Rhodesia's reliance 
on immigration as a source o f  total growth stood apart. For example, from 1955 
through 1972 net migration gains accounted for over 60 percent o f  total white 
population growth, and this figure includes five years o f  net migration losses/ In 
comparison, Australia's net migration gains for the same years accounted for only 35 
percent o f  its total population growth.3 Rhodesia's reliance on migration was further 
reinforced by the precipitous drop in white birth rates through the 1960s and 1970s,
. . .  4 . .again at a rate divergent from other similarly situated settler states. Immigration was 
therefore tasked with refilling Rhodesia's population at a rate faster than the constant 
emigration drain from the bottom and fast enough to supplement the sluggish white 
birth rate. Consequently, positive migration figures in Rhodesia were more crucially 
important to the political survival o f  the minority regime than they were to any 
comparable settler state. Despite this great reliance on white immigration to mask 
emigration, increase the white population, and keep pace with African natural 
increase, the Rhodesian state suffered from numerous legal, political, economic, and 
logistical barriers to their effective promotion and absorption o f  immigration.
Positive white population growth was o f  immeasurable psychological 
importance for white Rhodesians. As John Stone observed in the South African 
context, “Small shifts in numbers take on an actual as well as symbolic importance
1 The title is taken from a quote by the one-time Rhodesian Minister o f Immigration, Harry Reedman 
22 September 1964 Committee of Supply, col. 648.
2 Statistics derived from: Monthly Digest o f Statistics issued by the Rhodesian government’s Central 
Statistical Office (hereafter CSO).
Statistics derived from: Australian Bureau of Statistics. Australian Historic Population Statistics, 
Tables 64 and 4 (Canberra, Government Publication, 2006).
4 White Rhodesia experienced a 51 percent drop in crude birth rates in the years from 1962 to 1979, 
far greater than any comparable population anywhere on the globe. Statistics derived from: Rhodesian 
Annual Reports of the Secretary of Health. Vital Statistics (Salisbury, Government Publication).
which can no way be related to their absolute size,’0 and so it was in Rhodesia. It was 
widely stated in Rhodesia at the time that white immigration was a ‘barometer' for the 
political fortune o f  Rhodesia.6 The two-time Minister o f  Immigration, P.K. Van der 
Byl, for example, described immigration as, “a delicate barometer o f  Rhodesia's self- 
confidence, and whenever this was less positive the barometer reacted immediately.” 
Correctly reading the white migration trends for a month, quarter, or year could 
reflect, it was felt, the general well-being of the country. The perception o f  stability 
and confidence that these whites ‘voting-with-their-feet' provided, in turn created 
more stability and more confidence in Rhodesia. Another snowball effect was that 
with more immigrants, Rhodesia's overseas networks grew exponentially, which 
provided for more potential immigrants, as it was usually those with pre-existing 
connections who tended to immigrate and stay.7 Positive immigration bolstered the 
idea that a white-led Rhodesia was permanent, and strengthened Ian Smith's hand in 
negotiations during his innumerable settlement talks. Immigration exuded vitality. In 
the very same ways, however, the awareness o f  population decline and falling 
immigration numbers had the opposite effect: it conveyed national illness and decay. 
Rhodesia would experience this reverse snowball effect from the mid-1970s onwards. 
Immigration in Rhodesia was therefore an end in itself, not merely indicative o f  well­
being, but a cause o f  well-being, and instead o f  comparing immigration to a 
barometer which measured the climate, perhaps it would be more apt to compare it to 
a thermostat which changed the climate.
The Migration Market
The Rhodesian state did not formulate its immigration policy in isolation, and 
white Rhodesians, inside and outside government, were very aware o f  the global and 
regional migration markets in which they were vying for immigrants. On the north 
side o f  the Strand in London, between the imposing South Africa House on Trafalgar 
Square and the equally massive Australia House at its eastern end, stood Rhodesia
J. Stone, ‘The ‘Migrant Factor' in a Plural Society: A South African Case Study’, International 
Migration Review , Vol. 9, No. 1 (Spring, 1975).
6 ‘Biggest Gain of immigrants for Ten Years', RH, 20 December 1968.
The importance of pre-existing links was true for all commonwealth immigrations. A. Richardson, 
British Immigrants and Australia: A Psycho-Social Inquiry (Canberra, Australia National University 
Press, 1974).
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House—now Zimbabwe House—which was then, as now, a narrow five-story 
building. This was the symbol of the Rhodesian state in London, and the main 
clearinghouse for potential immigrants to Rhodesia, where the London-based staff 
would process and vet immigrants. Following UDI in 1965, Rhodesia House’s status 
was highly ambiguous; its staff was allowed to perform some, but not all, of the 
functions formerly afforded to them, most importantly, they could not handle any
O
immigration matters, either promotion or vetting. By the late 1960s Rhodesia House 
was the site of frequent anti-apartheid protests, sit-ins, and even of violent damage. 
On several occasions youths shimmied up the flag pole and replaced the Rhodesian 
flag with the Union Jack. Finally in 1969, following the decision to declare Rhodesia 
a republic, Britain ordered Rhodesia House to be closed for good and emptied of all 
staff, yet the building continued to be a site of protests and political demonstrations 
throughout the 1970s and became a sort of totem for the anti-Apartheid movement.9 
Both the Rhodesian and international media followed these stories about the fate of 
Rhodesia House with great interest.10 Not five hundred yards in either direction from 
the besieged and abandoned Rhodesia House, Australia House, New Zealand House, 
and South Africa House were welcoming record numbers of British emigrants. The 
Herald regularly reported on the immigration numbers attracted by the former white 
dominions, and from regional rivals like Zambia, and it is clear that Rhodesians were 
fully aware of the strong competition for skilled immigrants and readily understood 
their limitations in these global and regional markets.
There were two major populations of potential immigrants from which 
Rhodesia sought to attract immigrants: whites already in Africa, and whites from
8 ‘Agreement on Status o f Rhodesia House,’ RH, 25 November 1965.
9 See for example: ‘Attempts to Fire Rhodesia House Alleged’, RH, 13 March 1968; Another front 
page story detailed how a young member of the Communist League climbed the flag pole and tore 
down the Rhodesia flag. ‘New Flag Tom down in London: Rooftop Raider Strikes at Rhodesia House: 
Mission Chief Denies Provocation’, RH, 4 January 1969; ‘Police Evict Demonstrators from Rhodesia 
House: Sit-In Siege Lasts 4 Hours’, RH, 8 January 1969; In another incident, more than 500 anti- 
Rhodesian protestors attacked Rhodesia House and smashed a plate glass window. ‘Rhodesia House 
Attack Foiled: London Demonstrators turn on South African Embassy: Leaders o f Mob Fight with 
Police’, RH, 13 January 1969; In another high-profile act, two men again climbed up the flagpole and 
replaced the Rhodesian flag with the Union Jack. ‘Flagpole Raiders Leave Their Perch’, RH, 13 
January 1969.
10 See for example, The Times (London) coverage of the Rhodesia House protests: ‘Arrests After 
Protests in Strand’, The Times, 13 November 1965; ‘Smith Flag Survives Mauling’, The Times, 4 
January 1969; ‘Battle o f the Strand in South Africa and Rhodesia Protest’, The Times, 13 January 1969; 
‘Students at Rhodesia House’, The Times, 22 February 1969; ‘Five Arrested After Apartheid Rally’,
The Times, 27 May 1969; ’43 Charged After Rhodesia Protest March in London’, The Times, 14 
February 1972.
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outside Africa. Regionally, Africa had a population of migratory whites who freely 
floated from one African country to another depending upon job opportunities and 
political conditions. Many of these whites were of British origin, but their loyalty was 
neither to any one African country, nor to Britain as it then existed. Whites already in 
Africa were much more responsive to both positive and negative trends in Rhodesia, 
with some moving in during good times and out during bad times. A Herald editorial 
from 1968 emphasised the transience of this white African population:
In the wider-visioned days of the ‘40s and ‘50s the drain of Europeans from 
one part of Africa to another was not a prime target of Immigration Ministers. 
It was recognised that these migrants moved as jobs offered and would soon 
try their luck over yet another of the many horizons offering ... In the event, 
‘white’ Africa has drawn back to the Zambezi and suitable horizons are 
scarce; much effort is now being made by individual countries to attract as 
many as possible of the Europeans leaving the remaining white pockets of the 
‘black’ continent.11
The editorial went on to ask why Rhodesia should not try to attract and retain these 
people. South Africa was a way station for many in this migratory population, and by 
far South Africa was both the greatest source of immigrants to, and emigrants from, 
Rhodesia. It was always a great concern among many Rhodesians that South Africans 
not ‘poach’ these whites from Rhodesia. To assuage these fears, representatives of 
South Africa, and even of Australia, reassured the Rhodesian state that there would be
1 'y
no government efforts to ‘poach’ their whites. Even so, Rhodesia was much more
successful in attracting immigrants from this pool of migratory African whites,
especially in re-attracting one-time Rhodesian residents, than they were in attracting
1 ^white immigrants from outside Africa.
In the case of white immigrants from outside Africa, Rhodesia was a relatively 
less attractive destination than the former white dominions. Interest in moving
11 ‘Why Don’t they Come Here?’, Editorial, RH, 21 February 1968.
12 See for example, ‘No Poaching o f Emigrants by Australia’, RH, 6 April 1961. The Australian High 
Commissioner promised that Australia would not attempt to woo Rhodesian whites. It is interesting to 
note that Rhodesians under the Federation likewise expressed a gentlemanly unwillingness to poach 
Kenyan whites prior to African majority rule. Parliamentary Debates, Vol. 12, ‘Motion: Immigrants 
From Kenya and Tanganyika’, 30 March 1960.
13 For example, one third of all Rhodesian immigrants in 1978 were former residents. See 
Parliamentary Debates,’ Committee o f Supply Vote’, 26 July 1978, col. 850. In 1975 De Kock cited 
that this figure in 1974 as then one in six. Parliamentary Debates, ‘Committee of Supply Vote’, 12 
February 1975, col. 1273.
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overseas ran high in Britain, and British migration to the former dominions was robust 
from the mid-1960s to the early 1970s, and this was ruefully realised to be the case by 
Rhodesians at the time, as migration patterns were regularly tracked in the popular 
press—what numbers were moving to what countries, and why. A UK poll 
conducted in 1966, asked Britons, “Have you ever seriously considered going to settle 
in another country?” Of the respondents, 30 percent answered “Yes.” Of that 30 
percent, 42 percent said they had considered Australia, 27 percent New Zealand, 24 
percent Canada, 6 percent USA, 5 percent South Africa, and only 2 percent 
considered Rhodesia.14 The politically uncertain future of post-UDI Rhodesia was 
identified to be a hindrance to Rhodesia’s success in the migration market long before 
the escalation of the shooting war. Ironically, it had been argued by RF politicians in 
and out of government before UDI that only by declaring unilateral independence 
could the state boost Rhodesia’s flagging immigration numbers.15 A Herald editorial 
from 1967, commenting on the recent drive for skilled immigrants, stated:
[The Minister of Immigration] particularly wants the professional men and 
women—doctors and nurses, teachers and engineers—as well as technicians 
and artisans and men with capital. So does every country in the world, South 
Africa included. Rhodesia would stand a better chance of attracting money 
and new brain—even of re-capturing the brain drained from her during the 
past few years—if she were politically acceptable to the main sources of the 
trained men she must have. Given a constitutional settlement there is a chance 
of attracting the skills which the Minister affirms are essential.16
This obsessive competition with the former white dominions for immigrants 
led Immigration Minister P.K. Van der Byl to speciously claim that Rhodesia’s intake 
actually surpassed Australia’s in 1970, but not in total numbers, but as a percentage of 
the total white population, which considering Rhodesia’s total white population of 
230,000 was hardly impressive.17 This compensatory bravado masked the state’s and 
white settler society’s anxieties about Rhodesia’s relative attractiveness in the 
migration market, and a hopeful rejoinder that was often heard in explaining away 
emigration losses was that emigrating residents would soon realise the grass was not 
greener abroad and soon return. One returning emigrant described her stay in Britain
14 A. Richardson, British Immigrants.
15 See for example: ‘Independence in Needed to Boost Immigration’, RH, 6 March 1965.
16 ‘The Price of Survival’, Editorial, RH, 29 July 1967.
17 ‘Immigrant Figures ‘Surpass Australia’s’— Van der Byl’, RH, 12 June 1970.
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and why she returned in an article in the Herald  in 1979, saying, ‘i t ' s  not funny when 
you're paying £15 a week for a poky little room to be told by the Pakistani landlord 
that he's going to ration your bathwater.’' On the basis o f  this and several other 
personal stories, this article and others preceding it pointed to a possible optimistic 
trend that many former residents were returning, “preferring to brave the uncertainties 
o f  a country at war than accept the way o f  life overseas.", s In the event, the numbers 
did not support these anecdotal observations, and while returning residents always 
formed a significant percentage o f  total immigrants, and their horror stories o f  the 
outside world were widely repeated as evidence to stay put, it was never the case that 
most emigrants eventually returned.
Rhodesia's four main selling points to potential immigrants was its warm and 
sunny climate; the freedom to start a new life without the constraints of dour post-War 
Britain; an anachronistic imperial lifestyle; and relatedly, an inflated material standard 
o f  living for whites.15 T he first selling point o f  its sunny climate was just as easily 
made in Australia and South Africa, both o f  which also enjoyed long beautiful 
coastlines, while Rhodesia was landlocked. And as it was, Britain's weather did 
appear to be a major consideration in emigrants' calculations. An Australian official 
was quoted in 1964 as saying that their emigration drop that season, “was entirely due
9 0to the better winter England has just experienced.'’" Other anecdotal evidence from 
Rhodesia confirms the importance of weather as a factor in moving. When asked why 
she was emigrating from Britain to Rhodesia, the 89 year-old Theresa Mahoney was
9 1quoted as saying, “To Hell with Wilson and Damn the Weather!” The reaction to 
various frustrations over life in post-War Britain was certainly a strong force driving 
out-migrations, but this impulse too did not uniquely advantage Rhodesia.
18 'Gapping it in Reverse: Emigrants Fins Grass no Greener’, RH, 18 October 1979.
|l> See also, 'Problems Face New Immigrants in Rhodesia’, RH, 7 October 1968. The article described 
the results o f a Herald survey of new immigrants. "Most immigrants today hail from England, South 
Africa, and Portugal. They come here without any preconceived political prejudice, are sun- 
worshippers and admit to being attracted by a lower cost of living and better pay.” See also articles in 
the series: ‘New Rhodesians-V’, RH, 12 October 1968. Couple from England can buy a car for the first 
time; 'New Rhodesians-VH’, RH, 15 October 1968; 'New Rhodesians-IX’, RH, 17 October 1968. 
Couple from Kenya left because of the strain o f African rule. ‘New Rhodesians-IIE, RH. 10 October 
1968. Portuguese man from Mozambique “likes the country, the easy life and the Rhodesian girls.” 
'New Rhodesians-XIE, RH, 22 October 1968. Couple from New Jersey came partially because of New 
Jersey's cold weather. ‘Family Leaves Britain for Children’s Sake’, RH, 24 October 1968. Left Britain 
in part because of non-white immigration into Britain.
20 ‘Good UK Winter Cuts Emigration", RH, 17 April 1964.
21 ‘89 year old Immigrant is Due Tomorrow’, RH, 19 December 1968.
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It was the last two related selling points, of being the last haven for 
anachronistic imperial values and promising an inflated standard of living for whites, 
which proved the most effective for Rhodesia. Only by promising a privileged status 
and significant material benefits for whites as compared against their countries of 
origin could Rhodesia remain at all competitive in the migration market. One 
example of this emphasis on material betterment was this large advertisement that ran
99in a Dublin newspaper, as reported by the Herald. The advertisement’s text, which 
ran alongside a half-empty pint glass of beer read:
The 10,000 Irish in Rhodesia will be drowning the Shamrock tomorrow. 
Granted they have no Croke Park but they have just the weather to give them a 
powerful thirst. If you want a spacious home, good wages, reasonable 
taxation, first-class school, expert medical attention, help for the missus in the 
house and a bright sunny future for all. If you want assisted passages for 
yourself and your family if you qualify, and a two year special concession, 
where a family with two children can earn up to £1748 (£200 Sterling) tax- 
free, come out and have a pint.
An advertisement in The Spectator magazine posted by the Rhodesian Department of 
Promotion ini 973, described Rhodesia as an imperial idyll out of time:
Rhodesia. It isn’t easy to find that haven to escape to any more. Most of the 
world’s idyllic retreats are getting a little tarnished—and prices aren’t what 
they were once, to say nothing of taxes. But there is one last retreat where 
Britain’s way of life is still treasured and life has a special tempo of its own. 
Where endless sunny days and peaceful ways let one forget the problems of 
life elsewhere. Rhodesia. A land of leisurely pursuits and sophisticated 
facilities; of outstanding service and good neighborliness; where money still 
goes a lot further and taxes are low. There are spacious homes, domestic help, 
modem health amenities, fast communications and uncrowded cities. The arts 
are catered for and sport is second to none, no matter what you fancy.
Rhodesia is dedicated to preserving a way of life we all cherish. We would9^
like you to be a part of it.
An advertisement that ran in the Daily Mirror in 1967 appealed to the entrepreneurial 
spirit many felt was lost in Britain:
Rhodesia invites you.. .to pull up your roots and move to a country where life 
is still a challenge. Where hard work and initiative still bring their just
22 ‘New Move to Attract Irish Immigrants’, RH, 19 March 1969.
23 Rhodesian Immigration Advertisement, The Spectator, 22 December 1973, found in FCO 36/1716.
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rewards. Where opportunities for advancement and capital investment are 
virtually limitless...to live in a modem, sophisticated society where people 
still smile. Enjoying the benefits of a superb climate, low taxation and good 
salaries, a fine standard of living, educational, health and sporting 
facilities.. .to make a new life in a country with a great future.24
Another example of this marketing style that more explicitly emphasised the material 
benefits whites could expect in Rhodesia, was from the American-based Newsweek 
magazine in 1970, which ran the following advertisement:
Promote Yourself. Why wait for promotion? Promote yourself out of the rat 
race and into your kind of future. Then go to the top, fast in Rhodesia. You’ll 
get higher wages, lower taxes; more take home pay that goes further in a 
country where almost everything costs less. On top of this you’ll enjoy one of 
the world’s highest standards of living in a booming, stable country. And a 
sun-filled, outdoors way of life. Move now, before the rush. Rhodesia offers 
a chance to move up in your field; to take greater responsibility and be well 
paid for it. The rapidly expanding economy means plenty of room for top 
talent in almost every field. And there are incentives for immigrants: Assisted 
passages, substantial tax abatements in your first two financial years; lower 
cost of living because of cheaper food and lower rents; excellent medical 
services, good schools, a wide variety of entertainment and sport—and almost
9 ^12 months a year of sunshine! Go Places in Rhodesia.
With this style of immigration promotion, the state was at times accused of 
over-selling Rhodesia to prospective immigrants. There is some evidence that this 
over-selling and the deflated expectations of new immigrants occurred in the early 
1970s, as many newcomers left soon upon arrival, and publically aired their 
disappointment in the Rhodesian press. The nexus between the methods of 
promotion and disappointment and eventual emigration was identified by several 
African MPs. In 1976, one opposition MP pointed out that, “because of the bright 
picture which is being painted of Rhodesia, which is exaggerated, when these people 
come into the country they do not find this brightness and they are bound to fly by
9 7night.” Another opposition MP argued that these materials highlighted the 
desperation of the state, especially when compared against other demand-side nations’
24 Rhodesian Immigration Advertisement, Daily Mirror, (no date) December 1967, found in LAB 
8/3195.
25 Rhodesian Immigration Advertisement, Newsweek, 21 September 1970, found in FCO 35/354.
26 See for example, ‘Few Jobs for Immigrants’, RH, 18 May 1972; ‘Newcomers Find Good Jobs Hard 
to Get’, RH, 25 July 1972; and ‘Rhodesia Not Utopia for Everyone’, RH, 9 October 1972.
27 Parliamentary Debates, Vol. 89, ‘Committee of Supply Vote’, 12 February 1975.
literature. This flow o f disappointed immigrants back to the supply-side countries 
was recognised to very damaging to Rhodesia's image abroad, especially to 
prospective immigrants, further weakening their competitiveness in the migration 
market, especially since the state relied a great deal on word-of-mouth propaganda as 
the state’s official propaganda in those countries was blocked by sanctions 
regulations.
In the global migration market, Rhodesia was poorly positioned to take
2 9  radvantage o f  British migration trends." During these very active years of British 
emigration o f  the late 1960s and early 1970s, Rhodesia suffered from self-inflicted 
wounds, most importantly stemming from Smith’s decision to declare UDI at the end 
o f  1965, when British immigration was flowing in at a swift pace. International 
sanctions and Rhodesia’s negative international image after UDI severely hampered 
large-scale immigration from Europe, 0 even as the economic crises o f  the mid 1970s 
increased the general attractiveness o f  emigration as an option for many Europeans.3, 
Even among those people overseas interested in Rhodesia as a destination, many were 
quite often confused by, if  not fully dissuaded by, the complex and shadowy process 
o f  moving to an illegal regime, in which emigration was subject to international
. . . . .  l')
sanctions and often domestic enabling legislation in the country o f  origin. " 
Paradoxically, what attractiveness Rhodesia did possess was intimately connected to 
the country’s racist political and economic structure that UDI solidified, and 
represented an ideology that was very controversial in most o f  the immigrant supply 
countries, particularly Britain. These same policies also rendered Rhodesia's long­
term future uncertain. As a result, Rhodesia’s immigration policy was forced to rely 
heavily upon whites in Africa, a population which was both fickle and not very large. 
But this exposes the central dilemma in the state's immigration policy: that Rhodesia 
could neither conform to world opinion by surrendering white supremacy and
28 Parliamentary Debates, Vol. 94, ‘Committee of Supply Vote’, 5 August 1976
29 See for example, ‘Emigration Queues in London’, RH, November 27, 1968; ‘More Britons want to 
go to South Africa and the ‘white’ Commonwealth', RH, May 11, 1968; ‘Emigrants leaving Britain at a 
rate of 100,000 a year’, RH, 24 December 1962; ‘Big Rush from Britain Maybe Record’, RH, 22 March 
1966.
30 In a 1966 survey of British emigrants, Australia was preferred to South Africa and Rhodesia 
because o f the African countries’ “racial troubles.” See A. Richardson. British Immigration, p 14-15.
British economic woes led to lines outside Australia Elouse, Canada House, and New Zealand 
House, as Rhodesia House remained unoccupied. ‘Migrant Queues Grow as Crisis Worsens,’ RH, 1 
February 1974.
32 ‘Hopeful Immigrants in Dilemma’, RH, 17 January 1974.
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repudiating UDI and with it their primary economic appeal, nor could they protect 
white privilege and remain a pariah state indefinitely, especially as Rhodesia’s 
peculiar demographic juggling act relied upon a steady flow of new immigrants to 
replace those leaving.
Discourses Concerning Immigration
The Rhodesian state viewed white immigration as vital to its political and 
economic structure. Since the founding of the colony, whites in Rhodesia created 
racialised economic dichotomies to justify, maintain, and strengthen their hegemony 
over the African populace. Long before the publication of the Sadie Report, the 
white/African population dynamic had grafted onto it immutable pseudo-economic 
dualities set in opposition to one another, reflecting perceived divisions such as 
skilled/unskilled, capitalised/non-capitalised, entrepreneurial/non-entrepreneurial, and 
tax payers/social welfare drainers, which overlapped perfectly with race. These 
artificial divisions provided a gloss for ostensibly non-racial defences of Rhodesia’s 
population policies. The Sadie Report concluded in relevant part:
... economic development is fundamentally a function of the religious, social, 
and cultural values of a society and the psychological traits of its members, 
which together constitute a way of life. A study of the Bantu peoples of 
Africa reveals the absence at this stage of most of those elements which are 
conducive to economic growth as an endogenous process...the professional 
and technical men and those skills and experience which are prerequisites to 
the employment of workers in the lower echelons of the skilled hierarchy, 
[cannot] simply be imparted to an economically under-developed people by 
way of a crash programme of education and instruction.33
With the help of this new economic language, the long-standing promotion of 
immigration to increase the white population was presented by the state as being 
apolitical, administrative, and bureaucratic—an exercise in cool-headed economics, 
rather than hot-headed bigotry. This rhetorical tightrope walk between blatant racism 
and economic development was succinctly expressed by a Rhodesian Front 
backbencher in 1969: “ .. .Immigration is vital to this country. It is vital that we close
33 J.L. Sadie, ‘Report by J.L. Sadie on Planning for the Economic Development o f Rhodesia’, 
(Government Printer, Salisbury, 1967).
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the population gap between the African on one side and the European on the other. I 
am not being racial in this. I am dealing with it from the point of view of the 
development of the country. The Europeans who come here develop the country and 
as they develop the country so employment opportunities occur for all races, not only 
for the European or the African.”34
Immigration was additionally rationalised as a tremendous bargain vis-a-vis 
the endogenous training and schooling of Rhodesian whites. This was an argument 
offered during many of the budget debates over immigration. The Minister of 
Immigration, Harry Reedman, argued in 1965:
The cost of learning is high anywhere, but to bring in people who have learned 
various skills and techniques at the cost of other nations is clearly an 
advantage. We save instantly on their education and subsistence and accrue a 
stock-in-trade of their aggregate skills and take in these new assets on a ‘free
i  c
on board’ basis. I would say, what a valuable consignment.
It was argued that immigration, even when calculating assisted passages and the 
settling-down costs for the state, was far cheaper than paying for the unproductive and 
expensive years of childhood and schooling, as was necessary with Rhodesian-bom
Xfkwhites. Immigration was also seen as an inexpensive way to provide for an influx of 
foreign capital, and the amount of capital declared by recent immigrants was often set 
against the costs of assisted passages and presented as a great profit for Rhodesia. 
These two premises combined in immigration discourses to present white immigrants 
as ready-made assets to the economy.
The stated premise of the racialised division of skills and potentialities upon 
which Rhodesia’s immigration policy rested was certainly not borne out in the 
evidence, either inside of Rhodesia or outside, a reality regularly pointed to by 
African MPs. Thus, government officials were often forced in Parliamentary debates 
to articulate defences of the non-racist character of the government’s immigration 
policy which played out in an oft-repeated rhetorical fencing match. Some officials 
were certainly more adept and subtle in masking the policy’s racist character than 
others. On one such occasion, an African MP asked the acting Immigration Minister,
34 Parliamentary Debates, Vol. ‘Committee of Supply Vote’, 1 August 1969 col. 1061
35 Parliamentary Debates, Vol. 60, ‘Committee o f Supply Vote’, 9 March 1965.
36 See for example: Parliamentary Debates, ‘Committee of Supply Vote’, 9 March 1965, col. 461; 
Parliamentary Debates, ‘Committee o f Supply Vote’, 2 October 1974.
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if  it was skills and capital that Rhodesia was in such desperate need of, would the 
government consider importing skilled Africans from outside Rhodesia to fill 
openings, to which the acting Minister bluntly replied: “ I would have thought [the
' l ' j
questioner] had enough brains to realise the [government’s] position." A year prior, 
the Minister o f  Immigration replied to a similar question about bringing in skilled 
Africans to fill in critical openings in the economy, by saying that attracting African
38immigrants would be “a case o f  bringing coals to Newcastle."' Yet these rare 
instances o f  candour remained the exception, and state officials unifonnly denied any 
surreptitious racial motives in immigration, at least in public. But behind closed 
doors, in Cabinet meetings, and RF party gatherings, away from public glare, state 
officials contradicted their impassioned assertions o f  non-discrimination, and 
explicitly crafted an immigration policy based upon bringing in whites for political, 
not economic reasons, with the goal o f  re-balancing racial ratios.
In late October 1969, after the publication of  both phases o f  the census, a
resolution carried unanimously at the Rhodesian Front Congress to make immigration
39less selective, and to ensure that more jobs should be created for whites. Rhodesian 
Front Congresses had in the past always been very secretive and closed to the press, 
but this one was unique in that it was relatively well reported. The explicit policy o f  
mass unselective immigration carried unanimously, in sharp distinction to the 
government's publicly stated immigration policy. Van der Byl's published address to 
the RF Congress regarding this resolution provided an interesting and rare public look 
into real thinking behind the government's immigration policy. In his speech, he 
claimed that his Ministry ceaselessly received requests from industrialists to allow in 
Coloured skilled labour from South Africa, requests that he always turned down. 
Instead, he proposed allowing in unskilled whites and training them in skills once in 
Rhodesia, a proposition obviously contradicting both the government’s assertion that 
it was skills not race that was the guiding principle, and negating the bargain of 
importing ready-skilled immigrants over training indigenous residents. He called for 
an immigration policy that would be “as unselective as possible [for whites],” denying 
residence only to “rogues, scalawags, and criminals." Also indicating the direction of 
RF's immigration vision, he said he thought it “utterly deplorable" that there was still
37 ‘Brains in Question’, RH , 13 August 1970.
s Parliamentary Debates, ‘Committee of Supply Vote’, 17 January 1969.
‘More Jobs for whites and Wider Immigration are Called for’. RH, 25 October 1969.
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a tendency to discriminate against non-British immigrants. He also said the 
government rejected the idea that Rhodesia must remain “as a preserve for the English 
way of life.” This public glimpse of the secret official thinking of the government on 
immigration resulted in heated debates in Parliament where Opposition MPs quoted 
Van der Byl’s words back to him, and the hostile response no doubt counseled future 
RF Congresses to be held, as had prior ones, behind closed doors.
Throughout the post-UDI period, and even after the anomalous 1969 RF 
Congress, the government continued to speak in ‘two tongues’ regarding 
immigration.40 To support their claim of the exclusively economic nature of 
immigration, state officials continued to assert that their policy was ‘selective’ in 
terms of targeting certain individuals who would aid Rhodesia’s development. In this 
discourse on immigration, selectivity was contrasted with mass, ‘unselective’ 
immigration: the former being economic and apolitical and the latter being political 
and racial. Despite the government’s consistently stated policy of selective 
immigration, the primary, and arguably the sole, criteria for this selectiveness in 
immigration was race. Indeed, in 1964 the Cabinet explicitly laid out the policy that 
the first requirement for immigrants was that they must be white.41 Also out of public 
view, it was reiterated that the policy for non-white immigration was that they would 
only ever be allowed in on exceptional circumstances of the entry being “in the 
national interest” or for “humanitarian concerns.”42 The true character of Rhodesia’s 
immigration policies were heated topics of debate in Parliament, with thrusts and 
parries that were repeated every time immigration votes were up for Supply 
Committee debates. One common line of attack on the state’s immigration policies 
was the de-linking of skills and capital with skin colour through the use of counter 
examples.43 The purpose of this de-linking was to pierce the transparent economic 
rationales offered by the state, and reveal the racist character of its immigration 
policies. These efforts on the part of African MPs to de-link race from skills and 
capital meant identifying both unskilled and poor white immigrants allowed in, and 
identifying skilled and capitalised non-whites denied access. Responding to these
40 This phrase was used by an African MP to describe the variance between Van der Byl’s public and 
private statements regarding immigration. Parliamentary Debates, ‘Committee o f Supply Vote’, 17 
January 1969, col. 294
41 Smith Papers, Box 017, Cabinet Minutes, ‘Immigration Policy’, 8 July 1964.
42 Smith Papers, Box 024, Cabinet Minutes, ‘Immigration Policy: Permanent Residents: Non- 
Europeans’, 7 September 1971.
43 See for example: Parliamentary Debates, Vol. 68, ‘Committee of Supply Vote’, 31 August 1967.
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critiques, state officials nearly always retorted with boiler plate non-answers that 
obfuscated the state’s true motives. The most salient thrusts and parries in Parliament 
regarding immigration were repeated throughout the post-UDI period, and are 
included below:
PARLIAMENTARY DEBATES ON IMMIGRATION
OPPOSITION CHARGE GOVERNMENT RESPONSE
1) The state's immigration policy is racist and 1) The policy is non-racial and
politically motivated. economically motivated.44
2) The state is allowing in unskilled whites, that 2) New immigrants create jobs for all
compete with Africans for jobs. Rhodesians, white and African.45
3) The state is allowing in poor whites, especially 3) Immigrants are a net financial boon,
through the assisted passage schemes. even when calculating assisted 
passages.46
4) The state is denying residence to skilled 4) The state has an interest in
and wealthy non-whites. protecting indigenous jobs in Rhodesia 
by keeping non-white foreigners out.47 
The state accepts hundreds of 
thousands o f foreign migrants for 
work.41*
5) The state should educate the Rhodesian 5) Education takes too long to address
labour force to create new skills. current needs, and immigration is
L  • 49cheaper in any case.
6) The state is allowing in whites with dubious moral character. 6) The state responds to criminality 
when it occurs, and most immigrants 
are hard-working people o f  good moral 
character.50
44 See for example, Parliamentary Debates, Vol. 80, ‘Committee o f Supply Vote’, 18 November 1971. 
This broader claim was clearly untrue, as Rhodesian Cabinet records indicate.
45 See for example, Parliamentary Debates, Vol. 80, ‘Committee o f Supply Vote’, 18 November 1971. 
This is certainly a questionable claim, and is more likely a flipping o f causes and effects, as 
immigration tended to swell during better economic times with higher employment.
46 See for example, Parliamentary Debates, Vol. 90, ‘Committee o f Supply Vote’, 18 July 1975. The 
definition o f capital as defined by Immigration Ministers was very loose and included moveable assets 
such as cars, and as a result the economic benefit to Rhodesia of this capital influx was greatly 
exaggerated, especially when compared against settling down costs, balance o f payment issues, and 
infrastructural strains caused by new immigration.
47 See for example, Parliamentary Debates, Vol. 79, ‘Committee o f Supply Vote’, 21 July 1971. This 
argument was particularly disingenuous, as non-whites were already barred from the skilled jobs that 
would have been taken up by these potential immigrants.
48 See for example, Parliamentary Debates, Vol. 90, ‘Committee of Supply Vote’, 18 July 1975.
These migrant workers equated with white immigrants were only in Rhodesia on a temporary basis and 
had no opportunity to obtain permanent residence, and were, by definition, not immigrants at all.
49 See for example, Parliamentary Debates, Vol. 80, ‘Committee o f Supply Vote’, 18 November 1971. 
This might have been true in the short run, but the long term costs of importing and retaining foreign- 
schooled migrants was most likely more than improving Rhodesian training.
50 See for example, Parliamentary Debates, ‘Committee o f Supply Vote’, 29 September 1977. This 
might have been true generally, but even Immigration Ministers on several occasions complained about 
the lack o f effective vetting processes for post-UDI immigrants.
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Irrespective o f  any entertainment value derived from these periodic repartees, 
African MPs had little power to alter these policies, nor indeed did the occasional 
forced exposure o f  the state's racist motivations, as with Van der Byl's impolitic 
public statements from 1969, shock the wider white Rhodesian public, who no doubt 
already assumed and largely supported the underlying racial motivations.
Perhaps a more interesting question, was why state officials bothered to 
expend the energy in hiding their motivations and cloaking the connections between 
the various population policies at all? The answer likely was that the intending 
audiences for these rhetorical charades were the wider international community and 
the African population. This act o f  speaking with 'two tongues' can be explained as 
an attempted reconciliation of  the two conflicting policy goals pursued by Smith after 
UDI; o f  bolstering white power in Rhodesia and simultaneously winning international 
recognition. Though UDI removed some o f  the liberal constraints hampering 
Rhodesia's racial policies, the goal o f  a negotiated settlement also militated against 
the state acting in an unconscionably racist fashion that would preclude Britain from 
realistically granting independence. Another targeted audience was also likely 
Africans in Rhodesia, a population the state was desperately trying to convince to 
practice family planning.
The state's policy o f  promoting family planning relied upon a degree o f  trust 
and cooperation that the state carefully nurtured in that policy sphere. The exposure 
of blatantly racist attempts to bolster the white population through immigration could 
jeopardise this policy o f  slowing African growth rates, and RF politicians always tried 
to publically de-link and de-politicise the two policies, but without much success. 
Though public linkages between the state’s various population policies were usually 
assiduously avoided, this discursive cloak occasionally was lifted, and in a rare 
example o f  candour in Parliament the Immigration Minister, P.K. Van der Byl, posed 
this odd rhetorical to an African MP who had criticised Rhodesia’s unselective, open- 
door immigration policy o f  the early 1970s:
... If the African population was to slow down its rate of increase then it 
would be quite possible that we would require fewer immigrants to provide 
job opportunities. I am prepared to come to an understanding with hon. 
Member on the cross benches in this— that if  the African population is 
prepared to reduce its rate o f  increase by 1% then I am prepared to forcibly 
drop the European potential immigration by 2%. Are they prepared to accept
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that or not? I think this is a very generous offer and will solve all these 
difficulties [regarding the unselectivity of white immigration policy].51
Needless to say, this preposterous offer was never taken up, and indeed these sorts of 
flippant remarks actually set back government policy. In the family planning context, 
a former Family Planning Association of Rhodesia (FPAR) supervisor for Midlands 
described how many Africans identified the political and racist motivations of the 
RF’s population policies by reading, or hearing about, what was said in Parliament:
The thing that was hammering us [impeding our efforts] was then there were 
some whites who could talk in Parliament, that ‘Oh those Africans are so 
many.’ In Parliament! ‘These Africans are so many, they don’t even know 
what family planning is.’ That alone was barrier for us. Some educated 
people in the rural areas, they knew [what was said in Parliament]. They said, 
‘You are talking of this [the benefits of family planning] but why are they 
saying that?’...They said, ‘Ah no, there is something behind it.’52
Echoing this same problem in the promotion of family planning, a nurse working in 
an FPAR clinic said:
They [local men] were saying that this is a white man’s tool to put down the 
number of Africans... And then the white regime that was there would come 
out and say there are too many Africans, let’s use family planning... It was 
also because of the negative press releases from the white regime, like there 
are too many Africans, we must cut down the number of Africans so far then 
family planning was to cut down the number of Africans which was all wrong
Regarding the incongruence of immigration and family planning specifically, an 
article from ZAPU’s Zimbabwe Review from 1970 stated:
Whilst the settlers are, on the one hand, fielding this birth control campaign 
among Africans on the excuse of a population strained economy, they are, on 
the other, advertising for increased immigration from Europe...Who can fail 
to realise the whole trick in the circumstances?54
51 Parliamentary Debates, Vol. 84, ‘Committee o f Supply Vote,’ 9 August 1973.
52 Kaler, Running, p. 202.
53 Kaler, Running, p. 202.
54 A. de Braganca, I. Wallerstein, The African Liberation Reader: Documents o f  the National 
Liberation Movements, Vol. 1 (Zed Press, London, 1982) pp 153-157. Quoting ‘African Population 
Growth Strangulation’, Zimbabwe Review (January/February 1970).
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Because of these tensions between public statements and (not-so) secret 
motivations, the state was compelled to strengthen white numbers and lower African 
numbers to retain power, but could never be publically heard to be doing either out of 
racist motivations, lest these initiatives fail because of non-cooperation: this was the 
rationale behind the ‘two tongues.’
Economic Aspects of Immigration
The two-tiered economy, buttressed as it was by the abundance of cheap
African labour, meant that many whites could enjoy a privileged lifestyle in Rhodesia
: that they could enjoy probably nowhere else on earth. Even artisans and craftsmen
could afford domestic servants, and possibly a free-standing house with a pool, and a
car. There was one car for every four whites in Rhodesia in 1952, which was
equivalent to the United States’ ratio in 1977.55 A survey from 1970 found that 97
percent of whites had refrigerators, one sixth had pools, and one fifth had hi-fi sets.56
This material gap between standards of living in supply-side countries and Rhodesia
was obviously greater for the less skilled and less qualified whites that slipped in.
This was a fundamental tension that would constantly plague Rhodesia’s racial
immigration policies: those individuals who would gain the most through immigration
^  to Rhodesia, and who would obviously be the most keen to commit themselves to
_o immigrating to Rhodesia, were the same individuals who could not be easily
y/” \    •
absorbed. On the other side of the coin, those highly skilled and professional whites
who looked to gain the least compared to their material standing in other countries
were the ones who were unsuccessfully sought after by Rhodesian immigration
officials.
From at least the mid 1960s, there were shortages in the skilled and 
professional sectors of the economy, and consistent with the discourse on racialised 
skills, white immigration was to be the primary method of adding more skills to 
Rhodesia rather than endogenous training and education, as there were not enough 
white youths in Rhodesia to train in all the necessary skills, and the large African
55 See Blake, A History, p. 277.
56 ‘Living Standards Among Highest’, RH, 9 May 1970.
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population was deemed to be un-trainable. As a result of these assumptions of 
raeialised skills and potentialities, the state's immigration policy was always defended 
publically as the simple, and facially non-political, syllogism: the economy needed 
skills and capital, only white people had the necessary skills and capital, and therefore 
the state's policy was to attract white immigrants.
Two factors contributed to a serious dearth o f  skilled and qualified workers in 
Rhodesia. One was Rhodesia's expanding economy— largely a result o f  the industrial 
diversification following international sanctions— and the other was the qualitative 
skills turnover following UDI that drained more and more skilled whites from 
Rhodesia and replaced them with unskilled whites. Because o f  the de fac to  job 
reservation that existed in Rhodesia, when vacancies were created in the skilled or 
professional positions, these jobs often remained open until whites could be found to 
fill them. The domestic education system did not produce the right number o f  white 
graduates in the required variety o f  skills needed to fill all the existing positions, and 
to remedy these deficiencies, the apprenticeship programme was revamped several 
times in an effort to ensure that enough whites came through the education system, 
yet none o f  the plans worked sufficiently well. A Herald  editorial from 1967 reported 
on the findings o f  the Select Committee on Education, which concluded that there 
were nowhere near the number o f  whites necessary to fill all the skilled positions, and 
even with mass immigration the Committee foresaw greater job integration as 
necessary/ 1 Even in light o f  this Report, the Smith government, instead o f  filling 
these positions with non-whites, relied solely upon immigration to import these skills, 
and even made moves to harden job reservation for whites. Consequently, troubling 
gaps opened up and remained in many areas o f  the economy, especially in the 
professional and engineering fields, which immigration was unable to fully satisfy. 
Even so, Smith’s government was pulled by contrary pressures, one economic and the 
other political, and any serious effort to soften white preserve to address skill 
deficiencies would have meant political suicide for Smith, net migration losses, and 
probably an end to the UDI experiment.
White society was not uniform in its beliefs regarding job reservation, 
however. The commercial, business, and industrial communities felt most keenly the 
squeeze on their bottom lines o f  having positions remain unfilled when a massive
7 'Basic to the Report', Editorial, RH, 8 May 1967.
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untapped pool of cheap labour longed to work. Many employers wanted to hire 
Africans to fill white jobs, even if it meant that several Africans would be required to 
fulfill each component part of what was formerly one white job. This idea was known 
as ‘job fragmentation,’ and was bitterly contested by the white labour unions who 
advocated instead for what they called ‘the rate for the job,’ which locked certain jobs 
into a set wage for one worker. This union policy, which was later taken up as the 
RF’s official policy, was ostensibly non-racial, but it was in practice and intention 
another form of job reservation for whites, as the rate set for any job was high enough 
to preclude an African from charging that amount. The President of the Association 
of Mineworkers was reported to have stated in 1969: “The greatest fear of the white 
workman in Rhodesia today was that his job would sooner or later be done by an 
African for less pay, resulting in his having to leave the country...” He continued, 
“We are fighting to maintain wages and conditions and we intend that the white
CO
workman will not be booted out of the country to make way for ‘cheaper labour.’” 
That statement reflected the nub of the issue from the white labourers’ perspective, 
and this threat of a white exodus in the wake of job fragmentation was taken seriously 
by Smith’s government and stiffened its resolve in stopping fragmentation, even if it 
resulted in greater economic troubles. Nonetheless, out of necessity job 
fragmentation did still occur in some sectors, notably in the Rhodesian Railways and 
the building industry to the extent that these areas became increasingly Africanised.59
Africans’ economic aspirations were thwarted at two levels by the Rhodesian 
political and economic system. At the peaks of the economic pyramid there were the 
Swiss cheese holes that remained open but reserved for white immigrants, in spite of 
the fact that more and more Africans were obtaining the qualifications and skills 
necessary to fill these positions. Consequently, African school-leavers with advanced 
degrees filled the unemployment queues in the cities vying for the limited 
opportunities available to them, while the state vigorously solicited white immigrants 
to fill open positions in the economy. In addition to the sacrosanct white job 
reservation at the top, the post-UDI immigrants took up unskilled or semi-skilled 
positions that had previously been the sole preserve of Africans.60 The introduction of
58 ‘’Cheap Labour’ Issue Worries Mineworkers’, RH, 21 October 1969.
59 ‘Need Anybody Suffer?’, Editorial, RH, 22 October 1969.
60 For anecdotal evidence o f this phenomenon, see: Mr. Samuriwo’s statements to the Committee o f  
Supply, August 1, 1969, col. 1063. Samuriwo pointed out that the job of parking meter readers used to
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these new less-skilled immigrants, particularly the Portuguese, angered African 
politicians. They were derogatorily referred to as “fish ffyers” 61 by many African 
MPs because of the large numbers who worked at fish-and-chip shops in the cities. 
But it is important to note that these new immigrants’ skills and qualifications were
A9not only derided by Africans, but also by longstanding white residents.
After further job integration was quashed by the RF government and more 
intensive education programmes for whites continued to prove insufficient, Rhodesian 
immigration was solely charged with providing Rhodesia with much-needed skilled 
labour, but predominately those who immigrated after UDI were less skilled than 
those who were leaving, and serious skills gaps remained in the economy. The extent 
of any ‘brain drain’ was hotly contested in and out of Parliament, although by the mid 
1970s it was clear that Rhodesia was suffering a net loss in skills due to migration. 
The persistence of these skills gaps added to the frustrations of the rising African 
educated classes. In addition, the new immigrants did not only fail to redress the 
skills shortage, but challenged Africans for their positions, piling a further layer of 
racial tension to Rhodesia’s race relations, without solving any of the regime’s 
economic problems.
The Formation and Evolution of the State’s Immigration Policy
The immigration policies of the RF governments reflected various efforts to 
negotiate the conflicting pressures of domestic politics, economic need, other 
demographic re-balancing policies, and the overriding desire of the Party’s right-wing
ATto bring in “more white faces.” While there was a general consensus in the RF that 
there needed to be more white faces, how to achieve this without threatening
be one that was exclusively African, but was then a European job. In a follow-up speech, RF 
backbencher Mr. Pinchen, claimed the new Europeans could probably read meters better than their 
African predecessors. See also, Mr. Rubatika, Committee o f Supply, August 1, 1969, col. 1076. 
Rubatika claimed beer sellers use to be an African job, but was then European. He went on to say that 
new immigrants also threatened African jobs in the building industry and in clerical work.
61 African MPs were very hostile to the non-British character o f white immigration after UDI. One 
MP, Mr. Maposa, said: “You see in the cafe’s at night many areas have become either Portuguese, 
Greek or whatever you may prefer to call them. These are not the immigrants the Minister says are 
carefully selected. The number is increasing. At one time I heard there were more than 35,000 
Portuguese, most o f whom are no better than any African really...” Parliamentary Debates, ‘Committee 
of Supply Vote’, 29 September 29 1977, col. 295.
62 ‘Immigrants Hit for Rudeness’, RH, letter from S.G. Brown, 26 June 1972.
63 Parliamentary Debates, ‘Committee o f Supply Vote’, 29 January 1970.
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unemployed whites in Rhodesia, appearing blatantly racist and thereby derailing other 
demographic policy goals, or upsetting the social and economic structure o f  Rhodesia, 
was a complex and subtle task.
The Rhodesian Front, under Winston Field, won the 1962 election in Rhodesia 
on the platform that concessions to African nationalism and multiracialism had gone 
too far, and under their rule would progress no further. Rhodesia was to be secured in 
white hands in perpetuity, even if  this meant illegally cutting their ties with Britain. 
Though population anxieties had long been present among the Rhodesian right- 
wing— even Field himself had at one time forcefully argued for the creation o f  a white 
peasant class64— once in power, Field did very little to positively re-balance racial 
ratios, even after the 1962 census revealed the contours o f  the racial population gap. 
Field’s immigration policy remained exactly as had been his predecessor Edgar 
Whitehead's: highly selective.65 Specifically, Field kept in place the capital 
requirements, the pro-British bias, and the guiding principle o f  selective immigration 
that there be, “No direct competition with people already in the country.''66 
Immigration therefore required openings to fill as a prerequisite, and coming to 
Rhodesia on spec was discouraged. As a result o f  this inactivity on the demographic 
front, dissatisfied Rhodesian Front backbenchers regularly challenged the Minister in 
charge o f  immigration to defend Field's restrictive immigration policy in light o f  the
67 . .iperceived need for more whites. The H erald 's opinion page also reflected wider 
signs o f  public discontent, that despite the RF's election, Rhodesia was still bleeding 
whites through emigration and there seemed to be no plan to replace them. ' This all 
combined to create a pervasive sense o f  frustration over the unfulfilled promises that 
surrounded Field's tenure. It was an internal RF coup in April o f  1964 that removed 
Field from the premiership in favor o f  the man whom the right-wing believed would 
declare UDI, plug the emigration leak, and permanently secure white rule: Ian 
Smith.69
94 S. Onslow, A Scheme.
65 See, for example: ‘In Parliament Yesterday: ‘Selective’ immigration: Field Trying to find jobs for 
Civil Servants’, RH , 2 October 1963.
66 Smith Papers, Box 016, Cabinet Minutes, ‘Immigration Policy’, 5 November 1963.
07 See for example: ‘In Parliament Yesterday: Flare-Up on Immigration’, RH. 23 July 1963.
68 See for example: ‘Too Tittle is Done to Keep Men Who Built-up Rhodesia’ letter ‘Reluctant 
Emigrant’, RH. 9 October 1963; ‘More Immigrants Essential’, letter S. Cooper, RH. 2 August 1963.
69 Meredith makes the claim that Smith partly came to power to assuage fears over white emigration, 
to stop the white flight. See Meredith p 46.
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In many ways, the policy differences between Smith and Field were greater 
than those between Whitehead and Field, and certainly this was true in the realm of 
immigration. Upon assuming the premiership, Smith immediately created a new 
cabinet position of Minister of Immigration, the first such post in Rhodesia’s history. 
The first Minister of Immigration, Roads, and Tourism was Harry Reedman, a 
businessman with a long history of interest in immigration issues. The creation of the 
post, and the appointment of Reedman to fill it, indicated a renewed interest in 
immigration and was an expression of the urgency in which these population issues
nr\
had risen in the public mind. Reedman had long believed in mass white 
immigration and a dramatic widening of the selectivity net to allow in more whites, 
regardless of their skills set. An attache from the British High Commission in 
Salisbury was describing Reedman’s reputation in Rhodesia when he wrote, “Mr. 
Reedman is renowned for his grandiose visions, bordering on the grotesque, of large-
71scale immigration into Rhodesia. ” Even before entering the Cabinet, Reedman 
conceived of Rhodesia’s future immigration policy as resembling Australia’s and pre- 
War America’s, and explicitly targeted racial population parity as the ultimate goal of
79his immigration policy. To justify this mass immigration, Reedman made the 
absurd assertion that whites must come to defend Rhodesia from the Chinese, who
7*1
would soon come to Africa in large numbers to settle. Reedman was prone to 
making such outlandish claims and wa^awfo) at the management of the public’s 
expectations, and as a result did much to discredit mass immigration as a viable policy 
goal.74 Once in the Cabinet, Reedman pushed hard for approval of an ambitious, 
albeit impossibly vague, mass immigration scheme, but after debate the full Cabinet 
did not approve of the magnitude or design of the scheme advocated by Reedman.
But while rejecting Reedman’s particular plan, the Cabinet did agree as early as July 
1964 that, “[it was] essential to have a bold immigration policy, as the African
70 Letter from NAI French, British High Commission, to JN Allen o f the Rhodesia Department, 13 
January 1965, DO 183/885.
71 Letter from a member o f the British High Commission, NAI French, to JN Allen of the Rhodesia 
Department, 13 January 1965, DO 183/885.
72 Parliamentary Debates, Committee o f Supply Vote, 22 September 1964, col. 660.
73 Oddly enough, some African MPs agreed with Reedman’s assertion of the threat of mass Chinese 
settlement, but posited that the best way to foreclose this possibility was to continue to have large 
African families and resist calls for the state’s family planning schemes. Parliamentary Debates, Vol. 
63, ‘Motion: Family Planning’, 9 March 1966.
74 Reedman said, “with tremendous developments ahead, Southern Rhodesia was capable of 
supporting 40,000,000-50,000,000 people at a high standard o f living.” Parliamentary Debates, 
‘Committee o f Supply Vote’, 22 September 1964, col. 653.
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75population would double itself in 20 years and the ratio should be reduced.”
Therefore by July 1964, only three months after Smith’s rise to the premiership, his 
Cabinet had already accepted mass immigration as a policy principle. But mass 
immigration as a principle was not the same thing as planning for mass immigration, 
and as his Cabinet decided to drop selectivity requirements and form a new 
Immigration Promotion Department, it proceeded ahead without any plans to absorb a
7 f \large influx. Stating this new policy, the Cabinet agreed “that the doors should be 
opened wide immediately to everyone of European stock, subject to health 
requirements and police records...[and that] all selection should be removed which
77would militate against mass immigration...” Expressly linking white immigration 
to African natural increase, the Cabinet continued that “the target must be to reduce
7 0
the present ratio of 16:1 Africans to Europeans to 5:1, and as soon as possible.” No 
fuller explanation was offered in the meeting for the target ratio of 5:1; however it 
was most likely that it was the goal of a ratio more similar to that of South Africa’s at 
the time, which was very nearly 5:1. The South African ratio of 5:1 as a goal would 
certainly make sense, as the South African state was in 1964 politically secure and 
seemingly inviolable, a situation envied by Rhodesian settlers. These first Cabinet 
meetings under the new Smith government unequivocally refuted subsequent 
government denials of racial goals behind the state’s immigration policies, as mass 
unselective white immigration was explicitly intended to match, if not overtake, 
African natural increase, and indicated a sharp break from past Rhodesian 
governments in terms of immigration policy.
Reedman was replaced as Immigration Minister by Jack Howman in July 
1965. Howman was initially welcomed by the Herald as a more moderate and sober- 
minded choice for the position, which was then combined with the Ministries of
7 0Information and Tourism. Howman, who was in Winston Field’s Cabinet and 
resigned after the promotion of Smith to the Premiership, was always more moderate 
in his political stances than the dogmatic right-wing members of the Rhodesian Front. 
He significantly reduced the inflated expectations regarding immigration brought 
about by Reedman with a much more pragmatic approach, and reset Rhodesia’s
75 Smith Papers, Box 017, Cabinet Minutes, ‘Immigration Policy’, 8 July 1964.
76 Smith Papers, Box 017, Cabinet Minutes, ‘Immigration Policy’, 21 July 1964.
77 Smith Papers, Box 018, Cabinet Minutes, ‘Immigration Policy’, 18 July 1964.
78 Smith Papers, Box 018, Cabinet Minutes, ‘Immigration Policy’, 18 July 1964.
79 ‘Immigration: Back to Earth’, Editorial, RH, 28 June 1965.
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policy away from the goal o f  racial parity. Upon taking up his Ministerial post,
Howman agreed with the Finance Minister that immigration promotion efforts would
80be suspended and assisted passages phased out until more opportune moments arose. 
But even as promotion efforts eased, immigration during 1965 was surprisingly robust 
indicating a recovery from the post-Federation doldrums, despite the rhetoric from 
pro-UDI Rhodesians that immigration numbers would swell only after independence. 
Thus, despite being one part o f  the larger package o f  justifications for UDI, 1965 was 
a very good year for immigration and it was actually much harmed by UDI in the 
short term. In July 1967, after an extended cessation o f  promotion activities before 
and after UDI, there was launched a new immigration drive by re-instituting an 
assisted passage scheme, advertising in overseas publications, and by asking 
Rhodesians to forward on propaganda literature to their contacts abroad.81 At the 
same time, and in seemingly contradictory fashion, Howman argued for a reinstitution 
of  earlier selectivity requirements even as he called for a new influx, and argued that 
Rhodesia already had a large reservoir o f  unskilled labour, and that, ‘'in any case, 
uncontrolled immigration could lead to the growth o f  a ‘white trash' element and
o?
ultimately generate embarrassing problems in regards to [racial] segregation."1- The 
Cabinet rejected Howman's call for greater selectivity, and maintained the lax entry
83standards for whites instituted during Reedman’s term. In a Cabinet shuffle in 1968, 
Howman took up a different Ministerial portfolio and was replaced by PK Van der 
Byl.
Van der Byl was an Afrikaner, which was in itself quite significant in the post
o f  Minister o f  Immigration, as it was a clear signal o f  Smith's new vision o f  a white 
Rhodesia not riven by the age-old rivalry between the British and the Afrikaners. 
Indeed, much o f  Rhodesia’s early immigration policy was explicitly designed to 
exclude Afrikaners from immigrating to Rhodesia. His first term in office was the 
high water mark o f  post-UDI Rhodesia, and this general success was both reflected 
by, and spurred on by, immigration successes. During his tenure, Van der Byl 
expanded the scope of  Rhodesia's incentive programmes to entice new immigrants. 
Internationally, this was very much a ‘sellers' market,’ with demand for skilled
80 Smith Papers. Box 019, Cabinet Minutes, ‘Immigration: Assisted Passages Scheme’, 20 July 1965.
81 ‘Immigration Offensive: Howman announces new assisted passage scheme: Advertising campaign
to be launched'. RH , 28 July 1967.
s~ Smith Papers, Box 021, Cabinet Minutes, ‘Immigration Policy’, 5 April 1967.
s' Smith Papers, Box 021, Cabinet Minutes, ‘Immigration Promotion', 16 May 1967.
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immigrants exceeding supply, and demand-side countries vying for immigrants 
through offering competing incentives. Rhodesia’s assisted passages programme was 
the most widely known of these incentives and it mirrored similar assisted passage 
programmes by Australia and South Africa. As was argued to Parliament, “Study 
throughout the world indicates that unless you provide assistance to immigrants you 
cannot get these immigrants. Australia does it, New Zealand does it, South Africa
O A
does it and if we are to get the immigrants we need we must [do so as well].” Tax 
incentives, state-subsidised housing, and postponement of immigrants’ military 
service were all also introduced. Van der Byl organised more unorthodox 
immigration drives as well: mailing unsolicited literature to selected localities abroad,
85asking Rhodesians to send out literature to friends and relatives abroad, and he even 
once appealed to Rhodesians to open up their homes to allow new immigrants to stay
o/
with them until they settled in. In another campaign in 1969, he initiated an 
immigration contest in which citizens sought to attract the most positive immigration 
responses from their foreign contacts: first prize was a free weekend holiday in 
Rhodesia, second place was a new refrigerator, and third place was a new record
on
player. The most famous of all Rhodesia immigration campaigns, though, was the
massively conceived, but ill-fated, Settler ’74 campaign, which again asked 
Rhodesians to draw on their foreign contacts in an effort envisioned to attract
QD
hundreds of thousands of whites. In forms mailed to residents and in large cut-out 
advertisements in Rhodesian newspapers, current residents were informed of the 
benefits of large-scale immigration: “They will enjoy a much better life out here, and
84 Parliamentary Debates, Committee o f Supply Vote, 31 August 1967, col. 1721.
85 Van der Byl did not create these direct mailing out of whole cloth, however, as Howman had first 
introduced them in 1967. See for example, ‘100,000 Air Letters Used to Launch Drive for 
Immigrants’, RH, 29 July 1967.
86 After a Herald letter-writer asked if  Van der Byl himself would open up his home, he declined, 
claiming his home was used to accommodate visiting VIPs. See ‘Van der Byl is Unable to House 
New-comers’, RH, 17 February 1968.
87 See ‘More Immigrants-‘Greater Prosperity” , RH, 22 March 1969. George Rudland, Minister 
without portfolio, handed out prizes to winners o f the recent immigration competition. Mr. Rudland 
presented Dr James Dick, o f Salisbury, with the first prize o f tickets for a six day Flame Lily Holiday 
(donated by Air Rhodesia); Mr. and Mrs. Jeff Healey, o f Salisbury, with the second prize o f a 
refrigerator (donated by Atlantis Electric Company); and Mr. and Mrs. Ernest McGarry, o f Bulawayo, 
with the third prize of a radiogram (donated by Wholesale Radio Supplies Ltd).”
88 For the nationalists perspective on this campaign see: Zimbabwe Review, ZAPU’s weekly organ, 12 
January 1974. The British government’s FCO speculated in a confidential memorandum that the 
Settlers ’74 drive was designed to take advantage of the energy crisis in the UK and Western Europe. 
FCO 36/1766.
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OQ
they’ll ensure YOUR future. So do them, and yourself, a favour.” But already by 
February 1974, the government had retreated from its earlier rhetoric of a million 
potential immigrant names, and set a more measured and decidedly less ambitious 
tone.90 In the end, the Settler ’74 campaign was an enormous failure; the original goal 
of 100,000 immigrants was soon reduced to 10,000, by May 1974, only 4,200 names 
of potential immigrants had been received, and the campaign was soon abandoned 
altogether.91
_._Jn spite of Van der Byl’s creative energies, the Rhodesian state faced 
4remendousJe^al barriers to immigration promotion that hindered large-scale 
immigration. The United Nations imposed selective sanctions in 1966 and mandatory 
comprehensive sanctions in 1968. The 1968 sanctions included a section on 
emigration to Rhodesia, and it was followed in Britain by domestic legislation 
forbidding the solicitation or encouragement of emigration to Rhodesia from Britain. 
Rhodesia’s informal, decentralised, and outsourced methods of immigration 
promotion were necessary after these restrictions, as this UK legislation closed off
09access to the mainstream media. In 1970, Van der Byl described this difficulty in 
promoting abroad:
Immigration promotion is subject to UN mandatory sanctions and it is subject 
to a special Order-in-Council of the British government. It is second only to 
one or two of our commodities as regards the degree of difficulty which 
sanctions have inflicted on us. The fact of the matter is that we are very 
limited indeed as to the avenues in which we can promote immigration, 
because it is forbidden in practically every country in the world for us to place 
newspaper advertisements, which were the main source of immigration 
promotion in the past. But nonetheless we do find—and I am not going to go 
into any detail on this—we do find ways of doing it from time to time.93
In Britain in 1974, The Economist and The Spectator magazines were both 
prosecuted for placing immigration advertisements in violation of this Order and were 
fined.94 Blocked from these wider circulation outlets, Rhodesia also targeted regional 
newspapers and page-turning special-interest periodicals such as Accountancy Age,
89 Settler ’74 Advertisement by Ministry o f Information, Immigration, and Tourism, RH, 1 January 
1974.
90 ‘Settler ’74 ‘Only if  There is Work” , RH, 18 February 1974.
91 See Godwin and Hancock, p 138.
92 See Van der Byl, Committee o f Supply, 28 July 1970, col. 886.
93 See Van der Byl, Committee o f Supply, 28 July 1970, col. 886.
94 FCO 36/1716
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Bridge Magazine, and The Ophthalmic Optician.95 The British Department of Public 
Prosecutions (DPP) was initially unwilling to prosecute these ‘small fish’ violations 
because of the undeserved publicity they would bring, but by 1974 the British Foreign 
Office urged them to proceed, arguing that any publicity in this matter would be good 
for Britain’s image.96 The British government also limited the amount of money
97allowed to people openly emigrating to Rhodesia to a paltry sum. There were, of 
course, strategies to avoid this monetary restriction, which included claiming a 
different country as their final destination—usually South Africa—then moving on 
from there to Rhodesia. Nonetheless, despite this large loophole,(many ^ ho'm ight 
have normally been interested in Rhodesia were certainly turned off from taking part 
in such cloak and dagger activities.
Rhodesia’s immigration promotion efforts suffered from its international 
pariah status. It became a symbol for many inside of Britain and the West of obdurate 
white settler colonialism: racist and pernicious. Most importantly in terms of 
immigration yields, Rhodesia was widely perceived as being dangerous and its 
political future unsettled. The foreign press was roundly vilified by Rhodesian state 
officials as being biased in their reporting on the military conflict and the extent of the
no
violence in Rhodesia. In response to how these negative associations overseas 
effected immigration, Ian Smith said that, “it is amazing how people, including our 
friends from South Africa, are led to believe that it is dangerous to cross the border.”99 
The social stigma of emigrating to Rhodesia was also significant in the years after 
UDI, as emigration was viewed by many to be a political act, and as such emigrants 
were deemed to be viable targets for condemnation. In 1974, the UK Council of 
Churches decided to launch a concerted effort to discourage emigration to southern 
Africa, Rhodesia included.100 Those that did make it to Rhodesia had to thus make a 
concerted effort to surreptitiously evade Britain’s monetary controls, withstand social
95 FCO 36/1716
96 FCO 36/1716
97 See for example ‘Man o f 82 can take Only L I5 to Rhodesia’, RH, 22 May 1969. “The Bank o f  
England has turned down a plea, made on compassionate grounds, to let an 82 year-old man take his 
savings to Rhodesia. Even the L50 travel allowance has been refused, and he may take only a 
maximum of L15 ‘for emergencies.’”
98 ‘Told Dreadful Things...But Immigrants Still Come to Rhodesia’, RH, 6 September 1973.
99 ‘Smith Says Immigration Will Pick Up’, RH, 24 October 1973.
i°° Churches Asked to Fight Emigration to Rhodesia’, RH, 16 April 1974.
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stigma, and settle in an illegal entity with an unclear political future—hardly as 
smooth a transition as cruising to Perth or Wellington.
For others, though, post-UDI Rhodesia became a defiant symbol—a nation 
upholding the fading British values of pride and strength; unwilling to be cowed by 
World Communism, the Afro-Asian Bloc, or an appeasing Britain. To these imperial 
sentimentalists, Rhodesia’s defiance was a positive mark influencing their emigration 
decisions. In 1974, one prospective immigrant to Rhodesia stated his reason for 
choosing Rhodesia as being, “I see Rhodesia as the last bastion of the British 
Empire.”101 Post-UDI Rhodesia became a political position that people were either 
‘for’ or ‘against.’ And Smith himself was for many years a very popular figure in 
Britain, drawing supportive crowds, as well as hostile crowds, whenever he arrived. 
Yet with the real barriers to migration, the political sympathy and support for 
Rhodesia among certain circles did not necessarily lead to immigration. It was one 
thing toast to ‘Old Smithy’s’ defiance in a London pub, but it was quite another thing 
to pack up and move there.
When Van der Byl left the immigration post in 1974, he was replaced by 
Wickus de Kock, another Afrikaner. During this period, net migration yields were 
temporarily inflated by the influx of Portuguese fleeing from Mozambique and
107Angola during 1975 and 1976. Behind this temporary success, though, the reality 
of a more ominous figure on the spreadsheet was growing, which was the rate of 
emigration. Emigration had been slowly increasing since the intensification of the 
guerrilla war in 1972 and rose steadily as the war progressed. Though the upward 
blip of Portuguese refugees in the mid-1970s partially obscured this fact, Rhodesia’s 
population was leaking at an even faster rate than normal. As will be discussed in 
chapter six, demands from the military conflict put pressure on immigration as well as 
emigration. The grace period during which new immigrants were free from military
1 OTservice was reduced from two to five years in 1975, but even the existence of this 
reduced grace period aroused some resentment among current residents,104 and
101 ‘Why Rhodesia? Prospective Immigrants Give Reasons for their Choice’, RH, 8 February 1974.
102 Immigration Minister De Kock explained this influx thus: “We have had a considerable increase in 
the numbers o f persons o f Portuguese extraction from Mozambique, in particular, who come to settle in 
this country which is attractive to them...May I say without any hesitation that we urge Rhodesians to 
welcome these people who wish to come and settle in this country...” Parliamentary Debates, 
‘Committee o f Supply Vote’, 22 July 1975, col. 1142.
103 ‘Call-Up Net Tightens on Immigrants from Today’, RH, 1 August 1975.
104 ‘Immigrants’ Grace Period Ridiculous’, RH, letter from Corporal R.R., 15 March 1976.
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balancing the conflicting demands of current residents with potential immigrants and
the military conflict proved an insuperable task. Embarrassingly for the Smith
n
government, De Kock himself emigrated in 1977. ^
Following Ian Smith’s speech in 1976, which acknowledged the inevitability 
of majority rule, Rhodesia’s immigration policy shifted conceptually from building a 
white population capable of maintaining white minority rule, to building a population 
capable of securing white privilege in African majority-ruled state. These were the 
years of the patching and plugging of holes in the population dike. When Van der Byl 
took over the Ministerial post again in the fall of 1977, both he and Rhodesia were on 
the political tumble. Though large budgets were still voted in for immigration, and 
particularly for assisted passages, few were interested in immigrating to a war-torn 
Rhodesia in the late 1970s. The money voted for immigration had increased 
consistently from the mid 1960s until the mid 1970s, peaking in 1976 at R$822,000. 
Significantly, however, the amounts voted were all spent through 1975, but largest 
sum that was voted in 1976 corresponded with a drop in interest in immigration to 
Rhodesia generally, and specifically the drying up of the Portuguese influx, and only 
half of the 1976 immigration budget was actually spent. Subsequent sums voted for 
immigration spending were always more aspirational than realistic, and unspent 
money was carried over year after year, before dropping off completely in the last two 
years of settler rule, reflecting the vastly reduced potential for immigration to 
Rhodesia.105
The Rhodesia government acknowledged after the first year of Smith’s 
premiership and the dismissal of Reedman, that racial parity was an unrealistic goal 
for white immigration. It was still explicitly hoped, however, that immigration could 
serve to narrow the racial ratios closer to that of the South African state, and after the 
retrenchment around the time of UDI, the late 1960s and early 1970s witnessed 
relatively large immigration yields. The numbers of immigrants during this period 
were widely touted, but who these immigrants were, what skills they possessed, and 
where they arrived from was purposely hidden from public scrutiny. The targeted 
South African ratio was also soon abandoned as unrealistic, and immigration was 
tasked only to peg the white population to keep pace with African natural increase so 
as to hold current ratios, but even this humbler goal could not be achieved, and
105 Rhodesian Estimates of Expenditure Reports, 1965-1979.
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African growth rates continued to widen racial ratios. And in the final years of white 
rule, immigration served only as a partial cover to mask white emigration.
ANNUAL IMMIGRATION AND EMIGRATION OF RHODESIAN WHITES (1960-1979)'06
Year Immigrants Emigrants Net
1960 8000 7000 +1000
1961 8000 10000 -2000
1962 8000 12000 -4000
19631(17 7000 18000 -11000
1964 7000 15710 -8710
1965 11128 8850 +2280
1966 6418 8510 -2090
1967 9618 7570 +2050
1968 11864 5650 +6210
1969 10929 5890 +5040
1970 12227 5896 +6331
1971 14743 5336 +9407
1972 13966 5141 +8825
1973 9433 7751 + 1682
1974 9649 9069 +580
1975 12425 10497 + 1928
1976 7782 14854 -7072
1977 5730 16638 C . -10908
1978 4360 18069 -13709
1979‘os 3288 14472 -11184
Analysing the Post-UDI Immigration Yields
Despite the (not-so) secret policy of unselective immigration in force since the 
first months of Smith’s premiership, Van der Byl and later Ministers, still publicly 
claimed to pursue selective immigration, and never overtly sought mass immigration 
after Reedman.109 Mass unselective immigration was unpopular among many 
sections of the white community, and it was for this reason as well that the state never 
publically advocated for mass unselective immigration policy. To reconcile the 
public and secret policies, selectivity was always very loosely interpreted. Describing 
what were Rhodesia’s selectivity criteria in 1965, for instance, Howman, said: “First 
of all, that he has white skin. I think that is accepted.. .Secondly, he must be free from 
active tuberculosis.. .Thirdly, he must not be a criminal; fourthly, he must not be a
106 Figures are from the Monthly Digest o f Statistics, CSO.
107 Migration figures prior to the dissolution o f the Federation are only estimates. These were from 
the CSO Monthly Digest o f Statistics, December 1972..
108 The 1979 figure was averaged from the six months for which information could be found from the 
CSO Monthly Migration Digests and estimated out to appear as a full twelve month period. The 
available months of January, March, April, July, September, and October averaged 274 immigrants and 
1206 emigrants a month.
109 Parliamentary Debates, Committee o f Supply Vote, 10 August 1965, col. 71. There were even 
right-wing efforts to lessen the criminal bars as they pertained to immigration to allow in more white 
immigrants. Parliamentary Debates, Committee o f Supply, 12 August 1965, col. 184.
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communist.. .Then we go to the next criteria of whether or not he needs help and he is 
fitted and able to take work and contribute.”110 These were hardly restrictive 
standards by any definition, and obfuscating or deflecting scrutiny as to the specifics 
of immigration yields under these lax standards was always a difficult verbal game for 
many officials. As such, there was much controversy as to the skills of the 
immigrants that did arrive. Employment agencies found it difficult to find work for 
the new immigrants. One agency official complained the RF government was too 
unselective, and said, “This often created a system where some unqualified people 
expected to find a vacancy above their station in life.”111 Towing the official line, 
state officials always maintained that the immigrants coming in possessed new skills 
which were greatly needed in Rhodesia, and thus contested charges of any brain drain. 
It was not only Africans and employment agents, however, who questioned the 
economic and social implications of this turnover, as the lower economic class of 
many of the new immigrants was a difference noted by older residents with 
unambiguous disdain. One white resident stated in reference to the government’s 
policy, “Are we so hard up for white skins that we have to let in Europe’s riff-
119raff?” Nonetheless, during the budget debates in Parliament, the various Rhodesian 
Front Immigration Ministers consistently deflected specific questions about the skills 
and backgrounds of the new immigrants by framing immigration specifics as vital 
national security secrets hidden due to their sanctions implications.113 All that were 
ever revealed of these new immigrants were their numbers.
Some qualitative distinctions between emigrants leaving and immigrants 
arriving were harder to conceal. One characteristic noted by author Frank Clements 
was that there was a general population transfer of so-called liberals out of the country 
and more conservative or apolitical-types coming in.114 Ethnically, there was also a 
shift away from the distinct pro-British bias that earlier characterised Rhodesian 
immigration in favour of more Afrikaners and southern Europeans, particularly 
Portuguese, a reflection of affirmative state policies to extend the scope of acceptable
110 Parliamentary Debates, Vol. 62, ‘Committee o f Supply Vote’, 10 August 1965.
111 ‘Agencies Consider many Immigrants ‘Unsuitable” , RH, 15 June 1968.
112 ‘Immigrants Hit for Rudeness’, RH, letter from S.G. Brown, 26 June 1972.
113 See for example: Parliamentary Debates, Committee of Supply, 21 July 1971, col. 749.
114 Clements, Deterioration, p. 243.
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whites after UDI to include non-English speakers.115 Portuguese immigrants became 
a conspicuous element in white Rhodesia, especially after the Lisbon coup, and 
despite efforts on the part of the state to welcome non-British whites into white 
society, there was significant residual xenophobia.116 To combat this resistance to 
non-British immigrants, state officials regularly pleaded with Rhodesians to welcome 
in these new residents.117 In keeping with the vision of a broader white Rhodesia, 
immigration promotional literature in the 1970s was printed in six other European
1 I o
languages not including English. In the early 1970s, there were even plans to 
consider the implementation of crash courses in English for new arrivals.119 It is 
interesting to note, that it was often the African MPs who were the ones who protested 
most strongly against the non-British character of Rhodesian immigration after
1 90UDI. But the precise degree of increase of non-British immigrants after UDI is
191difficult to determine, even as it was certainly significant. Even while a broader 
pan-European vision of white Rhodesia was being promoted, this wider scope of 
desirable immigrants was never extended to include Asians or Coloureds. The 
longstanding official state policy was to admit non-Europeans only if  it was in the 
national interest or out of a humanitarian concern, and this never changed even during 
acute skills shortages.122 Indeed, in 1969, despite the fact that capital influx was one
115 The Cabinet decided as early as 1964 that, “In general it should be accepted government policy 
that no persons should be refused entry into the country for purposes o f immigration solely on the 
grounds o f a lack o f knowledge o f English.” Smith Papers, Box 017, Cabinet Minutes, ‘Immigration: 
Conditions for Entry’, 24 November 1964.
116 Smith Papers, Box 023, Cabinet Minutes, ‘Miscegenation, Prostitution and Allied problems’, 24 
August 1971.
117 ‘Plea to Aid ‘Foreign Language’ Migrants Settle’, RH, 10 July 1970.
118 Parliamentary Debates, Committee o f Supply, 22 July 1975, col. 1140.
119 ‘English for Immigrants’, RH, 18 July 1970.
120 “I would like to advise the Minister that we do not want immigration from Greece. We do not 
want immigration from Greece, and we do not want immigration from Israel. This country has been 
civilised by English people and our immigration must be fixed from the English speaking people.” 
Parliamentary Debates, Committee o f Supply, 31 August 1967, col. 1682.
121 In an answer to a suggestion o f stationing a linguist at various immigration posts, Van der Byl 
claimed that, “still at this stage 80% o f our immigrants are in fact English speaking,” and thus 
concluded that a linguist would not be cost effective. Parliamentary Debates, Committee o f Supply, 9 
August 1973, col. 1680. The most accurate description of the national breakdown after the post-UDI 
period was from 1974. The then Minister of Immigration asserted that the origins o f the immigrant 
coming in 1974 were as follows: UK 31%, South Africa 27%, Portugal 11%, Zambia 7%, Australia 
3%, Greece 2%, Malawi 1%, Botswana 1%, Italy 1%, USA 1%, Holland 1%, and Others 12%. 
Parliamentary Debates, Committee o f Supply, 12 February 1975, col. 1261. However, since 
immigration officials only recorded the countries o f departure not migrants’ nationalities, these 
numbers must be taken with qualification.
122 Smith papers, Box 024, Cabinet Minutes, ‘Immigration Policy: Permanent Residence: Non- 
Europeans’, 7 September 1971.
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justification for white immigration and the need for foreign exchange was pressing, 
Van der Byl declared that the idea of bringing in rich Indians was “ridiculous.”
Post-UDI Rhodesia also received more than its share of kooks, criminals,124 
racists, and misfits.125 Especially in the later 1970s, an odd amalgam of the 
disaffected, the opportunistic, and the radical showed up in Rhodesia. Time Magazine 
reported that large numbers of “carpet-baggers” and “bargain hunters seeking a cheap 
way to live in a style they could not afford anywhere else” were trickling in to 
Rhodesia. One recent arrival in 1977, who was slotted into an iron mine supervisor 
position, said: “It’s easy work. The niggers dig all the holes. You just stand over 
them.” The same article also reported embryonic chapters of both the John Birch
1 9 f \Society and the American Nazi Party sprouted-up. Consistent with these
observations, the Herald regularly reported immigrants being deported for omitting
prior convictions on their immigration forms, and the heavy publicity some of these
i 11deportations garnered were picked up in Parliamentary debates. One reason 
Rhodesia let in so many dubious characters after UDI was that because of sanctions 
regulations, the source countries did not supply Rhodesia with background 
information on immigrants, and the state did not have officials in the source countries 
to vet potential immigrants, so who they actually received from their immigration 
drives was in many ways a mystery. In 1977, Van der Byl stated:
... the screening is done to the best of our ability and one must absolutely 
accept that because of the situation in which we find ourselves in this country 
there is a certain lack of cooperation, shall we say, between ourselves and 
other countries from which people coming into this country emanate, this is 
very often fraught with a considerable amount of difficulty. Therefore it does 
happen that people do get into this country who are highly undesirable and if 
whose proclivities were known before their arrival, would certainly not be let
123 Parliamentary Debates, Vol. Committee o f Supply Vote 31’, 17 January 1969.
124 There were even right-wing efforts to lessen the criminal bars as they pertained to immigration to 
allow in more white immigrants. Parliamentary Debates, Committee o f Supply, 12 August 1965, col. 
184.
125 L. Ron Hubbard, the founder o f Scientology, briefly set up his headquarters in Rhodesia, and James 
Earl Ray was believed to be making his way to Rhodesia when he was nabbed in Heathrow airport and 
extradited to the United States for killing Dr. Martin Luther King. See ‘Rhodesia-US Link in Manhunt: 
Immigration Query by Luther King Suspect: Government Assurance o f Watch is Reported’, RH, 14 
June 1968.
126 ‘Land o f Opportunity’, Time Magazine, 24 October 1977.
127 See for example, ‘Immigrant had 46 Convictions’, RH, 12 May 1973; and ‘Convicted Immigrant 
Told to Go’, RH, 13 October 1973.
128 Parliamentary Debates, ‘Committee of Supply Vote’, 29 September 1977.
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As it was, Rhodesia was forced to net them all and any sorting had to be done after 
arrival.
Tensions and Contradictions in Rhodesia’s White Migration Policies
The nature of white migration patterns to and from Rhodesia precluded 
effective planning. By the early 1970s, at the peak of the immigration influx, the 
Rhodesian economy was straining under the proportionately high rate of white 
immigration. Affordable, decent housing in particular was in short supply for new 
residents. This led to bottlenecks wherein many new arrivals left before being
190effectively slotted into the Rhodesian economy. The state undertook various 
initiatives to rapidly expand the urban infrastructure to support more whites by 
supplying furnished flats in high-density housing units and guaranteeing state loans to
1 30new immigrants for settling-in costs. Nevertheless, this housing shortage was 
never solved adequately, partially because of the inherent problems in future planning 
with such high rates of turnover in Rhodesia. Overbuilding in expectation of large 
yields led to waste, neglect, and embarrassment, and building too slowly created 
disillusionment among the new immigrants, many of whom came flushed with 
inflated expectations of life in Rhodesia. As it was, the rushed accommodations 
disappointed many new immigrants, and this ebbing of migrants was never 
contained.131 What spending there was on new immigrants also often provoked bitter
132responses from current residents who felt neglected in favour of newer arrivals.
More broadly, extensive planning of the scale first proposed by Reedman and others 
would have resulted in a radically different Rhodesia. It would have among other 
things demanded significant capital outlays from the tax coffers, which would meant
129 ‘Only Fifth of Immigrants Quit—Minister’, RH, 9 October 1970; ‘Immigrant Housing Shortage 
‘Critical” , RH, 7 August 1970.
130 ‘Helping the Immigrants,’ RH, 14 September 1970; and ‘Immigrants to get Furnished Flats’, RH, 
27 August 1970.
131 ‘Rhodesia Will Lose Immigrants’, RH, 22 December 1971; ‘Immigrants not so Keen on Low-cost 
Housing’, RH, 6 January 1972.
132 See for example, ‘Those Bom in Rhodesia Also Need Houses,’ RH, letter from M.J. Lawrence, 29 
July 1972.
133 A report by a South African academic counseled Rhodesia that a true influx would mean three 
Salisburies, three Bulawayos, three Gwelos, and three Umtalis by the end o f the century.
‘Immigration: Israel Can Teach Rhodesia’, RH, 19 May 1972.
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sacrifices on the part of current white residents, the same residents who already 
chaffed at the special treatment afforded new immigrants. As the Cabinet recognised 
as early as the mid 1960s, these sacrifices required for mass immigration would have 
eaten into the cherished standard of living enjoyed by whites, which would have 
predictably resulted in greater emigration. The state’s solution to this dilemma was to 
continue immigration promotion and ignore the more politically-sticky necessities of 
economic planning and spending that should have accompanied such policies.
Mass immigration piled on other strains to the Rhodesian economy, increasing 
the demands on schools, housing, and damaging Rhodesia’s balance of payments 
through the draining of foreign currency reserves and the exporting of remittances.134 
These economic burdens rose to the point of provoking a Cabinet debate in 1971 on 
the overall cost-benefit merits of mass immigration. Though ultimately deciding that 
immigration’s political benefits of maintaining a favourable racial balance 
outweighed the significant costs, these burdens, and the Ministerial push-back as a
i i f
result of them, never fully disappeared. Indeed, several months after the first
debate over the wisdom of mass immigration, another Cabinet memorandum was 
distributed by the Minister of Local Government and Housing outlining the problems 
associated with high immigration yields. The memorandum criticised the high rate of 
immigration as a percentage of the overall white population—4 percent as opposed to 
the purported optimal target of 1 percent—which overburdened housing and other 
services. In summation, the Minister argued that the mass immigration intended to 
save Rhodesia, could ironically “destroy the ideal conditions under which we lived in 
this country.” Acknowledging the difficulties that immigration presented, the full 
Cabinet agreed that “normally the rate of 1 percent increase was the optimum figure, 
but the position in Rhodesia was somewhat different since in many parts of the world 
the same sense of urgency did not prevail.” Rhodesia was viewed to not have the 
luxury of a more rational rate of influx, since the state needed as many white faces as 
possible, as quickly as possible. With this decision, the Cabinet again prioritised the 
political and psychological benefits of immigration over the economic and social
134 Smith Papers, Box 024, Cabinet Minutes, ‘Economic Policies Following a Political Settlement 
With Britain’, 30 November 1971.
135 Smith Papers, Box 024, Cabinet Minutes, ‘The Balance o f Payments Situation and the Economic 
Consequences’, 7 December 1971.
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burdens, reasoning that, “[immigration] was fundamental and of cardinal importance 
to the survival of the European in this part of the world.”
Conclusion
In Rhodesia’s population race between white immigration and African natural 
increase, the former was perhaps destined to lose in the long-run. Because of the 
unpredictability of economic trends and the myriad other factors that play into 
migration decisions, perhaps migration is inherently ill adapted to match the constant 
rhythm of natural increase. Comparatively, differential fertility rates seem to always 
outpace competitive migration.137 The white fertility transition had long been firmly 
entrenched in Rhodesia, and historically all political efforts to cajole or pressure 
women in post-fertility transition societies into having higher numbers of children
1 TO
have failed, and in Rhodesia, the white rate of natural increase actually declined
throughout the 1960s and 1970s. White immigration, as the main source of white 
population growth, increased the population at an arithmetic rate, by adding additional 
people—people who for whatever reason tended to not have many children in 
Rhodesia. The African natural increase, however, was geometric in its growth. As a 
result, even Rhodesia’s Herculean efforts to attract large numbers of immigrants could 
only temporarily alter their population demographics, as these immigration numbers 
were quickly eaten into by the relentless rate of Africans’ natural increase. Any 
efforts to compete with African population growth were described by one newspaper 
article as “spitting against the wind.” 139
Immigration was seen as the great hope, the panacea to cure all of Rhodesia’s 
ills. It was to increase the overall white population and ideally narrow racial ratios, 
but failing that, it was expected at very least to mask the consistent outflow of
136 Smith Papers, Box 025, Cabinet Minutes, ‘European Immigration’, 14 March 1972.
137 See for example the competitive population struggles o f the linguistic groups in Quebec and the 
Israeli/Palestinian conflict: D. Kaplan, Canada’s Linguistic Groups,; P. Fargues, ‘Protracted National 
Conflict and Fertility Change: Palestinians and Israelis in the Twentieth Century’, Population and 
Development Review, Vol. 26, No. 3 (September 2000).
138 P. Demeny, ‘Pronatalist Policies in Low Fertility Countries: Patterns, Performance, and Prospects’, 
Population and Development Review, Vol. 12 (1986). This certainly did not mean Rhodesian Front 
politicians did not try. One Rhodesian Front backbencher said the use o f birth control by white women 
was “race suicide.” Women who did practice birth control were labeled “selfish” and materialistic. 
‘Charges o f ‘Racialism’ in Debate on Family Planning’, RH, 21 April 1966.
139 ‘The African Explosion’, Financial Mail, 30 April 1971.
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migrants leaving Rhodesia. It was the failure of immigration policy to fulfill even this 
more limited role in the mid-1970s that exposed a declining population. The 
knowledge of this decline created feelings among the whites of a national rot that ate 
into Rhodesia’s internal and international legitimacy, and just as positive immigration 
represented a symbolic affirmation of Rhodesia, negative net migration indicated its 
disaffirmation and artificiality. Perhaps most importantly, as the war intensified, the 
white population decline meant that even greater pressure was put on the small 
population, who by the late-1970s were fully stretched between their military and 
economic commitments. The circle was thereby closed, such that with greater 
demands being made upon the population, there was more emigration, which in turn 
created even greater demands on those who remained which rendered Rhodesia less 
attractive to potential immigrants. This circle constricted more and more until the 
final collapse of white rule.
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Chapter VI
African Agency in the War of Numbers
As argued in earlier chapters, the consequences that flowed from the widening 
racial ratios in Rhodesia combined to play a major role in the ultimate collapse of the 
white settler regime. These racial ratios were directly related to the political fate of 
the white regime, and not merely as a proxy for decline or as a correlative factor, but 
also as a causal factor. Earlier chapters have outlined the attitudes and actions of the 
white population and the settler state in this population contest, and this chapter 
explores to what extent African nationalists were able to participate in this population 
contest. The main questions that need to be answered when analysing the agency of 
African nationalists in Rhodesia’s war of numbers are: 1) To what extent did the 
African population as a whole view these disparate racial population matters 
holistically? 2) To what extent did African nationalists have control and influence 
over the various factors that determined population trends? and 3) To what extent 
were these factors purposefully influenced in order to bring about specific political 
goals? The answers to these questions have implications as to what degree did 
African nationalists produce these dramatic demographic changes that contributed to 
independence in 1980, and to what degree was this parallel war of population 
numbers guided not by conscious political agency, but instead by forces having little 
to do with liberation politics.
White and African Perspectives on Population Matters
As we have seen, Rhodesia’s racial population ratios were the combined result 
of several components: white and African rates of natural increase, white and African 
migration patterns, and methods of population enumeration. The extent to which 
Africans viewed these diverse population components that made up these racial ratios 
holistically, as part of a wider racial population contest, was uneven across different 
regions, generations, and education levels. Different sections of the African 
population were widely divergent in their knowledge of these trends, their interest in 
engineering them for political goals, and in their capacity to influence them.
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As argued in chapter two, from the early 1960s these population numbers 
began to be deemed important, and their diverse components linked together by the 
white population. Generally, whites viewed population matters holistically, with 
fertility, mortality, and migration factors conceptualised as constituent parts of a zero- 
sum racial population contest. Most whites observed these widening racial ratios with 
a sense of dread, as they fed into older colonial fears of racial swamping and mixed 
with newer post-UDI fears of the settler regime’s viability in a post-colonial Africa. 
This holistic approach was certainly shared, and indeed nurtured by, the post-UDI 
state, and its racial population policies reflected this. Despite their characteristic 
transience, whites in Rhodesia were fairly uniform in their support of these state 
policies aimed at mitigating these expanding ratios, and as argued in chapter four, this 
transience likely solidified white political unity even as there little actual population 
continuity. Kaler argues that there was a consensus in the white community on three 
general points concerning the African population problem: 1) that African fertility 
patterns were a problem, 2) that this problem was a danger to African well-being and 
the stability of the white state, and 3) that whites had a responsibility to intervene to 
ameliorate this problem.1 Adding to Kaler’s points, there was also a consensus 
among whites to stop emigration and to stabilise or turn back the racial ratios. 
However, the specific methods to effectuate these diverse policy goals, as well as the 
end goal of such policies divided the white public. Nonetheless, there was still a high 
degree of political unity among whites behind the holistic view of population matters, 
a desire to ameliorate the effects of widening ratios, and the goal of stabilising or 
reversing racial ratio trends.
In population matters, as with other political issues, Africans were less 
unified than whites, and one of the several complications in this inquiry into the role 
of Africans in Rhodesia’s war of numbers, is that it is impossible to speak of the 
African population as a monolithic mass, who all pursued the same political goals for 
the same purposes. This was partially due to the political/sociological phenomenon of 
the relative cohesiveness of minorities versus majorities, but other factors specific to 
Rhodesia also contributed to a diversity of views, actions, and interest levels among 
the African population. There were significant cleavages within the African 
population between tribal/ethnic/regional groups, urban and rural communities, men
1 Kaler, Running, p. 29.
and women, as well as older and younger generations. While some sections of the 
African population were very active in liberation politics, many others were markedly 
uninterested in, or indeed suspicious of or opposed to, the liberation movement, and it 
is still debated what degree of political support nationalists had among the general 
African population.2 Whereas Terence Ranger traces the historical antecedents to the 
nationalist movement by emphasising the formation of a ‘peasant consciousness’ that 
rendered rural Africans a receptive audience to guerrilla appeals, Norma Kriger 
emphasises the coercive character of guerrilla/peasant relations. Gann and 
Hendriksen explore the deep divisions within African society regarding the war, and 
describe how the guerrilla war was also “a black civil war” in which “many more 
Africans died at the hands of bush fighters than did Europeans,” and where the 
guerrilla fighters were opposed not just by the Rhodesian white forces, but also by 
“traditional chiefs and headmen...an entire army of black functionaries, telegraphists, 
detectives, court interpreters and policemen...African ‘master farmers’, building 
contractors and transport operators [who] had obtained a modest, and sometimes 
considerable, degree of prosperity” who “distrusted the guerrilla’s promises.”4 
Though the nationalists and guerrillas described African opposition as ‘sell-outs,’ this 
facile labeling does not answer for the deep divisions with the African population 
regarding support for the nationalist cause. There were heated and occasionally 
violent clashes between the nationalist factions themselves, and ZAPU and ZANU, as 
was common with many liberation movements, were arguably as hostile towards one 
another as against the Rhodesian state, a situation exploited with some success by the 
white regime. Even within the different nationalist groups, Kriger describes the 
‘struggles within the struggle,’ where she highlights the generational, gendered, and 
economic conflicts within the nationalist movements. Likewise, Kaler expands on the 
gendered divisions within the guerrilla camps. As a result, any search for uniform 
African views regarding the population war, or politics generally is illusory.
Nonetheless, despite these significant divisions several general conclusions 
can be drawn as to African views and African actions concerning population matters.
2 For an interesting summary o f these debates, see S. Robins, ‘Heroes, Heretics and Historians o f the 
Zimbabwe Revolution: A Review Article o f Norma Kriger’s Peasant Voices’, Zambezia, Vol. 23, No. 1 
(1996).
3 T. Ranger, Peasant Consciousness and Guerrilla War in Zimbabwe (London, James Curry, 1985);
N. Kriger, Peasant Voices.
4 T. Ranger, Peasant Consciousness, p. 276, quoting L.H. Gann, T.H. Henriksen, The Struggle fo r  
Zimbabwe: Battle in the Bush (New York, Praeger, 1981) p. 90.
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The spectrum of African political interest from apathy to activism roughly correlated 
with the conceptualisation of racial population factors holistically, and with efforts to 
influence these factors to further political ends. Most African political leaders, both 
in Parliament and out, fully appreciated the significance of racial population matters 
in the fate of the white regime. As will be discussed, nationalist politicians and 
guerrilla leaders attempted to engineer these numbers to achieve political goals, and 
African MPs regularly attacked the state’s population policies in Parliament. For 
those less politically minded and for whom support for the nationalists was decidedly 
less warm, the linkage between population and politics was most likely less clear. For 
the great bulk of black Rhodesians, population matters did not terribly concern them, 
as generally the perception of the linkage between its diverse components was weak, 
and the desire to engineer these numbers for political purposes was by and large 
nonexistent.
An obvious question is then left: Why would it be the case that matters of such 
deep political importance as population ratios would not concern the bulk of the 
African population, especially as a war for national liberation was being waged? One 
major reason reiterates the argument made by Lann and Henriksen concerning the 
lack of any consensus within African society about direction of any political change 
from the white-ruled status quo, or indeed even if such change was desirable. But 
several other factors also contributed to this lower level of interest concerning holistic 
population issues among the African population, even among those who sympathised 
with the liberation movement. One explanation was that the vast majority of Africans 
lived in rural areas, and the influx or outflow of a few thousand whites in and out of 
the cities would not have been noticeable, or have had much of a direct impact on 
their lives.5 Whereas whites, who were overwhelmingly urban, would have been 
much more intimately aware of even subtle shifts in white migration patterns. To a 
large percentage of Africans, especially those in the TTLs, whites were a distant and 
seldom seen urban community.6 Furthermore, some of these elements, such as 
African fertility and mortality levels carried a great deal of independent significance
5 For example, between 1955 and 1979 immigration averaged only 10,207 annually and emigration 
9,983 annually, the vast majority of which occurred within Salisbury, Bulawayo, Umtali only.
Statistics derived from Rhodesian Central Statistical Office Monthly Digest reports.
6 In December 1974, for example, 81.7 percent of Rhodesian whites lived in towns. G.H. Tanser, The 
Guide to Rhodesia (Johannesburg, Winchester Press, 1975). p. 310. Since the 1950s, the 
overwhelming majority o f white immigrants came to the urban areas.
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irrespective of liberation politics, and were not readily equated with the other
n
components that did not. As will be discussed below, fertility issues had a deep 
cultural and economic importance, and any linkage to white migration was likely an 
irrelevant abstraction to most rural Africans. Generally, precise population 
information would not have been as readily available among rural Africans, especially 
those living in more remote areas, which would have militated against their tracking 
these factors with any precision even if they were so inclined. In contrast, whites 
were regularly confronted with population figures in the popular media. Moreover, 
because Africans were not in control of state administration, the direct correlation 
between racial population figures and the practical effects of these numbers—as they 
pertained to housing, education, health, other social spending, tax revenues, electoral 
roles, employment opportunities and the like—would not have been as explicitly 
addressed as they were among the white electorate. Because whites were in control of 
state administration, diverse population trends were necessarily disaggregated and 
analysed as part of state business, and population issues becoming political issues was 
a natural result of this. In this important racial population contest that was so closely 
connected with Africans’ political liberation, it is important to note that by the early 
1960s, when these trends began to be seen as being significant by most of the white 
population, these trends were all moving in a direction that harmed the white regime 
and aided the nationalist cause. This crucial population contest was thus being won 
by African nationalists without requiring much effort on the part of the winning side.
It was this reality that, more than any other reason, informed African nationalist views 
regarding population issues, and since Rhodesia’s racial population trends were 
moving in the direction in which African nationalists wanted, there was no great need 
for nationalists to mobilise the populace towards this goal. The sheer fact of winning 
without trying in this sphere of activity would obviously counsel nationalists to 
expend their limited energies elsewhere. For these reasons, population matters were 
by and large not conceptualised holistically, they did not generate the same degree of 
interest, and certainly not the same degree of urgency, among most Africans as they 
did among the white population. Yet to the frustration of the settler state and the
7 E. Schmidt, Peasants, Traders, and Wives: Shona Women in the History o f  Zimbabwe, 1870-1939
(Portsmouth, Heinemann, 1992).
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delight o f  the nationalists, the African population insouciantly continued to widen the 
population gap.
The Politicisation o f ‘Natural’ Growth Rates
The degree to which Africans were having more children and thereby 
widening the racial ratios to effectuate political ends was a sensitive issue to white 
Rhodesians. Some high-level state officials saw in African pronatalism a concerted 
effort to weaken to the state. As the Minister o f  Health callously declared in 1972, 
African politicians, “seem quite happy to see people starve as long as they can step on
o
their backs or over dead bodies to get into power." Many lower-level RF politicians 
and members o f  the rank-and-file certainly agreed with the Minister’s accusation that 
nationalists were cynically promoting higher growth rates as a method o f  weakening 
the white regime. For instance, a letter from the Sabi Valley Branch Secretary of the 
RF to the Secretary of Health from 1973 stated, “ In fact we [the Sabi Valley Branch] 
would go further and say that they [the Africans] are using the population explosion 
as a weapon against the future o f  the Europeans in this country ."9 The extent to 
which whites actually believed this, and were not merely using it as an expression o f  
frustration, or more cynically, using the intentionality accusation to propose more 
draconian birth control measures, is unclear.
Regardless o f  the sincerity o f  these white accusations, African nationalists 
took up this claim that growth rates were indeed a political weapon consciously 
employed by the African people. In a letter to the editor from 4 June 1971, Ernest 
Mpofu wrote:
... though Africans are politically silent that does not mean they are pleased 
with the present political atmosphere in this country...We, the silent majority, 
are not happily silent. We are instead busily producing more and more babies. 
That is our only weapon. We hope to flood this country with the black 
population by a huge percentage during the next decade or two. Nature is on 
our side. While the government is busy screaming for more and more 
immigrants, we are busy sending our pregnant women to the nearest clinic to 
give birth to future voices. 10
x Parliamentary Debates, Vol. 81, "Committee of Supply Vote’, 4 August 1972.
() Kaler, Running, p. 64, citing NAZ B /137/5.
10 ‘Birth-Rate Being Used As Weapon’, letter by Ernest Mpofu, RH , 5 June 1971.
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Guerrillas in the field likewise picked up this rhetoric of the weaponisation of African 
wombs. Two African women interviewed by Kaler recounted the guerrilla’s political 
speeches to villagers:
“They [the guerrillas] opposed family planning, they wanted us to have 
children who will fight in the war.” Mrs. Ngavira.
“They encouraged us to have many children, they say [the children will be] 
tomorrow’s warriors and ministers [in government].” Mrs. Mhene.11
In an article entitled, ‘Other Fronts in the Struggle,’ ZAPU’s Zimbabwe Review 
explicitly declared that a population war was occurring and African birth rates were a 
key militarised front:
Next to the insecurity the enemy fears from the gutting red-hot barrels of guns 
is the preponderantly engulfing population increase of the 
Zimbabweans...There are eighteen Zimbabweans to one settler racist... They 
see the power of the Zimbabwean population and the armed struggle ending 
their dreams of a permanent paradise of economic monopoly and fictitious 
class of a so-called privileged race. It is as though a rock is about to fall on 
them—and indeed it is—hence their frantic abuse of the idea of family 
planning among Africans...One of the urgent needs of Zimbabweans is a 
greater rate of population increase necessitated not only by demanding space
19but also by the dictates of the armed liberation struggle.
Yet as again with white politicians, it must be questioned the degree to which African 
guerrillas truly believed the high growth rates were a result of liberation politics. 
Ascribing political motivations to the high fertility rates already occurring offered 
obvious advantages to the guerrillas, as it presented at least the illusion of greater 
control. As it was, it was doubtful that many women avoided using birth control to 
bolster the guerrilla armies or to drop a ‘rock’ on the white enemy. These private 
decisions to have more children were much more likely the results of intra-familial 
negotiations, and represented local social pressures, such as the possible return of 
lobola from the wife’s family or the fear of husbands taking additional wives if more 
children were not forthcoming, than out of the desire to further liberation politics. Yet
11 Kaler, Running, p. 194.
12 Zimbabwe Review, 17 November 1973.
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the idea of African fertility being a political weapon was continually employed by 
both sides of the population contest.
The Nexus Between Population and Land
Land scarcity in Rhodesia was historically the most emotive and most pressing 
grievance of the African peasants, and it was closely linked to African population 
growth. As argued in chapter three, the economic and political pressures that were 
intensified by African 'overpopulation' always reflected a distributive and allocative 
problem rather than an absolute scarcity problem. Structural racial inequalities 
thoroughly permeated the social, economic, and political spheres in Rhodesia, but it 
was the inequitable racial division of land which symbolically represented all such 
inequalities. It was white encroachment on African lands that served as the impetuses 
for the Ndebele rebellion in 1893 and the 1896-7 rebellion by the Shona and Ndebele. 
And it was because of these rebellions that the British colonists first decided to create 
African Reserve lands that would be off-limits to white purchasers. The Land 
Apportionment Act o f  1930 locked into place the racialised division o f  land in 
Rhodesia. This Act was updated and replaced by the Land Tenure Act in 1969, which 
re-divided the land in Rhodesia, allotting 47 percent o f  the total land area for
13exclusive white usage, and 53 percent for exclusive African usage. ~ The roughly 
equal division o f  land on paper was grossly unequal in regards to the quality o f  the 
land, and in terms o f  the population densities on their respective lands. The white 
population in white-assigned rural areas averaged one person per square mile, 
whereas Africans in the African rural areas averaged 45.8 persons per square mile, 
and in the Tribal Trust Lands this population density was much higher . 14 In stark 
contrast to the densely populated African lands, much o f  the white lands were 
unoccupied, which amounted to almost one tenth o f  the total white land area in 
1961.15 These divergent population densities on white and African lands were 
exacerbated by the contrary demographic trends o f  whites and Africans occurring
13 N. Kriger, Peasant Voices, pp. 52-53.
14 Kriger, Peasant Voices, p. 54.
Ir> Kriger, Peasant Voices, p. 54, citing M. Yudelman, Africans on the Land (Cambridge, Harvard 
University Press, 1964).
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through the 1960s and 1970s. Land issues and population issues were thus 
inextricably intertwined.
Tapping into African peasants’ pre-existing grievances over land scarcity was 
the most effective method of guerrilla propaganda. It also was the primary vehicle for 
African guerrillas’ appeals to cultural nationalism, as the discourse between guerrillas 
and African peasants was filtered and translated through the language of land 
metaphors. Land issues served as a flexible metaphor to broader themes of whites’ 
dispossession of African traditions, of African manhood, and the nation’s overall 
well-being, and could be analogised to other grievances so as to gamer wider support 
for the guerrilla movement. This method of discourse was, for example, used by 
ZANLA guerrillas in the field, as Commissar Comrade Zeppellin recounted to Julie 
Frederickse:
We would get into an area, study the problems in that particular area, and then
teach those people about their problems, how we can solve them by fighting
the enemy... we would tell them, ‘It’s you, the people of Zimbabwe, of this
area, who should have been in the areas where there are those farmers who are
getting a lot from the rich land. They’ve thrown you out of the rich land so
that you don’t get anything,’ and of course, then the people would like very
much to have that land which they did not have. In fact, overall, the land*16question was our major political weapon. The people responded to it.
By combining white immigration with land dispossession, guerrilla propagandists had 
little further work to do to link white emigration with land repossession. A popular 
Chimurenga song, “Maruza Vapambi Pfumi” encapsulated this linkage:
They come to Zimbabwe from Germany, America, Britain, fleeing from 
hunger in their own lands, seeing it was a black land, full of milk and honey. 
Our land, we the black people.. .It was not long before we saw them moving 
into our land of Zimbabwe. These oppressors were arrogant people, people 
with long trousers, who thought only of themselves and cared nothing for the 
Zimbabwean people, who were the rightful owners of the land.. .So we 
showed the people of Zimbabwe that when the oppressor is seen acting in such 
a manner it is time for him to go home; where his troubles are many and the1Twomen are lazy ...
16 T. Ranger, Peasant Consciousness, pp. 178-179, quoting Frederickse, None But Ourselves, p. 61.
17 T. Ranger, Peasant Consciousness, p. 170.
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Promises were made by guerrillas to peasants at political meetings to win support, and 
often these promises centered on repossessing lost lands by forcibly removing the 
whites. This meant both the more abstract political repossession of Zimbabwe, and the 
concrete sense of physically removing whites and repossessing their lands. Kriger 
quotes Africans from the Mutoko region recounting ZANLA political promises to 
African villagers:
Parents, you can’t live like this in the mountains. You must go and live in the 
valleys on the white farms...Whites have everything: cars, enough to eat, nice 
houses. You have nothing.. .The chief enemy was the white man. If he were 
driven off the land, there’d be enough land for everyone and people could1 ftplough and live where they liked.
Population density provided the linkage between land and population, and as African 
overpopulation in rural areas intensified these land grievances, it also provided more 
willing populations for guerrilla support. Since so much of the land was reserved for 
whites, and only sparsely occupied, the scarcity problems in the African areas that 
were intensified by high growth rates were recognised by politicised Africans to be a 
political rather than a purely demographic construct. An article in ZAPU’s political 
organ, the Zimbabwe Review, entitled, “Land: Rhodesia’s Powder Keg,” stated:
Four million are allotted less than 42 percent of the land whilst 6 percent of 
the population has exclusive rights over 58 percent of Rhodesian soil.. .Thus 
in fact, the bulk of the African population lives in and cultivates 21 million 
acres or 22 percent of the land surface... Population increase from 1931 had 
resulted in serious overcrowding in the African Reserves, the land formally 
allocated to every family had further to be subdivided into yet smaller plots. 
Every household was allocated a maximum of six acres, and livestock had to 
be drastically reduced since grazing land had become scarce.. .Under the guise 
of land consolidation, the African people were systematically dispossessed of 
rich land and driven to arid areas to give room to the new overlords—the 
white settlers.19
ZANU’s political organ, the Zimbabwe News, identified the essentially distributive 
nature of African overpopulation problem in this 1968 article entitled, “Battle Cry: 
Forward with the War of the Peoples’ Liberation—Chimurenga”:
18 Kriger, Peasant Voices, p. 98.
19 ‘Land: Rhodesia’s Powder Keg,’ Zimbabwe Review, No. 9, 24 October, 1966, in A. Braganca, I. 
Wallerstein, Liberation Reader, pp. 57-58.
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Confronted with the 4 Vi million peasants and workers in Zimbabwe, the !4 
million white settlers acknowledge that fact that they are a negligible 
minority... In most cases the European farms are just lying idle because, either 
the owners have no interest in developing them, or are now too rich to farm 
them, whereas Africans are packed like sardines in the so-called reserves 
where subsistence agriculture alone cannot support a reasonable standard of 
life.20
An article from ZAPU’s Zimbabwe Review entitled, ‘Genocide Economics in 
Rhodesia,’ echoed this same point: “...there is plenty of land in Zimbabwe: only that 
the greater and better part of it has been greedily appropriated by the white minority 
therein; and a lot of this white-grabbed land is just lying idle.. .”21 The Zimbabwe 
Review succinctly argued that family planning was actually an effort by the settler 
state to conform the African population to their reduced economic role in Rhodesia:
After depriving the African people of their cattle, thus putting an economic 
squeeze on the Africans, the settlers are now seeking to trim and tie down the 
size of African families to that squeeze.. .An African family which surrenders 
itself to be trimmed to the economy of the settlers is not helping itself at all but 
is contributing to the fortunes of the settlers.. .22
In an editorial addressing the Sadie Report’s recommendations to reconfigure 
Rhodesia’s population, the ZAPU’s Zimbabwe Review queried:
Rhodesia is three times the size of England. England with its small land area 
carries a population of more than 50 million people. Zimbabwe with its large 
land area carries a small population of 4.5 million. In short, whilst Rhodesia is 
about three times the size of England, England’s population is twelve times
0 "Xthe population of Zimbabwe. So what is family planning for?
African nationalists obviously had their own ideas of what state’s population 
policy was really for, and it had little to do with the state’s purported rationale of the 
amelioration of African suffering in the rural areas. The nationalists actively sought 
to communicate these alleged ulterior motives to the African people through their 
propaganda campaigns.
20 Zimbabwe News, July-September 1968.
21 Zimbabwe Review, 26 July 1969.
22 ‘African Population-Growth Strangulation’, Zimbabwe Review, January/February 1970.
23 ‘Birth Control’, Zimbabwe Review, 5 July 1969.
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Nationalist Propaganda
African nationalists affected the various components of Rhodesia’s 
demography unevenly, yet through different forms of propaganda the nationalists 
attempted to synthesise these different components into a comprehensive and easily 
understandable population policy and thereby impute a greater degree of control than 
that which existed. Regardless of their respective causality in each of these factors, 
nationalists propagandised about racial population issues consistently through the 
1960s and 1970s.24 The forms taken by nationalist propaganda can be divided
25between what can be characterised as political terror, or ‘propaganda of the deed’ ; 
direct verbal propaganda; and print media in partisan periodicals. It would be 
misleading to describe these forms as being wholly distinct and separate, as it was 
often in combination that these forms relayed their population message; for example 
harassing or intimidating family planning workers, railing against their work in 
pungwes, and reinforcing this message in print. This section will deal primarily with 
the nationalists’ print media, as the other methods are discussed in other parts of this 
chapter.
The periodicals analysed below are ZANU’s Zimbabwe News and ZAPU’s 
Zimbabwe Review, which in style, ideology, and subject matter differed very little, 
despite the antagonistic relationship between the two nationalist forces issuing these 
periodicals. These periodicals were produced outside Rhodesia, mostly in Zambia, 
Tanzania, or outside Africa and distributed as far afield as London to sympathetic 
organisations and movements, expatriates, exiles, and guerrillas in the field. The style 
in which these organs were written combined with their distribution, point to these 
periodicals not being intended to win converts or convince the apostate of the 
righteousness and prospects of the nationalist cause. And it was clearly to hearten and 
re-energise the flock, and inform sympathetic audiences of the rationales behind their 
various policies, that this print propaganda was produced.
24 Editions of both the Zimbabwe News (ZANU) and Zimbabwe Review (ZAPU) are located at the 
Institute of Commonwealth Studies Archives and Special Collections, Russell Square, London, UK.
25 Or as Mikhail Bakunin wrote in 1870 in his ‘Letters to a Frenchman on the Present Crisis’, “. . .from 
this very moment we must spread our principles, not with words but with deeds, for this is the most 
popular, the most potent, and the most irresistible form of propaganda.” See M. Bakunin, M. Shatz 
(ed), Bakunin: Statism and Anarchy (Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1990).
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Nationalist print media addressed population issues in different ways, 
depending upon the components being discussed. Print propaganda regarding 
population matters focused on five primary themes: 1) the previously discussed nexus 
between population pressures and land scarcity, 2) portraying the wide racial 
population ratios and the large African population as a source of power, 3) articulating 
their resistance to the state’s family planning efforts, 4) articulating their opposition to 
the state’s immigration policies, and 5) trumping the high white emigration rates as 
evidence of broader nationalist successes in the political and military spheres. The 
relative population numbers of whites and Africans were often cited as evidence of 
African strength and white weakness: at times explicitly, other times implicitly. For 
instance, the Zimbabwe Review cited the African population figure of 4 million three
9 f \  99times in one weekly edition, five times in another, and seven times in still
9 0
another, and in many of these same editions the figure of 200,000 whites is also 
repeated. An excerpt from a Zimbabwe Review article from 1964 exemplified this 
repetitive impact of African population numbers:
Let there be no doubt about the irrevocable decision of the 4 million African 
peoples of Zimbabwe that they and they alone are the unchallengeable owners 
and rulers of Zimbabwe and that it is their dedicated and irrevocable decision 
to take over the reins of government NOW. The white settlers, colonist 
inhabitants and all their progeny, now or after, living in Zimbabwe do so by 
grace, wishes and above all by their degree of cooperation and submission to 
the will of the 4 million African people as expressed by their chosen African 
majority government in Zimbabwe. Hence the recent arrogant declaration by 
settler PM Ian Smith that he cannot visualise in his lifetime an African 
government in Southern Rhodesia, is to us and the 4 million Africans in 
Southern Rhodesia a kind of fairy tale best suited to retell to his mother.29
The rhetorical thrust of this constant repetition is the strength of African numbers and 
the weakness of the regime as exemplified by white numbers. One Zimbabwe Review 
article specifically stated: “Today there are twenty five Zimbabweans to one white 
person in our country. It’s this which makes fascist Smith tremble into barbarous 
mischief.”30
26 Zimbabwe Review, 9, 24 July 1964.
27 Zimbabwe Review, 8, 14 November 1964.
28 Zimbabwe Review, 1, 28 November 1964.
29 (my underlines) Zimbabwe Review, 3, 24 April 1964.
30 ‘Genocide Economics in Zimbabwe’, Zimbabwe Review, 26 July 1969.
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The most successful themes of nationalist propaganda were those that jibed
with pre-existing African inclinations, as with their consistent theme of malevolent
white intentions, which readily found a receptive audience among many Africans.
Searching for racist thinking behind the regime’s population policies was easy
hunting for nationalist propagandists, and these grounded suspicions were often
bolstered by rumours and untruths. In this vein, propaganda reinforced the fear of
white medicine, in particular that which was distributed by the state, by feeding into 
1
older (yet untrue) rumours about the state surreptitiously sterilising African
32women. In print media, nationalists attacked most vociferously the state’s family 
planning efforts, which in part fitted in with this bad medicine theme. Amy Kaler 
divides nationalist rhetoric concerning family planning into three frames: 1) a plan to 
secretly annihilate the African population, 2) an example of white desperation, and 3) 
white disregard for sexual morality or decency. This rhetorical strategy was in part 
successful because the nationalists’ pronatalism was consistent with long-standing 
African practices such as bride-wealth and vertical family-based social security for 
elder relations. The pre-existing economic and cultural incentives to have more 
babies were supplemented by nationalist propaganda offering newer political 
rationales to older motivations. Combined with the aforementioned assertions, 
nationalist propaganda highlighted the racialised nature of state family planning 
efforts and how efforts to reduce the African population coincided with the RF’s 
policy of mass white immigration. As will be discussed below, it was the cultural 
nationalist preservation of patriarchal tradition that proved the most successful theme, 
especially in appealing to African males.
Propaganda in the print form confronted the state’s immigration policies on 
their merits, and challenged the state’s purported motives behind these policies. One 
way in which this was done was to expose the incongruence of the state’s family 
planning promotion and its simultaneous mass immigration policy. This specific 
rhetoric about white hypocrisy not surprisingly peaked around the time of the Settler 
’74 Campaign. The Zimbabwe Review queried: “Couldn’t the whole contradiction of 
imposing birth control among Africans in Rhodesia on the one hand and pressing for
31 There was some limited truth to the charge o f coercion in the realm o f family planning, but not state 
coercion, as the Herald reported that some employers required proof of birth control pill usage before 
employing African girls. ‘T ill or No Jobs’ Claim’ RH, 28 June 1971.
32 D. Jeater, Marriage.
33 Kaler, Running, p. 187.
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immigrants (a million) from Europe on the other, be likened to a single family which 
whilst taking birth control pills on the one hand, advertises for the collection of 
children for adoption on the other?”34 An example of the sort of state language 
concerning immigration seized upon as being inconsistent with other statements on 
family planning, can be found in a Rhodesian immigration promotion pamphlet from 
July 1965, which read: “The ‘new’ Rhodesia offers opportunities not bettered by any
*5 C
other country.. .by world standards Rhodesia is starved of population.” Nationalists
took on the issue of white immigration into a supposedly population-starved land and 
how this coincided with neo-Malthusianism in Rhodesia, by pointing out that if the 
problem were merely too many humans in Rfrodesia vying for resources, as suggested 
by the state’s family planning propaganda, then it would make little sense to import 
more white humans into Rhodesia. Smith’s loosening of immigration restrictions also 
proved to be great fodder for African opponents of the RF’s immigration policies, 
even those within the Rhodesian Parliament. In this regard, immigration was equated 
with mercenary recruitment, and immigrants were deemed mercenaries regardless of 
their age, gender, or their intentions on moving to Rhodesia.36 Added to these attacks 
on the nature of white immigration were threats made against the immigrants 
themselves, as they were accused of being witting or unwitting tools of the regime. 
The back cover of a Zimbabwe News from 1974, had the following words printed in 
bold letters below news clippings of war violence: “Are you prepared to immigrate to
i n
& die in Rhodesia???” Another article warned: “Future Rhodesia immigrants are 
warned to note that our liberation bullets have no mercy on reinforcements from
o
Europe or elsewhere.” An article from ZAPU’s Zimbabwe Review in 1973 
characterised the nature of white immigration after UDI as a vulnerability to be 
exploited by guerrilla forces:
Immigrants are fortune seekers. They have left their countries for new ones in 
order to make quick-money and enjoy their cheaply acquired riches. In 
guerrilla-infested land, a land of landmines and of a people that [have]
34 For example: ‘Smith’s Million Immigrants’, Zimbabwe Review, 12 January 1974.
35 Smith Papers, Box 019, Cabinet Memorandum, ‘Rhodesia: Assisted Passages to land o f Sunshine: 
Golden Opportunity’, 2 July 1965.
36 ‘Immigrant Reinforcements’, Editorial, Zimbabwe Review, 12 January 1974.
37 Zimbabwe News, January 1974.
38 ‘Immigrants Reinforcements’, Zimbabwe Review, 12 January 1974.
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resolved to rout once and forever its oppressors, immigrants find the situation 
far [from] being ideal and they leave.39
In targeting immigration, nationalist organs also signaled their appreciation o f  the 
importance o f  immigration to the settler regime, not just militarily— as so-called 
mercenaries— but also economically, politically and psychologically. Therefore, the 
dissemination o f  angry rhetoric aimed at newcomers and the state that promoted their 
migration was a political education to other nationalists and sympathisers as to why 
the arrival o f  a few thousand whites in Salisbury and Bulawayo mattered in the 
context o f  the wider liberation war.
Nationalist print propaganda in both the ZANU and ZAPU newsletters took 
great interest in the whites leaving Rhodesia as well as those coming in. Emigration 
figures were reported in nationalist periodicals often with commentary directly linking 
these movements with nationalist activity. As with the display o f  population numbers 
generally, emigration figures were on other occasions displayed alone, or with little 
comment. Commentary accompanying other figures emphasised the transience and 
lack o f  rootedness o f  the white population. With these observations, the 
propagandists exposed the nub o f  the settlers' greatest vulnerability, yet an 
observation o f  a phenomenon, no matter how keen, is certainly not the same thing as 
the power to influence that phenomenon. The straightforward message conveyed was 
that o f  the inevitability o f  the nationalist victory, and of  a more immediate positive 
momentum moving in the direction o f  white capitulation.40
To what audience, to what purpose, and to what effect did this print 
propaganda have on the actual population numbers? Most obviously, this form o f 
propaganda targeted literate nationalist supporters. Because the faithful outside of 
Rhodesia, and perhaps some limited clandestine readers within Rhodesia, were clearly 
the nationalists’ intended audience, it is likely that only a few whites in Rhodesia 
outside the Security Forces ever came across these periodicals. It is even probable 
that those Rhodesians who did find copies did not take their assertions or threats too 
seriously. Similarly, it is even more unlikely that any o f  these materials ever found 
their way into the hands o f  potential immigrants to Rhodesia overseas, either in the 
UK, South Africa, or elsewhere. This must surely have been known to be the case by
39 ‘The Ian Smith Dilemma’, Zimbabwe Review, 28 July 1973.
4(1 See for example, ‘The Revolutionary War Scares White Settlers’, Zimbabwe News, June 1977.
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the producers o f  these materials. As for potential white immigrants and emigrants, 
and so too with potential African practitioners o f  family planning, this nationalist 
propaganda was not intended to speak directly to them to influence their behavior, so 
much as to justify or explain why nationalist policies were what they were to 
sympathisers. This print propaganda itself did not intimidate white residents into 
emigrating, scare off potential immigrants from coming, or dissuade women from 
using birth control, though it did articulate an appreciation o f  the nexus between 
population issues and the fate o f  the regime, as well as create at least the illusion o f  a 
more activist and holistic population strategy on the part o f  African nationalists than 
what actually existed. To what extent nationalists’ actions, as opposed to mere words, 
effected population patterns will be explored below.
African Influence on White Migration Patterns
African guerrilla activity had both direct and indirect effects on white 
migration patterns, and it was on these components that the nationalists exerted the 
greatest degree o f  control in the wider war o f  numbers. Through the increasing drain 
on morale that call-ups generated, and the use of political terror, African guerrillas 
sought to make life in Rhodesia unbearable for whites, and to thereby induce higher 
emigration rates. These same tactics also served to give off the image o f  Rhodesia as 
a dangerous and unpredictable destination to potential immigrants in their source 
countries. Perhaps surprisingly, the nationalists were more successful in drying up 
white immigration than in directly inducing emigration. This was partially, perhaps, a 
reflection o f  disparities in information between current residents and potential 
immigrants. However, as discussed chapters four and five, these two factors o f  white 
migration were closely linked. In this way, African nationalists were able to apply 
pressure on the white population shuffle, and this had dramatic demographic and 
political consequences.
Ironically, the activities that produced the most dramatic demographic results 
were those in which the nationalists’ specific intent was diffused among several goals, 
demographic changes perhaps even the lesser o f  the many. This in particular 
references the guerrillas' military and terroristic activities during the war. Within this 
sphere o f  activity, nationalist actions can be further divided between actions aimed at
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directly lowering the white settlers' sense o f  security, and those morale-sapping 
byproducts o f  the war pertaining to the compounding military and civilian demands of 
the white population. Despite the many direct and indirect effects that stemmed from 
the war, these disparate effects all emanated from only a few categories o f  actions. 
ZANLA military strategy in the war was two-fold: to attenuate white manpower 
resources to the point that holding on to power proved too much o f  a strain on the
41small white population, and to create an atmosphere of terror and insecurity. Both 
o f  these prongs had demographic components. The attenuation o f  white manpower 
resources was only an effective strategy because o f  the relative sizes o f  the white and 
African populations. Likewise, the terror strategy was especially effective because o f  
the white population's constant population shuffle, and its need for new migrants to 
replace those leaving. Nonetheless, the demographic results o f  these actions were 
only o f  secondary consideration to the nationalist leaders. O f primary importance to 
them was the demoralisation o f  the white populace such that whites would surrender 
power. But again, as discussed in chapter four, white morale was intimately related to 
migration figures, and these two factors moved in tandem. The tactical applications 
o f  ZANLA's strategy were o f  the following types: 1) attacks on settler farms, directed 
at African farm workers and white farmers; 2) an increasing presence in the TTLs to 
recruit more guerillas, punish informers and state collaborators, and hold pungwes; 3) 
extensive mining o f  rural roads and attacks on moving vehicles, both military and 
nonmilitary; and 4) what can be described best as "propaganda o f  the deed,' high 
profile terrorist acts on non-military targets, such as downing two Viscount civilian 
airliners, the 1977 bombing o f  a Woolworth store, the fire-bombing of the Pink 
Panther restaurant, and blowing up an enormous fuel storage facility outside of 
Salisbury in December 1978.
A complication in determining the causation between guerrilla activity and 
migration patterns is that it is impossible to accurately discern the truthful reasons 
why emigrants decided to leave Rhodesia, or why potential immigrants decided not to 
come. When emigrants did cite reasons for their departure during the war years, 
which itself was only rarely done, emigrants tended to claim that they either left for
41 See, for example, the Chitepo quote in an earlier chapter on ZANU strategy. M. Raeburn, We Are 
Everywhere: Narratives From Rhodesian Guerrillas (New York. Random House, 1978), p. 201. 
ZIPRA's military strategy was based more upon conventional invasion forces, and did not become a 
military factor until much later in the conflict. See Ellert, The Rhodesian Front War.
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economic reasons, call-up strains, or political differences with the regime. These 
were all, in part at least, traceable to nationalist activity, though with an emphasis on 
the indirect effects of the war rather than the direct effects. Whites from the rural 
areas more explicitly cited security fears than did most emigrants, as their degree of 
risk was more immediate and palpable than the vast majority of whites, who were 
( ^  primarily urban dwellers. High rates of emigration from the rural border areas 
greatly expanded the scope of guerrilla activity and extended the territory accessible 
to the guerrillas. Those farmers who remained in these areas were under that much 
more of a threat, and demanded greater military protection from the state lest they too 
emigrate. For example, an internal memorandum from the Thrasher Zone of 
operations, which was along Rhodesia’s eastern border with Mozambique, dated April 
1978, read: “In February 1976 there were a total of 31 occupied farms in the Mayo 
Farming area. As at the 1st April 1978, the number of occupied farms has dropped to 
19... 11 of the 19 farmers have stated categorically that unless the security position 
improves, and by this they mean the presence of a permanent security force in the 
area, they will vacate their farms before the advent of the next rainy season... This 
will of course leave the remaining 8 farmers in an almost untenable position and there 
is every likelihood of their also leaving the area.42” While whites on the ‘sharp end’ 
of the guerrilla war explicitly cited security concerns for their departures, urban 
whites typically did not. A 1976 government survey of known intending emigrants 
asked, “Why are you leaving?” In reporting the results, the Minister of Immigration 
indicated that within this pool of known emigrants, the majority of respondents 
replied that it was because of a lack of job opportunities in Rhodesia, many others 
were pensioners wishing to retire by the sea, and others were leaving simply because 
they were getting married abroad and staying. He concluded: “[tjhere are a hundred 
and one excuses but a very small proportion say they are leaving because of the 
constant call-ups or they do not see any future in Rhodesia.”43 One of the weaknesses 
of this survey is that there were obvious reasons why emigrants would have tended to 
not be completely truthful in their given reasons for leaving, the most obvious being 
to avoid charges of cowardice. More importantly though, there was a selective bias in 
the respondent pool in that it only captured those emigrants who made themselves
42 BECM 2001/086/007 Memorandum by AW Rich, JOC Thrasher, 6 April 1978.
43 Parliamentary Debate, ‘Committee o f Supply: On Vote 12 Information, Immigration, and Tourism— 
$4,105,000’, col. 229, 5 August 1976.
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known to the state, which by 1976, was an ever-shrinking proportion o f  total 
emigrants. Even so, this survey jibes with a more recent survey o f  emigrants 
conducted in the early 1990s, in which only 5 percent o f  the ex-Rhodesian 
respondents indicated that they left due to the war .44 But this survey too suffers from
an even greater selective bias, as the pool was collected from among members of 
diasporal Rhodesian associations and was conducted many years after the move, both 
factors that would presumably skew towards retrospectively discounting the 
significance o f  fear in their decision making. It is therefore very likely that the direct 
effects o f  the war, in particular the fear o f  physical violence played a much more 
significant role in white emigration during the war years than was admitted to by the 
emigrants themselves, at the time o f  departure or in the years since, particularly 
among whites from the border areas. Yet as explained in chapter four, this 
phenomenon of  high rates o f  white emigration was as old as the colony and long 
preceded the shooting war.
ijo  Q . 4 \ a  v . \ . *The association o f  Rhodesia with white insecurity and continuous white call- 
ups played a major role in dissuading potential immigrants from choosing Rhodesia as 
a destination, as argued in chapter five. Both the direct and indirect effects o f  the war 
had a greater impact on lowering immigration numbers into Rhodesia than in raising 
emigration numbers from Rhodesia. White residents o f  Rhodesia, even factoring in 
their characteristic transience, would need greater prodding to leave than a potential 
immigrant would need to be discouraged from migrating to Rhodesia. Added to this 
inertia effect, was that the foreign press' coverage o f  the Rhodesian war portrayed the 
war in a much more negative light than did Rhodesia’s coverage o f  the war. While 
the white Rhodesian press reported overly optimistic appraisals until the very end of 
the war, the foreign press prematurely predicted the demise o f  the white regime, 
which would have had a chilling effect on Rhodesian recruitment. As it was, 
Rhodesian immigration officials openly conceded that negative foreign press
coverage arrectea Knoaesia s immigration yields. "yiNonemeiess, wnue immigration
44 W.G. Eaton, Modern Sunlight.
45 Parliamentary Debate, ‘Committee o f Supply: On Vote 31 Information, Immigration, and 
Tourism— L I,019,200’, col. 1055. 1 August 1969.
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did drop during the war years, surprisingly significant numbers still entered, at least 
partially mitigating the political and demographic effects o f  nationalist activity.46
  'QezjvD <KLl 4 ^  CA^jLe 4
African Influence on the Rate of White Natural Increase
/jrN J C ^
r ~ ^  1
The war had both direct and indirect effects on white rates o f  natural growth, 
but surprisingly it was not on white death rates that the war had had its greatest effect, 
but on white fertility. A problem that complicates the study o f  Rhodesian 
demographic behavior is that it is in many ways trying to hit a moving target due to 
persistent white transience. Nevertheless, approximately 1000 to 1500 whites, both 
civilians and Security Force members, died due to war-related causes.47 This was out 
o f  a total o f  16,974 registered white deaths from 1972 through 1979.4S This worked 
out to approximately 7 percent o f  white deaths during the war years being directly 
attributable to the war. In contrast, during the war years 113,889 Africans died, 
approximately 19,000 o f  which from war-related causes— 16 percent o f  all deaths .49 
Annual white mortality charts throughout the 1970s consistently had ischemic heart 
disease as far and away the greatest killer o f  whites, followed by cancer, in particular 
lung cancer/ 0 Another major killer o f  whites was motor vehicle accidents.61 These 
were all mortalities typical o f  other affluent communities around the world. In 
addition, despite a gradual rise in the 1970s, white Rhodesian death rates were always 
significantly lower than in Britain throughout the war years: from 1972 to 1979 the 
two averaged 8 deaths per 1000 and 11.8 per 1000 respectively/" The war, and by 
extension the guerrillas who waged it, did have some mild effect on white mortality, 
but oddly enough not nearly as much as did white tobacco fanners through the
LrvoJ. Q % vj a
46 From 1973 to 1979 immigration still ran at an average o f 7,542 annually. Statistics derived from 
Rhodesian Central Statistical Office Monthly Digest reports.
47 Godwin, Rhodesians Never Die, p. 280.
4S Statistics derived from Rhodesian Secretary of Health Reports (hereafter SHR), (Government 
publications, 1953-1979).
4<) Statistics derived from SHR and Godwin, Rhodesians Never Die, p 280. Many o f these African 
combat deaths were combatants serving on the government’s Security Forces.
50 SHR
51 A growing percentage of motor vehicle deaths from the mid 1970s were caused by landmines 
placed by African guerillas. Because of the prevalence of these landmines along Rhodesia/s roads, 
road traffic decreased to the extent that total road deaths dropped. This ironically meant that in 
statistical terms, all in all, the mining of Rhodesian roads saved white lives. SHR
SHR. British figures include only England and Wales.
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cigarettes they produced, nor even as white bar owners for over-serving automobile 
drivers.
The escalation o f  the guerrilla war had a greater effect on white fertility.
White Rhodesian birth rates in the 1950s were comparatively high for a wealthy 
society, but were roughly consistent with other contemporary settler communities, 
such as South Africa, Australia, and New Zealand, all of which were higher than the 
UK and other European nations.53 Even against these other settler communities, 
Rhodesia had the highest birth rates in 1950. All wealthy societies, including white 
Rhodesia, experienced a decline in birth rates from the 1950s to the late 1970s.
Sloping downwards at different pitches, the gap between Britain’s consistently low 
birth rate and the higher rates o f  Australia, New Zealand, South Africa, and America's 
white population tightened somewhat, yet Britain’s always remained the lowest, even 
by the late 1970s. Rhodesia followed this same general movement, but at a much 
steeper slope than all comparative Western societies.
WHITE CRUDE BIRTH RATES COM PARED ( 1960-1979)54
I960 1966 1972 1979
Rhodesia— 26.3 N Z - 22.3 RSA— 23.2" N Z - 16.6
RSA whites— 24.8 Aus— 19.3 NZ— 21.6 R S A - 16.5'6
US whites— 22.7 Brits— 17.7 Aus— 19.9 Aus— 15.4
Australia— 22.4 USw- 17.4 R h o - 18.1 U S w — 14.5
Britain — 17.1 Rlio— 16.9 USw- 14.5 Brits— 12.9
N ew  Zealand- N/A RSA— N/A Brits— 13.75* Rho— 11.0
This descent o f  white Rhodesia’s dropping fertility was not smooth, but 
instead resembled a series o f  drops and plateaus, like steps, which corresponded 
neatly with other historical and political trends in Rhodesia, particularly the boom and 
bust years o f  net migrations discussed in chapter four. Consistent with Rhodesia's
’3 Statistics derived from the United Nations Secretariat, World Population Prospects: The 2004 
Revision (New York, United Nations, 2005), (hereafter UNWPP) found on World Resources Institute 
web site, ‘Earth trends.’ URL: http:// earthtrends.wri.org
54 Statistics derived from: Rhodesian Annual Reports of the Secretary of Health, Vital Statistics
(Salisbury, Government Publication); Australian Bureau of Statistics, Australian Historic Population 
Statistics Table 42 (Canberra, Government Publication, 2006); Statistics New Zealand, Demographic 
Trends 2006 (Wellington, Government Publication, 2006); United States National Center for Health 
Statistics, Live Births, Birth Rates, and Fertility Rates, by Race: United States, 1909-2000 
(Washington, Government Publication); Official Yearbook of the Republic of South Africa, South 
Africa 1985 (Pretoria, Government Publication).
South African figure from 1970, not 1972.
M> South African figure from 1980, not 1979.
7 British figures are for England and Wales only. 
s British figure from 1973. not 1972.
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then robust economy and high political confidence, white birth rates remained about 
25 per thousand throughout the 1950s.59 In comparison, Britain’s birth rates during 
this time hovered between 15 and 17, on average around 30 percent lower than 
Rhodesians. Beginning in 1960, and coinciding with the disintegration of the 
Federation, Rhodesia’s birth rate plummeted during this first step down. Before 
leveling off again in 1966, Rhodesia’s crude birth rate fell nearly 36 percent from 26.3 
in 1960 to 16.9 in 1966, when it briefly dipped below Britain's for the first time.
From 1966 the birth rate flattened out, and even rose slightly as Britain's continued to 
fall. Rhodesia's plateau during these years was consistent with South Africa, 
Australia, and New Zealand's patterns, though notably Rhodesia’s rate was already 
lower than all three. This leveling occurred alongside the generally optimistic post- 
UDI mood and lasted until the winter o f  1972, when the war escalated, strongly 
suggesting a correlation. After 1972 the birth rate fell again, and following a small 
bump in 1974, that was most likely due to the influx of  Portuguese settlers, the birth 
rate would continue to drop until the end o f  the war. From 1972 to 1979 the white 
birth rate fell from 18.1 to 11, a 40 percent drop. Other comparable birth rates in 
1979 were Britain's at 12.9, white America's 14.5, Australia's 15.4, Greece's 15.5, 
and New Zealand’s at 16.6. All in all, Rhodesia had a 59 percent drop in birth rates in 
20 years, far greater than any comparable population anywhere on the globe.
The dramatic and unique demographic changes experienced by Rhodesia in 
the 1960s and 1970s are all the more notable in light o f  the transience o f  the white 
population. Because such a large percentage o f  whites were in Rhodesia for such a 
short time before continuing on to other destinations or returning home, that 
Rhodesia’s birth rates were at such variance with both the most common source and 
destination countries is even more puzzling. This disparity between birth rates in 
Rhodesia and elsewhere could be attributable to a combination o f  three factors: a 
migratory selective effect, a deliberate effort o f  many women in Rhodesia to limit the 
size o f  their families or postpone children beyond that which was already being 
practiced in other Western populations, and/or a general, unwanted disruption o f  
marital and sexual relations while in Rhodesia.
M S h
59 In 1960 the world average birth rate was 35-36. South and East Africa was 45, Europe was 19, 
North America and Oceania were 24. S.J. Behrman (ed). Fertility and Family Planning: A World 
View, (Ann Arbor, University of Michigan Press, 1969). p. 77.
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Selective migratory effects certainly influenced the composition of  Rhodesia’s 
white population in many ways. White migrants were always coming and going, but 
prior to 1960 whites were having more children in Rhodesia. The sorts o f  migrants to 
and from Rhodesia did begin to change after Smith's premiership in 1964, as earlier 
immigration restrictions on capital, skills, and ethnicity were all loosened. The 
immigrants after the mid 1960s were on average slightly less skilled and poorer, and 
were very often not British. These compositional changes o f  Rhodesian whites would 
not seem to necessarily influence birth rates in an adverse way, but instead would tend 
to have the opposite effect, as according to Vining's paradox ,60 of  wealth's negative 
correlation with birth rates. Furthermore, the non-British ethnicities that did appear in 
greater numbers— in particular Afrikaners, Portuguese, and Southern Europeans— all 
on average had higher birth rates than did those o f  British descent. These 
compositional changes would intuitively lead to a rise not a decline in birth rates. At 
any rate, any changes that did occur after Smith coming to power in 1964 would 
obviously not explain the drop in the early 1960s. It was probably in a different 
respect that Rhodesian migration influenced birth rates, through the interaction of 
Rhodesia's long-standing transience and political and economic uncertainty.
Migrants might well have had a child or children, but perhaps either before or after 
their stay in Rhodesia. This moves us directly into the second factor, which was the 
purposeful postponement o f  childrearing during insecure times, aided as this was by 
white women's easy access to birth control. Postponement could mean either waiting 
for better times in Rhodesia, or as stated earlier, waiting until exiting Rhodesia to 
have (more?) children. This break from child rearing while in Rhodesia, enabled as it 
was by access to family planning for white women, could have been the product o f  a 
rational, deliberate decisions o f  white families, or at very least, white women.
This reduction o f  potential family size was not always an act o f  rational 
planning by white families, however. From 1973, the consistent rise o f  call-up 
commitments and other strains o f  living in a country at war took their toll on white 
families. Some commentators have noted that these combined pressures physically 
and psychologically exhausted the white population. Discussing the effects o f  the war 
on the white population, Richard Hodder-Williams in an interview noted that, “By the
60 M. Potts, ‘Sex and the Birth Rate: Human Biology. Demographic Change, and Access to Fertility- 
Regulation Methods’, Population and Development Review, Vol. 23, No. 1 (March, 1997).
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end of the ‘70s [white] people were totally confused... and exhausted... [To most 
whites, the end of the war] was a release both physically and personally. [They 
suffered] tremendous psychological problems. Marriages had broken up during this 
period.” The end of the war “delighted” them, as it “was a release.”61 Consistent 
with Hodder-William’s observations, alcoholism and suicide rates were both higher in 
1970s Rhodesia than in most comparable populations around the globe. Divorce 
rates in Rhodesia were also very high, a result certainly related to war-related 
/  stresses.63 In 1976, Rhodesians had the third highest divorce rates in the world, with 
one in four marriages ending in divorce, leading some civic leaders to call for a 
change in the law to implement mandatory waiting periods before granting divorces.64 
Even in relationships that remained intact, war-time separation no doubt disrupted 
sexual relations which would also have an effect on fertility. In addition, the loss of 
the husband’s income forced recalculations of the economics of childbearing. One 
Herald article from August 1974 described at length the psychological and economic 
plight of white wives of soldiers:
A regular soldier on active service spends a month in the bush and 10 days at 
home. As one wife said: You marry him and then it’s a battle trying to find 
the time to get to know him.. .[wife, Jean, said] ‘It’s quite hard being on my 
own. I get very depressed just worrying about him in the bush. I just worry 
about everything... One month I nearly had to put the baby in a home because 
I didn’t even have the money for milk tokens. But I borrowed money from my 
friend for milk and got an advance on my husband’s pay. Then you have to 
pay it back and in the end you just can’t win. Because of all this I’ve started 
to work and now get $135 as a clerk. The baby stays with a nanny because I 
couldn’t get him into a creche’... [wife, Diedre, said] ‘I have to work but I’m 
going to have a baby and I’ll have to stop in the next few months. I dread to 
think how I’ll manage then.. .1 dread having my baby. It was a mistake.’
[wife, Anne, said] ‘Of course I have to work...You’ll find all Army wives 
struggle. I couldn’t afford to fall pregnant, much as my husband would like 
me to’... [wife, Sandy, said when the husbands return] ‘You try to put up a 
cheerful front, you don’t mention the problems of home. They’ve got 
terrorists to worry about.’65
61 R. Hodder-Williams interview, Oral Archives, BECM.
62 ‘Rhodesia Top the Big-Time Boozers’, RH, 18 July 1973.
63 See Rhodesia Herald articles on divorce, separation, and war stress: ‘Marriage No Bliss for Many 
Rhodesian Couples’, RH, 7 June 1974; ‘Family Stress Caused by Call-Up’, RH, 14 July 1976.
64 ‘Rhodesia Divorce Faster than in Reno’, RH, 16 August 1976.
65 ‘Terror War & Women Wait’, RH, 20 August 1974.
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These factors of purposeful postponement, unwanted disruptions in sexual relations, 
and war-related economic re-calculations, when taken together help to account for 
Rhodesia’s significant deviation from the fertility levels of comparative societies.
Regardless of the specific mechanisms at work, only the second step down in 
Rhodesia’s birth trends corresponded with the war, as the first step down in the early 
1960s was prior to UDI, and long before the war’s escalation in 1972. This first drbp 
could obviously be better explained by political and economic uncertainty, and 
transience and its effect on fertility, than by the war-related stresses. It would be an 
especially long stretch to attribute this first fertility drop to nationalist activity, any 
more than the wider decolonisation trends occurring throughout the continent. If this 
causality were to be taken seriously, Harold MacMillan would be as responsible for 
falling white Rhodesian birth rates in the early 1960s as Joshua Nkomo. The second 
drop during the war years can be more easily traced to guerrilla activity. Affected as 
the second drop was by the war waged by African guerrillas, it can be said that 
African military and political activity were partially responsible for Rhodesia’s odd 
fertility patterns, and in a limited sense this would be correct. However, it is highly 
doubtful that even the most politically aware nationalists pretended that this drop in 
white fertility, such as it was even known, was a result of deliberate nationalist 
policies intended to effectuate this drop, and as a result their actual mens rea was 
limited.
Nationalist Resistance to the State’s Family Planning Initiatives
Nationalists were the most active in their resistance to the state’s family 
planning efforts. These state efforts had their antecedents in colonial interference in 
African sexuality dating back to the earliest settlement in Rhodesia.66 Considering the 
long history of white interference in African sexuality, and African resistance to these 
interferences, the state’s interest in slowing the African birth rate in the mid 1960s 
unsurprisingly aroused deep suspicions among many sections of the African 
population in Rhodesia. By the mid 1960s, as official fears turned to African growth 
rates as a great threat to the regime, official blame in sexual politics landed on African 
men and traditional lineage systems and their pronatalist impact, and family planning
66 Jeater, Marriage, p. 35.
advocates portrayed African women as unwilling victims in this foolhardy pursuit of
sn
wanting more babies. This set state policy against the interests of traditional 
patriarchies, and African males generally, whose power was largely dependent on 
controlling female reproduction. This opened up a space for nationalists to forge a 
politically expedient alliance with important sections of rural society.
The alliance struck between rural patriarchies protecting male power and 
nationalists keen to establish themselves as agents of an African authenticity 
uncorrupted by the white settler state’s debasement, was part of nationalists’ strategic 
‘cultural nationalism.’ The depth of guerrilla commitment to gender equality was 
not so deep as to bypass the opportunity to create a bond with rural males and 
traditional rural elites, and this opportunity presented itself quite clearly in the issue of 
state-sponsored family planning. Kriger writes that in establishing this alliance, 
ZANLA had some difficulty in reconciling its purported “goal of liberating women 
from their double burden of racism and tradition” with an avoidance of any clash with 
African custom that would weaken rural support. Kriger concludes that in deciding 
how far to intervene in African customs that ran contrary to their liberation ideology, 
ZANU decided to “not go very far.”69 Kaler describes this compromised approach to 
liberation ideology for the sake of cultural nationalism in this way: “In the realm of 
marriage and family, cultural nationalism took the form of insisting that both genders 
conform to gender-specific norms of ideal patriarchal behavior. In this respect, the 
liberation movement did not attempt to change gender hierarchies and actually 
provided reinforcement to patriarchal values.” This opposition to family planning 
was not merely for the sake of rural alliances, however, as it also meshed well with 
the guerrillas’ other strategic goals, namely: the degradation of state administration in 
the rural areas; the facilitation of the economic, political, and morale strains placed on 
the state as a result of population growth; and the fulfillment of the long-term goal of 
bolstering African numbers that could fill military requirements in the future were the 
war to persist.
67 As Jeater’s book explains, during the colony’s early history the state oscillated between blaming the 
rural patriarchal system for purported African sexual deviancies and blaming the absence of these same 
systems when not present. Jeater, Marriage.
68 See generally, N. Kriger, ‘The Zimbabwean War o f Liberation: Struggles Within the Struggle’, 
Journal o f  Southern African Studies, Vol. 14, No. 2 (January, 1988).
69 Kriger, Peasant Voices, p. 193.
70 Kaler, Running, p. 9.
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In repeated exhortations in pungwes and political gatherings, guerrillas warned 
Africans that family planning was ‘cutting down the nation.’ But what did the 
guerrillas really mean by this? Kaler argues that guerrilla arguments about family 
planning stripping the nation of future soldiers and future voters were more 
metaphorical, spiritual, and symbolic than practical, as it would be many years until
71these hypothetical babies would be of use to the nation politically or militarily. 
However, when viewing these population matters holistically, it is clear that even 
newborn babies were of immediate political use to nationalists. More babies meant 
more scarcity and therefore more demands on resources, social services, and 
especially land, that the state was loathe to (re)distribute. More babies also meant 
new citizens for which present claims could be made on behalf of. Their contribution 
to Rhodesia’s overall racial demographics also had dramatic effects on both white 
morale and on African nationalist morale as discussed in earlier chapters. It is also 
not clear that African guerrillas, even in the later 1970s, knew that independence was 
as close as it turned out to be, especially as there were no liberated areas and the white 
state’s military capacity appeared strong and effective almost until the very collapse. 
Therefore, the appeals to produce future soldiers might have also been a reflection of 
the residual doubt that the war would be successfully resolved before these babies’ 
maturity, and the perceived effects of babies on the war should perhaps be taken 
seriously. Finally, more African babies meant a failure of the state programme 
promoting family planning, and this further meant a major state initiative in the rural 
areas was failing, and as Kriger argues in a broader context, this inability to impose its 
will or exert influence in this sphere and over this population added to the perception 
that the nationalists sought to foster, which was of a generalised degradation of state 
power and a severance of the connections between rural Africans and the settler 
state.72
This last motivation combined the guerrillas’ antipathy towards family 
planning with older anti-state and cultural nationalist impetuses. In this regard, the 
guerrilla opposition was not against family planning per se, so much as family 
planning was another state interference into the lives of rural Africans, and especially 
into the politically sensitive area of African fertility. This non-cooperation and
71 Kaler, Running, p. 201.
72 Kriger, Peasant Voices.
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sabotage targeting family planning jibed with other nationalist campaigns against 
cattle de-stocking and census-taking a decade prior. As well, there was a continuity 
with the contemporaneous destruction o f  cattle dips, the burning o f  Protected Village 
huts, attacks on agricultural extension officers, African workers on white farms being 
targeted, and the intimidation o f  those better-off African fanners who marketed their
t • 73goods through official state channels and were state certified master fanners. These 
were all part o f  a larger effort described by Kriger as the guerrillas' general antipathy 
towards any arm o f state activity, or any association with white settler society. It was 
to sever the connections, even those connections conceived to be beneficial, between 
the state and the rural Africans, that state services such as schools and cattle dips were 
attacked, and why even state anti-epidemic campaigns, such as the one against 
cholera, were frustrated by guerrilla activity,74 as the de-linking o f rural Africans from
• 75the state delegitimised the regime and opened up space for guerrilla support. But as 
with all such anti-state activity, the driving theme was a return to legitimate, 
traditionally African practices, untainted by colonial interference, and especially in 
the realm of family planning these appeals to resist white interference met with very 
receptive ears, particularly among African males. And as such, all state interferences 
in rural areas were conflated. As a female family planning worker interviewed by 
Kaler recounted about the guerrilla strategy:
Just like the digging o f  contour ridges and dipping o f cattle, such talk about 
family planning was there and regarded as a Western way o f  reducing the 
number o f  blacks so that we have fewer children and they come and take over 
the land and eventually the land is taken... Like the issue o f  contour ridges for 
conservation, to dig contour ridges or to take your cattle to the dip tanks to 
clean ticks, these were opposed as propaganda for the war...So all these 
things, these developmental issues that would do down the enemy would be 
advanced. During the war you use any available propaganda. If  s a question 
o f  what ideas people will buy and you advance them .76
Another example o f  this view that it was not family planning p er se that the guerrillas 
opposed so much as the state promoters o f  this policy, can be found in interview with 
a female family planning worker recounting conversations she had with guerrilla
73 Kriger, Peasant Voices, p. 106.
74 Kaler, Running, p. 218, footnote 9.
75 Kriger, Peasant Voices, p. 114.
(> Kaler, Running, p. 211.
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commanders in the field: “The Comrades just said, ‘Carry on [with your job]. There 
is no government that doesn’t like family planning, when we are the government we
11will want it.” And as it was, after independence the Zimbabwe government did 
want it.
Nationalist opposition to family planning was a public political position from 
as early as 1957, but this did not mean that many did not support the idea of family 
planning outside of Rhodesia’s peculiar political circumstances, that there was not a 
gender divide among nationalists regarding these matters, nor indeed even that many
78female guerrillas did not even privately use family planning services. All this 
displays the lack of any monolithic approach to family planning among all 
nationalists, everywhere, and in all circumstances, despite their unequivocal public 
positions.
Despite this patriarchal/guerrilla alliance regarding the opposition to family 
planning, many African women still used birth control throughout the war years, often 
at great risk to themselves. Kaler’s book describes many of the fascinating lengths 
that African women would go to hide their pills from their husbands:
Some would put them [pills] under the mattress, some would put them in the 
mealie-meal. But then these other ones [husbands] would fish it out. Some 
would hide them in a pot, when there are many pots in the house, but this man 
would sometimes just get the pills when his wife is not there, he would just 
search and when she comes he would say, ‘I have found this, so you are 
using!’ Maybe the men would be talking to each other at the beer halls, to
79give each other ideas where these women could be keeping their things.
This gendered divide over family planning existed within the guerrilla armies as well, 
and there is even evidence that female guerrillas covertly used birth control, despite
on
the staunchly pronatal position of the leadership. A female guerrilla was quoted as 
saying, “some of the male comrades did not like contraceptives because they thought 
it was murder, but really it was our duty and we female comrades were ready to 
defend it.”81
77 Kaler, Running, p. 211.
78 See generally, Kaler, Running.
79 Quoting Gloria Tekere. Kaler, Running, p. 136.
80 Kaler, Running, pp. 213-215.
81 Kriger, Peasant Voices, p. 193, citing M. Davies, compiler, Third World-Second Sex: Women’s 
Struggles and National Liberation: Third World Women Speak Out (London, Zed Press, 1983) p. 105.
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Despite this lack of uniformity among nationalists, family planning services 
were met with strong, and in some cases violent, organised resistance. Guerrillas in 
the field regularly railed against state-sponsored family planning efforts in their 
pungwes, where family planning was described as both a white scheme to ‘cut down’ 
the Zimbabwean nation, and as a health threat to the women themselves. In political 
meetings, guerrillas informed African villagers of the alleged ill intentions behind the 
state’s family planning programs, and the political justification for their pronatalism. 
The following are quotes from interviews compiled by Kaler of African women 
remembering guerrillas’ political attacks on family planning:
“During the war sometimes the comrades told the people they should not use 
family planning from white people because during the time of war we are 
losing children... they told us that the children you bear will be fighters who 
will fight for the country until they win, some will become doctors or nurses.” 
Mrs. Banga.
“ .. .the freedom fighters did not want us to listen to what was said by the 
whites. If the children are too few, we will all be lost fighting in the war.” 
Mrs. Maita.82
In addition to these rhetorical attacks on family planning, family planning 
workers and their families were directly threatened and intimidated. One former 
family planning worker described how guerrillas would confront them in the field and 
ask: “’Why do you want us to be few? You want us to be few because you want the 
Rhodesian forces to come and kill us when all our children will be dead. Because the 
government doesn’t want us to have many children, because if the children are many 
they will go out of the country and then come back and fight.’” Not all such 
interactions were just words, however, as in one instance a family planning worker
84was nearly executed at a pungwe until the crowd intervened to save the worker.
Kaler asserts that in all at least two and probably five family planning workers were 
killed as a result of their work. Even taking into account this physical violence, it was 
in the promotion and distribution of anti-state rumours regarding reproduction that the 
guerrillas proved most effective. As discussed earlier, these rumours fitted within a 
long tradition of African suspicion of white medicine, and this form of propaganda
82 Kaler, Running, pp. 194-195.
83 Kaler, Running, p. 199.
84 Kaler, Running, p. 206.
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found a receptive audience. This rhetorical frame of  the health implications of 
family planning medicines appealed to rural Africans of both genders, whereas the
86political rationales o f  creating future fighters appealed almost exclusively to males.'
In a more gender-specific method o f  propaganda, guerrillas appealed to 
African male frustration over the regime's meddling into what many considered to be 
the exclusive domain o f  African males. Rural men were generally against family 
planning because they thought it was intended as a political weapon by the state to 
reduce African numbers, but they also opposed it because they believed it allowed 
African women to be promiscuous, and because children were valuable both in terms
0 7
o f  status and in the economics o f  rural areas. More children provided much-needed 
free labour, and in the case o f  girls, could provide for the father a lobola, or bride- 
price, to be paid by prospective husbands to the prospective wife’s family. Boys also 
strengthened the lineage ties and spread the father's name, as well as providing
00
economic security for older age. These traditional benefits o f  more children were all 
important stoppers on state-sponsored initiatives to promote smaller families. More 
broadly though, Kaler argues that white male interference in African women's fertility 
must be viewed in the frame o f  the wider emasculation o f  African males. Kaler links 
male opposition to family planning with the more general emasculation o f  Rhodesian 
colonialism:
During the first three quarters o f  the twentieth century, masculinity was 
threatened and degraded by the white colonial regime...White colonists 
appropriated the material bases o f  masculine identity— cattle, land, labor— and 
intervened in African m en’s right to control their women and children, directly 
through laws governing marriage practices and family residences, and 
indirectly through the provision o f  alternatives to patriarchal control for young 
men and women. In this context o f  degradation, the promotion o f  birth control89was read as another attack on masculinity.
Whether or not the entire colonial experience in Rhodesia can be fairly characterised 
as attacks on African masculinity matters less than the narrower point that the settler
85 For an excellent study of African suspicion o f white medicine, see: L. White, ‘Poisoned Food, 
Poisoned Unifonns, and Anthrax: Or, How Guerillas Die in War'
Osiris, 2nd Series, Vol. 19, Landscapes of Exposure: Knowledge and Illness in Modem Environments 
(2004).
86 Kaler, Running, p. 195.
87 Kaler, Running, pp. 200-201
88 Schmidt, Peasants, Traders, and Wives.
89 Kaler, Running, p. 180.
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state’s interference in family planning in the last decades of settler rule was certainly 
an affront to African masculinity. As a guerrilla recruiting tool, this appeal to lost 
masculinity proved effective, as winning political liberation was tied to winning back 
their stolen manhood.90
How much did these nationalist anti-family planning activities affect actual 
population numbers? If nationalist activity in galvanising resistance to family 
planning was effective in promoting more African births, or at least in preventing 
state initiatives, then this demographic effect should be visible in African birth rates. 
After independence in 1980, the new Zimbabwean government ended the former 
state’s family planning efforts, and banned the usage of Depo Provera.91 It was not 
long, however, before the new ZANU government began to grow concerned about the 
effects of high fertility on the state’s economic and social goals, and set about trying 
to lower Zimbabwe’s birth rate. In 1984 the former Family Planning Association of 
Rhodesia was reorganised as the Child Spacing Organisation and tasked with the 
promotion of birth control. Reflecting this policy reversal and the full state 
sanctioning of family planning activities, Robert Mugabe’s own sister-in-law was 
placed as the programme director of the Zimbabwe National Family Planning Council 
in the 1980s, and in 1989 Mugabe received the Population Institute’s International 
Population Control award.93 The nationalists’ political turn on family planning so 
soon after coming to power was swift and within a few years had shifted from 
sanguinary hatred of such practices to aggressively promoting the same. But even 
though the ZANU government reversed their opposition to family planning, it still 
had to tread carefully to avoid older fears of the state’s regulation of women’s 
fertility.94
To isolate causation in Rhodesia/Zimbabwe, it is necessary to first examine 
traditional pronatalism in the broader African context. As a continent, Africa has 
been the slowest region to embrace birth control. Some demographers argue that 
African cultural factors are primarily responsible, as social and religious practices
90 Kaler, Running, p. 180-181.
91 A. Kaler, ‘A Threat to the Nation and a Threat to the Men: The Prohibition of Depo-Provera in 
Zimbabwe 1981’, Journal o f  Southern African Studies Vol. 24, No. 2 (June 1998).
92 D. Lucas, ‘Fertility and Family Planning in Southern and Central Africa’, Studies in Family 
Planning, Vol. 23, No. 3 (May - June, 1992) p. 155.
93 A. Kaler, Depo, p. 375.
94 Kaler, Running, p. 222.
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reward high fertility and more children reap real financial and social benefits.95 Even 
significant changes in what are commonly regarded as the socio-economic 
preconditions for fertility transitions matter less in affecting actual fertility numbers in 
Africa than the perception o f those factors.96 Thus even as shifts in industrialisation, 
infant mortality, family wealth flows, consumption patterns, urbanisation, and access 
to birth control technologies may occur, these objective preconditions take time to
97work through cultural filters. Traditionalist resistance to family planning was a 
continent-wide phenomenon in Africa in the 1970s. The few newly independent 
states in Africa that tried to implement population control policies were all met with 
great opposition from these traditional rural sources. In Rhodesia there was much 
social pressure on rural women to have many children irrespective o f liberation 
politics. In explaining the value o f fertility in Zimbabwe, a Mrs. Ngururu, 
interviewed by Kaler stated:
Some o f the women wanted [to have many children] but some didn't. I think 
those who wanted just wanted to be thanked by their husbands and to avoid 
divorce and polygamy. Even the elders encouraged many children because 
when their daughter failed to have children or to reach the number her 
husband wanted, they gave the husband the sister o f the wife. They did this 
because they were afraid that he will demand his lobola or marry another wife 
which means that the husband's wealth will be eaten by that other family. I
98can say that having children was encouraged by everyone at that time.
These traditional pronatalist forces in the 1960s and 1970s did not suddenly disappear 
with the ZA NU ’s policy change in the early 1980s. In a group interview from the 
1990s, the older members o f the Zvamaoko W om en's Club, near Wedze, stated:
Some o f our women were divorced by their husbands in the 1970s when 
women started to use injections. Our African men want children, so at that 
time we had to hide pills, but we go for injections because they are private and 
easier to use than pills, because he will try to find out [find where the pills are 
hidden] one day...Som e they are still hiding their pills, but they end up [get
95 See for example: J.C. Caldwell, P. Caldwell, ‘The Cultural Context of High Fertility in sub-Saharan 
Africa’, Population and Development Review , Vol. 13, No. 3 (September, 1987).
96 K.O. Mason, ‘Explaining Fertility Transitions’, Demography, Vol. 34, No. 4 (November 1997). p. 
450.
97 Potts has argued that ideational shifts sometimes initiate fertility transitions in the absence of other 
preconditions. Potts, Birth Rate, p. 16
98 Kaler, Running, p. 123.
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caught or found out]; their husbands get other wives. We are still fighting the 
war o f  understanding if  we are talking in terms o f  family p lanning."
These traditional pronatalist forces were not instantly overcome by state policy 
shifts in the regional context either. Kenya, which in 1968 became the first sub- 
Saharan state to implement a state-sponsored family planning effort, failed to reduce 
their birth rate, and as it was their birth rate actually rose throughout the 1970s, at one 
point holding the distinction as having the highest natural growth rate anywhere in the 
w orld .100 Similarly, Botswana introduced a state-sponsored family planning 
programme in 1971, only to experience a rise in its Total Fertility Rate from 5.6 
children per woman to 7.1 children per woman from 1971 to 198l . l()l As well in
Ghana, family planning measures introduced in 1970 yielded no results whatsoever by
1021980. “ Kenya, Botswana, and Ghana were all pioneers o f family planning, and 
significantly all were African-ruled states, yet all their programmes had seemingly 
failed after a decade o f  state promotion as a result o f traditionalist resistance. With 
the significant exception o f South Africa, no sub-Saharan country experienced a drop 
in birth rates from the 1950s until the end o f the 1970s. This was true irrespective o f 
whether the leaders in power were Africans, and notwithstanding any state 
programmes to lower the birth rate.
The family planning policies o f Rhodesia's settler state and the results that
I
flowed from them were remarkably similar to those in post-independence Botswana >-< N
103and Kenya. All three initiated state-sponsored family planning policies within a 
span o f three years in the late 1960s and early 1970s, and all three were in varying 
degrees ineffective at first, and their birth rates more or less mirrored those countries 
that had no programmes at all. On fertility matters, Zambia serves as a useful control 
for Rhodesia/Zimbabwe, as it was a regional neighbour, also a former British colony, 
and from the 1960s until the mid 1980s its government was “laissez faire” concerning 
its fertility rate.104 Zam bia’s birth rates remained close to Botswana, Kenya, and 
Rhodesia's until the early 1980s when all three activist countries dropped
99 Kaler, Running, p. 225.
100 L.M. Thomas, The Politics o f  the Womb: Women Reproduction and the State in Kenya (Berkeley,
University of California Press, 2003).
11,1 Lucas, Fertility and Family, p. 150.
102 Caldwell, Cultural Context, p. 414.
103 Statistics were derived from UNWPP.
104 Lucas described the Zambian government as “laissez faire” on population matters. Lucas, Fertility 
and Family, p. 152.
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significantly below Zam bia’s. This signature drop continued for all three at a faster 
pace than Zambia or the sub-Saharan average until the end o f  the m illennium .105 The 
divergence o f Botswana and Zimbabwe, as well as South Africa, has led one scholar 
to posit that this region o f central and southern Africa had by the early 1990s begun 
the fertility transition, whereas the rest o f Africa had yet to .106 Seemingly consistent 
with precondition theories o f fertility, after independence Zimbabwe began to 
experience rising incomes and expectations, and many o f the other socio-economic 
preconditions thought to influence drops in fertility rates. As well, new financial 
relationships may have had some effect on “expanding the parameters o f manhood to 
encompass a small family and a wife who goes to the family planning clinic,” as
107Kaler argues.
Yet these shifts and the perceptions o f  these changes were not at all universal 
and immediate. The ZANU government still had to confront residual “hang-ups” o f 
men in rural areas, and opposition from traditional peasant leaders concerning family
1 OX • r*planning. Into the 1990s, traditional chiefs remained outspoken in their opposition 
to family planning, as did others, who all pointed to the foreignness o f 
contraception.100 Most significantly, however, this resistance to state-sponsored 
family planning reflected a broader antagonism between African peasants and any 
state interference. As Kriger argues regarding post-independence Zimbabwe: 
“Peasant relations with states are characteristically overtly or latently antagonistic. 
Many peasants wanted, as before, to keep the state from imposing demands on them.” 
The political interests o f the male peasants and the guerrillas were initially aligned 
regarding family planning, but after the ZANU policy turn, they were in opposition. 
Regarding peasant/nationalist relations generally, Kriger notes, “Guerrilla appeals 
against whites had raised peasant consciousness and emboldened them without 
necessarily converting them to nationalists.” 110 As a result, the traditional male 
peasant opposition to birth control did not follow lock-step with ZANU policy turn in 
the early 1980s.
105 See also: W.C. Robinson, ‘Kenya Enters the Fertility Transition’, Population Studies, Vol. 46, No. 
3 (November, 1992).
106 See generally: Lucas, Fertility and Family.
107 Kaler, Running, p. 222.
108 Kaler, Running, p. 223, quoting Zimbabwe Herald columnist Idi Muvake, 19 September 1985.
109 Kaler, Running, pp. 224-225.
110 Kriger, Peasant Voices, p. 230.
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Despite its arguable tardiness, the rest of Africa did follow the fertility patterns 
of Zimbabwe and the early family planning pioneer states of Africa, though at a much 
slower pace. From the mid 1970s until the mid 1980s a growing number of African 
states became convinced that population growth had harmful economic and social 
effects.111 By the mid 1980s, this trend had turned into a majority of states which 
began to put into place population policies a decade and a half after Botswana, Kenya, 
and Rhodesia. Only after these newer policies had time to seep into the cultural 
frames of these societies, did the rest of Africa begin the slow process of lowering 
birth rates.
AFRICAN CRUDE BIRTH RATES COMPARED (1960-2000)'12
1960-65 1965-70 1970-75 1975-80 1980-85 1985-90 1990-95 1995-00
Kenya— 51 Ken-51 Ken-51 Ken—50 Ken-48 Zam-47 Zam-46 Zam-43
Zambia— 49 Zam—50 Zam—51 Zam-47 Sub- 47 Sub—45 Sub—44 Sub-42
Botswana— 48 R / Z —4 9 R / Z — 4 9 R / Z — 4 7 Zam-46 Ken-45 Ken-39 Ken-37
Rho/Zim— 4 8 Sub—48 Bots—48 Sub—47 R / Z — 4 5  R / Z —4 0 R / Z - 3 6 R / Z r 3 2
Sub-Saharart-48 Bots-47 Sub—47 Bots-45 Bots-42 Bots-37 Bots-32 Bots-30
That Zimbabwe’s birth rate began to drop at the very same time as the 
ZANU’s political turn might tempt one to conclude that this temporal overlap must 
imply causation, but this easy post hoc ergo propter hoc conclusion must be avoided. 
The nationalists’ political turn in the early 1980s towards supporting family planning 
did not itself alter the fundamental social, cultural, and economic conditions on the 
micro-level, and just as Botswana, Kenya, and Ghana’s state support in the late 
1960s/early 1970s did not yield immediate rural support for family planning in those 
countries, neither did Zimbabwe’s state sanction guarantee support. As these other 
countries’ experiences indicate, these traditional cultural forces were present and 
strong even under African governance. What the nationalists did do was inherit a 
family planning programme that had already been working to erode these traditional 
underpinnings with slow successes for over a decade, much as Kenya and Botswana’s 
had done. It was only in the 1980s that these programmes began to have real 
demographic effects, and only then did these activist pioneers pull away from
111 N. Heckel, ‘Population Laws and Policies in Sub-Saharan Africa: 1975-1985’, International 
Family Planning Perspectives, Vol. 12, No. 4 (December, 1986). p. 122.
112 Statistics derived from UNWPP.
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neighbouring countries that did not have long-standing policies. Looking at 
Zimbabwe’s birth rates in a comparative way, the drop in the 1980s was less a display 
of nationalist power in both resistance and promotion, than a display of the glacial 
pace of these deep social transformations which only came to bear fruit (or actually 
not bear fruit) after the nationalists took over the mechanisms of the state. Here, as in 
other respects, there was a great deal of symmetry between the old and new states, 
and far from showing great change in the state’s relationship with the peasant 
populace, family planning policies expose an equal disconnect between the rulers and 
the ruled, and an equal inability to change African peasant society from the top down
As the preceding argument outlines, pre-existing traditional obstacles to 
family planning—pronatalist husbands, the threat of returned lobola or polygamy, 
lineage ties, economic security in old age, other familial pressures to have more 
children—were more of a force militating against family planning usage under the 
white regime than was the more ephemeral and opportunistic nationalist resistance. 
This pre-existing resistance was a force tapped into by nationalists, but not controlled 
by nationalists. As a result, nationalist agency in this aspect of the population war 
was only partial at best.
Conclusion
Nationalist agency in the population war was mixed, and varied greatly 
depending upon which specific factor is analysed. Generally, nationalist agency 
regarding white population factors was greater than their agency over African 
population factors, paralleling the white regime’s similar scope of agency. White 
factors were easier to manipulate due to the small size of the white population, its 
transience, its connections with the formal economy, and its urbanity. The African 
population was always more difficult to manipulate through political means for the 
exact opposite reasons, and in many respects it was largely beyond the reach of the 
state. This inability of political actors to control the African population was a 
continent-wide problem in Africa for governments of all races, and was so even for 
the Zimbabwean state after 1980. Fortuitously for the nationalists, the tidal 
demographic trends of skyrocketing African birth rates occurring in the 1970s across 
Africa and within Rhodesia were politically beneficial to their movement.
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Nationalists in their propaganda added post hoc political justifications for these tidal 
changes, but did not steer them. As for the white population factors, nationalists did 
have some control in the shifting demographics. Some of their impact on these 
numbers, such as with immigration and emigration rates, was specifically intended, 
but others, including the drop in white fertility, were not intended, and one factor that 
was surprisingly not effected to any significant degree by African nationalists was the 
white death rate. A result of this peculiar population situation was that the 
belligerents on one half of the population war were consistently winning without 
having to do very much whatsoever, whereas their opponents were forced to expend 
prodigious amounts of their political, economic, emotional, mental, and physical 
resources Quixotically attempting to counter these trends.
Chapter VII 
Conclusion
The war of population numbers in Rhodesia was contested along many 
conceptual levels. It involved thousands of different actors inside and outside 
Rhodesia, some knowing participants and others unaware of their role; and its sites of 
contest were truly global in scope, stretching across the oceans into the vast migration 
networks to the great metropolitan capitals and seats of Western power. It was on one 
level, a political struggle between the Rhodesian state, its allies, and collaborators, 
both white and African; and African nationalists and their allies, both white and 
African; but despite this significant racial overlap between the contestants, the war of 
population numbers was still fundamentally racial in character. This war was a 
political contest, but one that had military and diplomatic components. In addition, 
there were important social aspects to the war of numbers, as it created gendered 
divisions within families over the number and spacing of their children, and on a 
certain level was a contest between pronatalist husbands and their antinatalist wives. 
The war combined the social and the political, as it was within the context of certain 
social and economic conditions in which individuals made their demographic choices. 
Contestants on both sides of the conflict sought to engineer these conditions to change 
the environments in which individuals made life decisions, and in so doing sought to 
make children a more or less economically attractive option for families, to create 
incentives or disincentives for whites to move to or stay in Rhodesia, to transfer 
economic burdens from the central government to African families so as to shift the 
costs of African population growth, and to spatially re-configure Rhodesia’s racial 
boundaries, altering work and residential patterns.
There was a remarkable amount of symmetry in the capacities of both the 
settler state and African nationalists to effectuate demographic change. In spite of the 
wide-ranging efforts to shape these conditions, both contestants in this population 
struggle were only unevenly effective in manipulating individual decision-making to 
the extent that their efforts yielded the desired demographic results. Both contestants 
were equally ineffective at manipulating fertility patterns in the short term, either the 
pronatalist policies targeting their own racial population, or the antinatalist policies 
targeting their opponent’s racial population. This was true, even though in the longer-
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term the state’s efforts to lower African fertility did yield results several years after 
white rule had ended. Both sides were more effective, however, in engineering 
migration patterns, as various degrees of coercion could be applied more effectively 
in this realm than in fertility, recalling the Secretary of Health’s admission in regards 
to family planning that, “[the state] could provide the water but could neither lead or 
drive the horse to the water nor make it drink.”1 The state’s failure to control and 
regulate the rural African population—most obviously through family planning, but 
also the regulating of cross-border African migrations, the registration of births and 
deaths, and effective census-taking—revealed the limits of state power in rural areas 
and over peasant populations, and as evidenced by the independent Zimbabwean 
state’s own difficulties in controlling and regulating rural populations, this may 
indeed reflect a generalised defect or deficiency in the African state.
Despite these deficiencies, both the settler state and African nationalists 
projected and imagined power over populations, regions, and phenomena that were, in 
reality, beyond their control. The settler state projected and imagined control over 
African migrations to and from Rhodesia? while these actual movements were beyond 
the capacity of the state to regulate effectively. The same was true regarding internal 
African migrations—keeping rural Africans from drifting into the cities and 
preventing alien Africans from working in Closed Labour Areas. Both trends were 
beyond the administration of the state, yet the promulgation of legislation regulating 
these movements, or retroactively designating the status quo as being within state 
regulations, projected a degree of control that was in reality nonexistent. In the 
registration of African births and deaths, and in the general accounting of African 
demographics, the settler state issued statistics and promulgated regulations, but these 
attempts at state control were ineffectual and the state’s knowledge of African 
demography remained, even after the 1969 census, largely guesswork. African 
nationalists likewise projected and imagined power over phenomena in which they 
had little direct agency. Much of the thrust of nationalist print propaganda was an 
effort to claim responsibility and power over events that had independent causes.
This was particularly the case regarding African fertility, in that nationalists claimed 
that fertility was being employed as a weapon of the liberation war, when in reality
1 Smith Papers, Box-024, Cabinet Memoranda 1971 Part 2, ‘Population Control’, 23 July 1971. 
Quoting M.H. Webster, 3 May 1971.
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high fertility rates had causes outside o f liberation politics. All o f these efforts o f the 
state and African nationalists to imagine power were in a sense commanding the sun 
to rise in the morning. The war o f  numbers that was waged inside and outside o f 
Rhodesia thus draws out broader themes o f the projection and imagination o f political 
power in postcolonial Africa, especially in the rural areas, and the limitations o f 
formal politics to effectuate change and control populations.
Though there was symmetry between nationalist and state agency in what 
demographic factors could be controlled, the distinct differences in the way the white 
and African populations were composed greatly favored the nationalists in this 
population struggle. White residents in Rhodesia were uniquely susceptible to 
migratory engineering due to their high degree o f transience and thin roots in 
Rhodesia. This meant that nationalist efforts to force Rhodesian residents to emigrate 
were much easier than they would have been had they had to uproot a more settled 
population. At the same time, the short-term bias o f  most migrants coming to 
Rhodesia also meant that it was possible for the state to attract a certain amount o f 
immigrants through economic incentives, as the relative "liquidity' o f migrants' 
personal investment in Rhodesia lowered the risks associated with moving there. It 
was the fact that this symmetrical power corresponded to the differences in the ability 
to engineer migratory factors and fertility factors, and that these factors overlapped 
with the primary methods in which the white and African populations relied upon for 
population growth, that gifted a decided advantage to the African nationalists in the 
war o f  numbers. And it was this relative inability o f the state to lower African birth 
rates in the short-term, and the contested nature o f  white migration that proved 
decisive in this parallel war o f numbers.
The settler state lost the war o f  numbers, even as the definition o f what 
constituted victory changed over time to increasingly less ambitious goals. There was 
never any publicly articulated and officially sanctioned population goal that the state 
sought to reach through their diverse population policies, likely because o f the old 
political rule to never set specific goals that could define your own failure. But goals 
were secretly articulated behind the closed doors o f  Cabinet debates, in confidential 
memoranda, departmental meetings, and RF Party Conferences, which did set 
population end-points. The ultimate goal o f racial parity was expressed by Sm ith's 
first Immigration Minister, Harry Reedman in 1964, but his view was likely not
shared by many others inside or outside government as a realistic population goal. In 
Parliament, Reedman stated emphatically, “With tremendous developments ahead, 
Southern Rhodesia was capable of supporting 40,000,000-50,000,000 people at a high 
standard of living.” But after Reedman’s statements were widely mocked in 
Parliament and in the public press as being preposterous, the Smith government 
distanced itself from the goal of racial parity, and Reedman and his goal of racial 
parity were pushed into the background. The target of the white population making « 
up ground on the rate of African natural increase was never abandoned, however, and 
only a few months into Smith’s Premiership, the Cabinet set up South Africa’s racial 
ratio of 5:1 Africans to whites as a viable policy goal. Yet even this goal was never 
close to being attained, as the racial ratios in Rhodesia widened from 19.7:1 in 1964, 
to 21.1:1 in 1974, to 28.1 in 1979. In 1967, the Sadie Report offered a population 
goal that was a function of pegging the economically active white population to the 
entry of Africans into the labour force. This goal meant setting a more favourable 
ratio, perhaps in the lower teens, but the Report did not realistically envision 
immigration rolling back African natural increase to any great extent, and certainly 
not to the South African ratio of 5:1. This was essentially a maintenance goal, an 
odd companion to Smith’s famous words several years earlier regarding African 
political advancement: “So Far and No Further!” But these racial ratios went much 
further, and even maintenance soon became an unrealistic objective. After the 
publication of the 1969 census revealed the extent of the widening population gap, the 
state’s population policy goals were set more towards slowing down these widening 
differentials, rather than maintaining a constant ratio. It was a partial admission of 
defeat in the population war, that the Rhodesian Front government began advocating 
for slice-and-dice racial policies to cordon-off what areas and what populations were 
the responsibilities of the central government, in effect redefining what and where 
racial ratios mattered. After Smith’s 1976 speech that conceded the inevitability of 
eventual African majority rule, the state’s goals for its population policy shifted 
conceptually towards the creation of a politically powerful white minority that could 
still maintain white privilege in an African-ruled state. In the final years of settler
2 Parliamentary Debates, Vol. 58, ‘Committee o f Supply Vote’, 22 September 1964
3 J.L. Sadie, ‘Report by J.L. Sadie on Planning for the Economic Development o f Rhodesia’, 
(Salisbury, Government Publication, Salisbury, 1967).
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rule, racial population policy focused on the papering-over o f the flow o f white 
emigration out o f Rhodesia, and became an exercise in mitigation.
From a policy perspective, the evolution o f the state's goals in the war o f 
numbers did not matter in so far as the strategies to effectuate them remained the 
same. However wishful or realistic these goals might have been, the state never came 
close enough to any o f them to alter the conduct or urgency o f the population war.
Yet in another way, the shifting definitions o f victory did matter, as they revealed 
something about the self-conception o f  white settlers in Rhodesia and what these 
white settlers hoped the Rhodesian state would become— whether it would be a 
majority white settler country o f the Australian or Canadian mould, a smaller version 
o f  apartheid South Africa, a fully partitioned entity, or failing that, a small but 
powerful minority under African rule.
Conundrums, Conflicts, and Contradictions Within the State’s Population 
Policies
The state's failure to achieve even these progressively humbler population 
goals was not inevitable or fixed as a result o f immutable demographic laws, 
nonetheless there were inherent paradoxes, conundrums, and contradictions existent 
within the state’s population policies that were never resolved or reconciled. The 
broadest and most significant paradox facing white Rhodesia was that the underlying 
population crisis and the remedies proscribed for this problem were both potentially 
fatal to the state. This fundamental paradox concerned the weak loyalty that most 
white Rhodesians felt for the settler state, and the reality that most comprehensive 
remedies for these population problems required a degree o f sacrifice that the white 
population was unwilling to make. These sacrifices would have included: a softening 
o f  white preserve so as to meet the socio-economic preconditions for the African 
fertility transition; more job competition, increased state spending, and strains on the 
urban infrastructure to allow for mass white immigration; and remaining in Rhodesia 
to serve in the military, spread out the conscription burdens, and ease emigration 
pressures. Yet the white population was by and large unwilling to suffer any 
degradation o f their inflated standard o f living, and when degradations to these 
standards did occur, whites emigrated in large numbers. Fully aware o f this tension
between problems and remedies, the state was forced to combat the existential threat 
that population pressures presented with half-measures and partial solutions, which 
had the twin effects of neither fully solving the underlying problem, nor fully 
satisfying the fickle white populace.
Another fundamental paradox faced by white policymakers concerned 
conflicts inherent in making Rhodesia a viable white settler state in post-colonial 
Africa. For white Rhodesia to survive politically and economically there had to be a 
continual influx of white immigrants and a greater retention of whites already living 
in the country. For this to happen, Rhodesia had to maintain its racialised economic 
and political system locked into place by UDI. Without these racially discriminatory 
systems in place and the elevated status afforded to whites, Rhodesia could not hope 
to lure a significant number of white immigrants away from the other demand-side 
countries, nor could the state expect to retain current residents if there was a softening 
of these racial preserves. At the same time, however, to permanently secure a future 
for white Rhodesia economically and politically, the economic sanctions and 
diplomatic isolation had to be lifted. This was true, despite Rhodesia’s defiant and 
unpredicted economic performance in the years immediately following UDI. Yet the 
price to be paid to have these international sanctions lifted was an end to Rhodesia’s 
racially discriminatory policies. To survive as a white settler state in post-colonial 
Africa, Rhodesia could neither keep the racist structures in place to stabilise white 
migration, nor jettison these structures to be free from international opprobrium.
A broad paradox existed between the Rhodesian state’s policies to promote 
mass immigration and the maintenance of the inflated standards of living for whites 
already in Rhodesia. The racial economic structure in Rhodesia was such that white 
privilege relied upon an imposed hierarchy of occupations and the artificially low cost 
of African labour, both of which were threatened by influxes of lesser-skilled whites 
who could not slot into the sectors of the economy designated for whites. Rhodesia 
was in some respects a haven for whites, but the territory’s carrying capacity for 
whites was limited, as was the willingness of current residents to subsidise the cost of 
attracting and sustaining new migrants. A chicken-or-the-egg conundrum also existed 
about what should come first: available jobs and infrastructure capabilities or new 
influxes of white immigrants. On the one hand, the short-term availability of 
employment opportunities provided inducements to potential immigrants and avoided
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conflicts with current white residents, as well as ensuring that the state could absorb 
the social costs o f more whites, but this policy could never attract sufficient numbers 
o f  whites to satisfy the state’s politicised demographic goals. In addition, there was 
the purported long-term economic growth potential o f  new immigration, which 
supposedly created new opportunities. In the event, current residents typically 
resisted calls for new immigrants when there were no employment opportunities 
available for them, as this would increase employment competition and potentially 
flood Rhodesia with white job-seekers. This cut through the nature o f  the w'hite 
Rhodesian experience after UDI: more immigrants were necessary to maintain white 
Rhodesia’s political viability, yet more whites meant a steady erosion o f the 
privileged status o f  whites in Rhodesia— the very essence o f what the settler state was 
trying to defend. And as with a previously exclusive beach, larger crowds had a 
deleterious effect on the value o f the experience for current bathers and lessened the 
attractiveness for potential beachgoers.
Some o f the settler state 's other migration policies also ran counter to each 
other. In order to stem the serious problem o f white emigration, the state began to 
impose draconian restrictions on whites leaving the country, but these emigration 
restrictions led to a conflict o f how to keep current residents in place without 
frightening-off potential residents. Within the competitive migration market, this lack 
o f liquidity must have been another negative consideration influencing potential 
im migrants’ decisions over whether or not to move to Rhodesia. Compounding this 
problem, the state's efforts to promote immigration also inadvertently reinforced the 
culture o f transience in Rhodesia. This culture o f "Good Time Charlies’ encouraged 
by the promotion literature, reinforced this unwillingness o f  Rhodesian whites to 
suffer declines in their standards o f living. After the war escalated in 1972, another 
conflict was exposed between the state 's military demands and the state’s migration 
goals. The regime steadily increased the call-up commitments for whites in Rhodesia, 
which had a predictably negative impact on emigration. Demand for white soldiers 
eventually forced the regime to reduce the ‘grace period' which exempted new 
immigrants from military service, a policy change which had a chilling effect on 
further immigration. The state could never find the correct balance between 
assuaging current residents and attracting new migrants. These conflicts and
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paradoxes all combined to render the Rhodesian state’s white migration policies self­
contradictory and unworkable.
There were also irreconcilable paradoxes involving the state’s efforts to 
combat African population growth. One such conflict existed between the 
preconditions for fertility reduction and the preservation of white privilege. The 
conflict arose because any systematic change in the African population’s educational 
or economic opportunities, or in urbanisation levels which would have a demonstrable 
effect on fertility, would necessarily threaten the white population’s privileged status, 
which would have had adverse affects on white migration patterns. To side-step this 
paradox, the Rhodesian state attempted to drop the African birth rate through family 
planning efforts alone, despite the weight of evidence that expanding economic and 
educational opportunities and increased urbanisation correlated with lower fertility 
rates. As with other aspects of Rhodesia’s population policy, this conflict was never 
resolved.
The Timing of Rhodesia’s Collapse
This thesis has argued that the white-ruled state had, since its founding, rested 
upon the perilously fragile demography of its white population, and that the military 
conflict only accelerated the demise of white rule. This then raises the question of 
why Rhodesia collapsed when it did and not at some other time. The answer lies in a 
combination of factors that ripened together in the late 1970s. First, white society 
after UDI viewed the importance of population matters differently than beforehand.
So long as Rhodesia continued to be a part of the larger British imperial system, 
population matters were only of administrative interest, but after the break-up of the 
Federation, and especially after UDI, racial demography was linked to independent 
nation-building. As such, loyal British subjects passing through the colony of 
Rhodesia before UDI, came to be viewed as disloyal Rhodesians after UDI. Second, 
white migratory inflows had matched outflows in both number and kind despite the 
continually high turnover of population before UDI, but thereafter, even when 
immigration matched emigration in scale, it was different in kind. The mismatch in 
skills took some time to have its full effect on the Rhodesian economy, but the ‘brain 
drain’ eventually put heavy strains on the economy, as well as exacerbated racial
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tensions. Third, knowledge o f the extent o f the African population 'explosion' and 
the pace o f  widening ratios only became known following the 1962 and 1969 
censuses, which revealed not only the size o f the African population but showed its 
rate o f growth, which was the fastest in Africa at the time.4 These factors combined 
to alter the objective conditions in the country in the 1970s, and perhaps more 
importantly, also the white population's subjective perception o f the conditions, such 
that the escalation o f the war was that much more damaging to the settler state.
The 1969 census, in particular, brought a new urgency to African and white 
population issues in the white public’s mind. By revealing previously hidden 
demographic facts, the census added a new urgency to efforts to rebalance Rhodesia’s 
racial demographics and rig the political system to secure white rule. Population 
issues in the 1970s became political matters o f  a deeper significance than they had 
been in the previous decade, and carried new psychological and social weight. It was 
within this context o f a heightened importance o f racial population matters, that the 
military contlict influenced a negative net shift in white migration patterns. But as 
with the census, it was the white public’s knowledge o f this shift in migration patterns 
that created the existential panic and initiated the full white exodus from Rhodesia, 
and it was this exodus more so than the war which precipitated the final collapse o f 
the white settler state.
\ j  o '  ^
How Unique Was Rhodesia’s Fate?
The foregoing analysis has attempted to reposition the role o f  population 
matters as being central to an understanding o f the final decades o f settler rule in 
Rhodesia. As argued throughout, the combined pressures that destroyed the 
Rhodesian state in the late 1970s would have been appreciably less intense had the 
white settler population been larger and more rooted. An intriguing counter-factual 
would be the length o f any extended lifespan o f the Rhodesian state had it been able 
to narrow the racial ratios significantly, thereby easing these pressures. Had the 
Rhodesian state achieved its goal o f South A frica’s racial ratio o f  5:1, for instance, 
would it have allowed for another decade and a half o f white minority rule, paralleling
4 H ighest Rate of Growth’, RH, 30 September 1969.
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South Africa’s demise in the mid 1990s?5 Would having met even the state’s humbler 
population goals enabled Rhodesia to survive into the 1980s? As'with all counter- 
factuals, the answers to these questions are obviously left to speculation and 
conjecture, yet there is little doubt in the case of Rhodesia that there was a direct 
correlation between racial population ratios and political survival.
Yet to what extent were these interwoven connections between racial 
population issues and the political fate of the settler state unique to Rhodesia? 
Rhodesia shared many characteristics with other settler states around the globe, and 
the shared traits of settler societies have led some authors to posit that there is a 
fundamental and distinct global settler ethos, notwithstanding other cultural or 
regional peculiarities.6 Irrespective of the truth or falsity of the assertion of a cross- 
cultural settler ethos, these peculiarities and differences between settler societies 
mattered greatly in the political fates of these settler states. Some territories that once 
had large settler populations are now politically, economically, and demographically 
still dominated by the race or ethnicity of that settler population, such as Canada, the 
United States, Australia, and New Zealand, while in other territories that once had 
large non-indigenous settlement, the descendants of those settlers are no longer in 
political control of the state, such as with Algeria, South Africa, and Zimbabwe.
Other examples shade various hues of a middle ground, as with the continuing 
political and demographic struggles between the whites and Melanesians in New 
Caledonia, and more violently between the Jews and Arabs over the fates of Israel and 
Palestine. Perhaps the most decisive factor in the complex and distinct fates of all 
these different settler societies has been the timing and trajectories of the 
settler/indigenous population ratios. The size and direction of these ratios may 
perhaps function as a political clock for when and how these various settler societies 
either lost control or consolidated control of the state. This is a line of inquiry that 
would be interesting to explore in more comparative detail.
Despite any parallels with other settler societies, Rhodesia was always a 
species unto itself. As an entity that straddled the legal and conceptual definitions of
5 The answer would likely be that while Rhodesia would have survived longer, it still would not have 
survived as long as did apartheid South Africa, as Rhodesia, unlike South Africa, would have still been 
burdened with complete international isolation, an active guerrilla war inside the country, and a legacy 
of white transience that would not have disappeared even had their ratios improved temporarily.
6 See for example, D. Stasiulis, N. Yuval-Davis (eds), Unsettling Settler Societies: Articulations o f  
Gender, Race, Ethnicity, and Class (London, Sage Publications, 1995).
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what it was to be a settler state, it defied easy comparisons. As a result, even while 
Rhodesia's political fate was inextricably entangled with its racial population ratios, 
to inductively assert with full confidence the universal applicability o f  this causal 
relationship between settler/indigenous racial ratios and the timing and ultimate fate 
o f  settler rule, would ignore Albert Einstein's wise admonition, that so far as the 
theories are about reality, they are not certain; so far as they are certain, they are not 
about reality. So perhaps we arrive again at the narrower conclusion that Rhodesia 
was indeed a special case. Four decades after UDI, the Rhodesian state now appears 
as a peculiar sort o f anachronism, an inchoate settler state that battled futilely against 
the political aspirations o f its African majority, against the irresistible tides o f world 
opinion and a growing moral consensus, and, o f course, against population numbers.
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